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THREE ESSAYS ON GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION 
IN RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This thesis looks into the relationship between natural resources and non-resource 
economic activity in resource-rich countries. This relationship has been investigated 
through the literature of the “resource curse” which was first noted by Sachs and 
Warner (1995) who show a significant negative relation between natural resource 
dependence and income growth. Despite the developing literature in that area, empirical 
tests suffered from endogeneity. In this thesis, I try to add more resilient identification 
strategies in order to assess the effect of resource abundance on the macro economy 
using exogenous variations in 136 countries from 1962-2012.   
     The first essay of this thesis examines the correlation between natural resource rents 
and economic diversification. The main question I ask in this essay is can resource-rich 
countries diversify their economies? To address this issue, the essay empirically tests 
diversification in exports, in employment and in value added and finds a significant 
negative impact.     
     In the second empirical essay of this thesis, I focus on giant oil and gas discoveries 
as the main external variation and test the role of institutional quality in diversification 
when a country becomes resource abundant. Results show that all countries with varied 
institutional quality go through export concentration after giant oil discoveries.    
     The third empirical essay looks more thoroughly into the manufacturing sector. I 
estimate the causal effect of two commodity shocks suggested by the Dutch Disease 
hypothesis on the tradable manufacturing industries: giant oil discoveries as a resource 
discovery shock, and oil price boom and bust as a commodity price shock. The results 
suggest a negative impact on the tradable industries growth in manufacturing value 
added and wages. These results add more credible empirical evidence to the Dutch 
Disease literature.  
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Chapter 1 
 
1 Introduction 	  
 
The literature on the relationship between natural resources and non-resource economic 
activity focuses on the concept of the “Dutch Disease,” while the “resource curse” was 
first noted by Sachs and Warner (1995), who show a significant negative relation 
between natural resource dependence and growth in GDP per capita. Despite the 
developing literature in that area, empirical tests suffer from endogeneity. Many papers 
in the literature have used the share of natural resources in GDP or in exports as a 
resource variation, whereby this variable could be reversely affected by the country’s 
growth and development. In this thesis, I try to add more resilient identification 
strategies in order to assess the effect of resource abundance on the macroeconomy 
using exogenous variations.   
The first two empirical chapters of this thesis I study the relationship between natural 
resources and economic diversification. Through the development literature, a number 
of studies have investigated the relationship between diversification and development. 
The findings vary across papers depending on the methodological approach used, the 
data set, and the diversification measures (De Benedictis et al., 2009). Cadot et al. 
(2011) argue that diversification should not be taken as a policy objective for two 
reasons: first, they emphasise the importance of specialisation, not diversification, 
following Ricardian theories that stress the importance of specialisation, not 
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diversification. Second, they argue that by looking into exports, the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model implies that export patterns are largely determined by endowments, drawing 
attention to factor accumulation, not diversification.  
However, policymakers in developing countries and resource-rich countries are 
constantly preoccupied by diversification, as they believe it is the path towards higher 
development, according to Papageorgiou and Spatafora (2012). Gylfason (2011) argues 
that economic diversification could stimulate growth by attracting new economic 
activity that avoids excessive reliance on primary production in a few natural-resource 
based industries, thus facilitating the transfer of labour from low-paying jobs in low-
skill, intensive farming and agriculture to more lucrative jobs in more high-skill, 
intensive occupations in manufacturing. Gylfason (2011) also argues that depending on 
natural resources could be good for growth, if well managed and used to diversify the 
economy. In exports, diversification may help countries to upgrade their resource-based 
sectors, as they move away from unprocessed primary exports, to more complex 
products and services (Gelb & Grasmann, 2010). A higher resource dependency makes 
diversification more difficult, but resource-rich countries still want to diversify for a 
number of reasons (Gelb & Grasmann, 2010). First, export diversification is associated 
with higher long-run growth, as engaging in manufacturing enables dynamic learning-
by-doing that raises productivity and income. Second, diversification exposes producers 
to a wider range of information about foreign markets and may open the way to other 
sectors. Third, diversification reduces the impact of volatile resource prices.   
 The first empirical chapter of this thesis examines the correlation between natural 
resource rents and the economic diversification. The main question I ask in this paper is: 
can resource-rich countries diversify their economies? To address this issue, the essay 
empirically tests diversification in exports, in employment and in value added in 136 
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countries from 1962-2012. In this paper, I follow Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) in tracking 
the noted U-shaped diversification path along development, but I find that this shape 
actually flattens when resource rents get higher. Intuitively, the more the resource rents 
the country receives, the less likely it would go through any diversification as it 
develops. Alternatively, more concentration in nontradable sectors increases. I combine 
data on a number of resource rents to address any heterogeneity that could arise in 
different resources. The concern with this analysis is that there may be confounding 
variables where diversification could reversely affect resource rents. To tackle this issue, 
I instrument for resource rents by using international commodity prices which are 
directly related to the resource revenues but not directly to diversification measures per 
se. The identification strategy argues that commodity prices are exogenous, as they are 
mainly driven by international supply and demand. Another factor in that paper is the 
different diversification outcomes across different kinds of resources. I suggest that oil 
and gas rents have a significant impact on export concentration, whereas other 
renewable resources tend to increase export diversification and employment.  
Between different country groups, there is a significant positive impact of natural 
resources on diversification among developed countries, while developing countries 
tend to develop more concentrated in exports, employment and value added. In the 
second empirical chapter of this thesis, I extend this analysis and focus on oil and gas as 
the main commodity. I also test the role of institutional quality on diversification when 
a country becomes resource abundant, driven by the heterogeneous outcomes I find 
between developed and developing countries in the first chapter. To measure the natural 
resources, I use giant oil discoveries as a news shock on economic diversification, using 
panel analysis and fixed effects model. Institutional quality measures used in this 
chapter are Polity2 and executive constraints. The results are largely similar between the 
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two measures. I further tackle any endogeneity concerns that could arise from using the 
giant oil discoveries as an exogenous variable by using oil reserves and natural disaster 
as instruments for oil discoveries following Cotet and Tsui (2013). The results suggest 
that the combination of grabber-friendly institutions and giant oil discoveries leads to a 
less diversified economy in non-tradable sectors, whereas producer-friendly institutions 
help countries to take full advantage of these discoveries and their following revenues, 
and maintain the employment share in the manufacturing sector and tradables. However, 
I find little evidence that producer-friendly institutions help countries to avoid export 
concentration: all countries tend to have concentrated exports with large shares in the 
resource sector. 
In addition, the second chapter’s results indicate that the manufacturing sector is the 
most negatively affected sector. More labour movement out of the tradable sector could 
have a negative impact on growth in the long run, which might be a single step towards 
the spending effect of the Dutch Disease. It is possible that the final impact would take a 
longer time to stabilise than is studied here. These results and the standing question 
about the impact on the manufacturing sector are the key to the third chapter’s question, 
where I ask: what happens within the manufacturing sector and which industries are 
mainly affected by the resource abundance?  
 
The third empirical chapter looks more thoroughly into the manufacturing sector and 
the heterogeneity between its industries as a response to the resource booms. In this 
chapter, I estimate the causal effect of two commodity shocks suggested by the Dutch 
Disease hypothesis on the tradable manufacturing sector: giant oil discoveries as a 
resource discovery shock, and oil price boom and bust as a commodity price shock. 
Using panel analysis, I compare between countries that have discovered giant oilfields 
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and countries that have not during 1962-2012. I also observe the outcomes during the 
oil booms and busts. The methodology is adapted from Rajan and Subramanian (2011), 
which evaluates the impact of receiving foreign aid on the tradable manufacturing 
sector. I follow Rajan and Subramanian (2011) in using the dataset provided by the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO): the industrial statistics 
database, which is derived largely from industrial surveys. I also follow their 
exportability classification in assigning certain manufacturing industries as “exportable” 
and focusing on them to assess the impact on the tradable industries within the 
manufacturing sector. Recent literature on the Dutch Disease indicates a positive impact 
of oil booms on manufacturing. I suggest that it is true that total manufacturing could 
benefit from oil shocks, through increased local demand for manufactured goods 
resulting from the revenue windfall that was met by increased demand on imports and 
local production. However, the main suggestion of this chapter is that tradable 
industries in manufacturing are harmed by the oil shocks. 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 examines if resource rents have 
any impact on economic diversification along the development path. Chapter 3 
examines if institutional quality in oil countries could have any role in determining the 
impact of oil shocks on economic diversification. Chapter 4 examines the Dutch 
Disease mechanism thoroughly by looking into the heterogeneity between 
manufacturing industries. Chapter 5 summarises the findings of this thesis and discusses 
the limitations of this work, and it provides potential suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter 2 
 
2 Natural Resources and Diversification 
 
2.1 Introduction 	  
 
Natural resource rents exceed $4 trillion per year, amounting to 7 percent of world GDP. 
Non-renewable resource revenues are a dominant feature of 50 economies with a 
combined population of 1.4 billion people. There are 24 countries for which resources 
make up more than three quarters of their exports, 13 countries for which resources 
make up at least 40 percent of their GDP, and 18 countries in which resources provide 
more than half of fiscal revenue.1 
Resource-rich countries have been historically heavily dependent on a limited range of 
natural resources, mostly for export. This limited diversification may lead to 
unsustainable growth, driven by a high concentration in low productivity sectors. 
Concentration in such sectors may lead to high vulnerability to macroeconomic 
instability, price volatility and external shocks. Many resource-rich countries aspire to a 
diversified economy, but many of them – especially the less developed countries – have 
limited experience with regard to which aspects of diversification are important.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (IMF 2007) and van der Ploeg and Venables (2012) 
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In this paper, we test the impact of natural resource rents on diversification in exports, 
in employment and in value added. By using employment data, Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003) find that diversification path follows a U-shaped pattern in relation to per capita 
income: countries tend to diversify at early stages of development, and then at higher 
stages of income they tend to specialise in certain sectors. This paper revisits the issue 
using an additional perspective: we investigate the effect of resource rents on the noted 
U-shaped diversification pattern in employment, in addition to value added and exports. 
We find a significant negative relationship between resource rents and diversification. 
The literature on the relationship between resource rents and non-resource economic 
activity focuses on the concept of the “Dutch Disease,” which is a widely-used term in 
the development literature. The Economist magazine coined the term in 1977 to explain 
the gas boom implications on the Dutch economy.  
The extensive literature on the Dutch disease is pioneered by Corden and Neary (1982), 
who show a decline in manufacturing employment and exports as a result of resource 
boom. Three factors can cause this boom: a technology-induced rise in productivity, a 
new resource discovery, or a rise in the commodity world price. They distinguish 
between two main effects of the resource boom on the manufacturing sector. Firstly, the 
spending effect occurs when a sudden rise in the value of the natural resource exports 
raises real income leading to extra spending on services, which raises prices and leads to 
adjustments in real exchange rate. That makes exporting non-resource commodities 
more difficult, and makes competing with imports across a wide range of commodities 
harder. Foreign exchange earned from the resource exports may be used to purchase 
internationally traded goods, at the expense of domestic manufacturers of the goods. 
Secondly, domestic resources such as labour and materials shift to the resource sector, 
where the resource movement effect takes place. Consequently, the price of these 
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resources rises on the domestic market, thereby increasing the costs to producers in 
other sectors. Eventually, extraction of natural resources sets in motion a dynamic that 
gives primacy to two domestic sectors – the natural resource sector and the non-tradable 
sector, at the expense of more traditional exports sector2.   
Arezki and Ismail (2010) test the Dutch disease on a sample of 32 oil-rich countries 
from 1992 to 2009 and find that during an oil boom, fiscal policies have helped to 
reduce capital expenditure. Harding and Venables (2016) find that exports of natural 
resources crowd out non-resource exports. They find that in countries with high income 
and good governance, the impact on non-resource exports becomes greater, as these 
countries tend to have higher manufacturing in their non-resource exports.   
The “resource curse” was first noted by Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001), who show a 
significant negative relation between natural resource dependence and growth in GDP 
per capita. They also argue that resource abundance squeezes the manufacturing sector, 
as in the Dutch disease model. Other studies considered oil rents specifically. Ross 
(2001) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) find a negative relation between oil 
rents and economic performance. Other papers show that the impact of resource 
abundance is mainly driven by political factors (Tornell & Lane, 1999). 
We also test if different kinds of resources could have varied impacts on diversification, 
as Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014) show that resource curse occurs in the case of point 
resource natural resources such as minerals, but not in renewable point source resources 
such as agriculture and forestry.  
To date, there are not many empirical studies on diversification. A few exceptions 
include Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), who find that employment diversification follows a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For more details, see Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, Escaping the Resource Curse (Columbia University Press, 
2007) and van der Ploeg and Venables (2012). 
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U-shaped pattern in relation to per capita income: countries tend to diversify at early 
stages of development, and then at higher stages of income they tend to specialise in 
certain sectors. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) also find the U-shaped pattern in plotting 
production concentration against income, but the depth of that shape varies across 
different income groups. Moore and Walkes (2010) find a positive relationship between 
economic volatility and concentration. In studying trade diversification, a number of 
papers find that exports are more concentrated than production, such as Hausmann and 
Rodrik (2003) and Easterly et al. (2009). Cadot et al. (2011) find the U-shaped pattern 
in export diversification, as countries tend to reconcentrate in exports after a certain 
point of income.  
Investigating productivity growth and structural change, McMillan and Rodrik (2011) 
argue that in developing countries, there are large productivity gaps between different 
parts of their economies, and between different firms within the same part or industry. 
These gaps are smaller in developed countries. They acknowledge that structural change 
could move in different directions along with the economic development process. In 
resource-rich countries particularly, natural resources do not generate much 
employment compared to manufacturing and other tradable sectors, which takes 
structural change in a direction away from productive sectors.  
This paper adds to the literature through examining the effect of resource rents on 
diversification. As shown above, previous literature covered the effect of development 
on diversification, or studied the effect of natural resources on development. In this 
paper, we combine the two strands of literature and study the effects of resource rents 
on structural change in employment and value added (internal diversification), and the 
effect on exports (external diversification). We examine the concentration in 
employment and exports in resource and non-resource, tradable and non-tradable 
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sectors. Previous literature examined these effects separately – either structural change 
or exports – and to our knowledge, none of them examined the effect of natural 
resources directly on diversification.  
The rest of the paper continues as follows: section 2 briefly describes economic 
diversification; section 3 defines the data and outlines the methods; section 4 presents 
the empirical results; and section 5 concludes.     
 
2.2 Diversification: How and why 
 
Through the development literature, a number of studies have investigated the 
relationship between diversification and development. The findings vary across papers 
depending on the methodological approach used, the data set, and the diversification 
measures (De Benedictis et al., 2009). Some of these studies find a monotonic 
relationship between diversification and development, where countries tend to diversify 
moving along the development path (Stokey, 1988), while other studies find countries 
grow into more specialisation as they develop (Krugman, 1987).  
More recently, a growing number of empirical studies have investigated the relationship 
between diversification and development. The highly cited paper by Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003) finds a nonmonotonic relationship, where diversification takes a U-shape pattern, 
a result found by other following papers such as Koren and Tenreyro (2007) and Cadot 
et al. (2011). Cadot et al. (2011) argue that diversification should not be taken as a 
policy objective for two reasons: first, they emphasise the importance of specialisation, 
not diversification, following Ricardian theories that stress the importance of 
specialisation, not diversification. Second, they argue that by looking into exports, the 
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Heckscher-Ohlin model implies that export patterns are largely determined by 
endowments, drawing attention to factor accumulation, not diversification.  
However, policymakers in developing countries and resource-rich countries are 
constantly preoccupied by diversification, as they believe it is the path towards higher 
development, according to Papageorgiou and Spatafora (2012). Alsharif et al (2017) 
revisits the literature on diversification in resource rich countries, and shows trends in 
non-oil exports and non-oil private sector employment. Gylfason (2011) argues that 
economic diversification could stimulate growth by attracting new economic activity 
that avoids excessive reliance on primary production in a few natural-resource based 
industries, thus facilitating the transfer of labour from low-paying jobs in low-skill, 
intensive farming and agriculture to more lucrative jobs in more high-skill, intensive 
occupations in manufacturing. Gylfason (2011) also argues that depending on natural 
resources could be good for growth, if well managed and used to diversify the economy. 
In exports, diversification may help countries to upgrade their resource-based sectors, as 
they move away from unprocessed primary exports, to more complex products and 
services (Gelb & Grasmann, 2010). A higher resource dependency makes 
diversification more difficult, but resource-rich countries still want to diversify for a 
number of reasons (Gelb & Grasmann, 2010). First, export diversification is associated 
with higher long-run growth, as engaging in manufacturing enables dynamic learning-
by-doing that raises productivity and income. Second, diversification exposes producers 
to a wider range of information about foreign markets and may open the way to other 
sectors. Third, diversification reduces the impact of volatile resource prices. Van der 
Ploeg and Venables (2012) argue that to achieve diversification in resource-rich 
economies, public and private investments are needed to work jointly through 
investments in human and private capital.  
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Figure 2-1.A shows the difference in export diversification between developed and 
developing countries in the sample. It shows developing countries increased their export 
diversification during the sample period more rapidly than developed countries. Gelb 
and Grasmann (2010) note that developing countries in general have had successfully 
diversified their economies and exports. They note that in the 1960s, about 80 percent 
of developing countries’ exports were primary commodities, while recent figures show 
that almost 80 percent are industrial products (although some primary industries are 
classified as industrial). These figures relate to the U-shaped pattern found by Imbs and 
Wacziarg (2003), assuming that developing countries are in the initial stage, where 
concentration is still high.  
Figure 2-1.B shows the difference in exports diversification between resource and non-
resource countries in the sample. What is apparent is we can see the higher level of 
concentration in the resource countries exports, which is mainly driven by resources. 
Elbadawi and Gelb (2010) show two types of diversification: diversifying by 
introducing new sectors in the economy, and diversifying within the resource sector. 
We focus on the first type in this paper. Diversification strategies do not always succeed. 
Esanov (2012) lists certain criteria for successful outcomes: sound macroeconomic 
environment, designing a realistic strategy taking into consideration local factors, well-
functioning government institutions, adequate financial sector and social infrastructure 
to support diversification efforts, and creating special incentives to facilitate export 
diversification.  
Rodrik (2007) emphasises the new findings by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), and finds it 
very interesting that it goes against the standard beliefs associated with the principle of 
comparative advantage. Rodrik (2007) suggests acquiring mastery over broader range of 
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activities, instead of concentrating on one specialization. He argues that the main key to 
diversification is direct government intervention or any other public action. He mainly 
stresses three keys to successful diversification strategy: first, public-private 
collaboration; second, “self-discovery” of which new activities can be produced at low 
enough cost to be profitable; and third, discovering that certain goods, already well 
established in world markets, can be produced locally at low cost.  
Figure 2-1: Export diversification	  
A. Developed and developing countries                B. Resource and non-resource countries: 
 
Notes: Gini ranges between 0 and 1; lower Gini indicates higher diversification. Source: WITS (2013) 
 
 
2.3 Data and empirical strategy  
 
2.3.1 Measures of economic diversification 
 
The dataset in this study includes sectoral data on structural change measured by 
employment, value added and exports. The number of countries in the dataset is 136, 
ranging between all levels of development. The data are annual, covering the period 
from 1962 to 2012. There are many measures for sectoral diversification; most of them 
are borrowed from the income equality literature. Here we calculate six measures of 
diversity, but we report only three measures: the Gini, Theil and Herfindahl-Hirschman 
indices. Table A-2 in the appendices presents descriptive statistics of these measures, 
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and Table A-3 in the appendices presents the correlation between all the measures, 
which is rather high. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) use Gini, HHI and the Coefficient of 
Variation. Cadot et al. (2011) use Gini and HHI and Moore and Walkes (2010) use only 
HHI. Lederman and Maloney (2003) use HHI. McMillan and Rodrik (2011) use the 
Coefficient of Variation. All measures are calculated in this study, but we report the 
Gini index only due to the high correlation between the three measures. (See appendix 
A for full data description.) 
We calculate diversity for all sectors first, and then for all non-resource sectors. To get 
the non-resource sector values in the ILO data, we exclude “Mining and Quarrying,” 
and in the WITS exports data we exclude “Crude material, inedible, except fuels,” 
“Mineral Fuels, lubricants and related materials” and “Commodities not classified 
according to kind.” The UNIDO data does not cover resource sectors at all.  
From Table A-2 in the appendices we can take that highest diversification in 
employment (using ILO dataset) happened in Algeria, in 1984. The highest export 
diversification (using WITS dataset) happened in Greece, 2006, while the highest 
concentration in exports happened in Libya between 1976 and 1981, dominated by the 
mineral exports sector3. 
 
Employment data  
Sectoral employment data are from International Labour Office (ILO, 2013) and United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO, 2012). ILO data covers 127 
countries, while UNIDO covers 125 countries. The ILO data includes all economic 
activities at the 1-digit level between 1969 and 2008. Sectoral shares are in percentages. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Due to data limitations, not all specifications cover exactly 136 countries and in most specifications, the panel is 
unbalanced. Appendix A presents a list of countries included in the sample of each specification. The size of the 
sample in this chapter is mainly dependent on the size of the resource rents dataset.  
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The unbalanced panel has 2369 observations (country-year). The ILO dataset reports 
employment in different classifications: some countries use the ISIC-revision 2, others 
moved to ISIC-revisions 3 and 4 in recent years, and some are using their own national 
classification. Employment data in the more disaggregated ISICrev3 and ISICrev4 were 
aggregated to ISICrev2, following Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), Timmer and Vries (2007) 
and McMillan and Rodrik (2011). If a country reports two revisions, the older one is 
used. For example, if a country reports revision 2 and 3 for the same year revision 2 is 
chosen, and if it reports revision 3 and 4 for the same year revision 3 is chosen. 
Moreover, if a country reports labor survey and official estimates for the same period, I 
choose the source that is mostly used to get harmonized numbers, otherwise the labor 
survey is chosen to have better credibility. Regarding the national surveys data, years 
that report classifications not matching revision 2 are dropped, as the data will get 
misleading. In more details; the segregated sectors in revision 3 mostly have the same 
title as they did in the reported aggregated sector in revision 2, and official estimates are 
preferred over labour surveys. Data not following ISIC conventions are dropped. Table 
A-1 in the appendices shows the concordance between ISICrev3 and ISICrev2.  
ILO data sometimes have inconsistent observations reported in certain sectors or years, 
as countries sometimes change their calculation method, even if they still use the same 
classification/revision. This is part of the data cleaning taken into consideration in this 
study, by dropping the inconsistent observations, making the panel more harmonised. 
For example, observations for Guatemala are dropped for the years 1990 and 1991. The 
data is reported using the same classification (ISIC-Rev.2) but the total number of the 
labour force was 2.136 (million) in 1981, and 2.228 in 1982, and 2.644 in 1987, and 
2.840 in 1989, and then suddenly dropped to 650.4 (thousands) in 1990 and 681.4 in 
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1991, and jumped back again to 5.390 in 2006 to be consistent with the previous 
sequence.  
Our alternative data source is UNIDO, which covers manufacturing activities only at the 
3-digit level of disaggregation (the main 23 industrial sectors) between 1963 and 2010 
(INDSTAT2). (INDSTAT4 disaggregates to 4-digit level but only goes back to 1985.) 
The UNIDO dataset is consistent over the years and did not need adjustment. The 
unbalanced panel has 3564 employment observations (country-year). 
Value added and labour productivity 
The UNIDO dataset also provides information on value added per sector, offering an 
additional measure of sector size and productivity in industrial employment. The value 
added dataset covers almost the same period as the employment dataset, although some 
countries do not report the two sets equally. The unbalanced panel has 3465 added-
value observations (country-year). 
Exports data  
Exports data are from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), which is a 
collaboration between the World Bank and the United Nations Conference of Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). The export data covers 133 countries. Data is selected in 
SITC-1-digit aggregation containing the main 10 trade sectors. Values are reported in 
constant 1000 USD with the base year being 2000. The unbalanced panel has 4575 
observations (country-year). The WITS data values are consistent over the years and did 
not need any adjustment.  
2.3.2 Empirical strategy 	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The methodology has three steps. First, we use panel data to examine the relationship 
between resource rents and diversification. Second, we use commodity prices as an 
instrumental variable for resource rents. Third, we test the heterogeneity of natural 
resources in different specifications. 
To estimate the effect of resource rents on diversification, we use the following model 
based on Imbs and Wacziarg (2003): 
                                                                                  (2-1) 
where  is the diversification measure in employment, value added and exports;  
are the country fixed effects,  are the year fixed effects;  is the resource rent 
measure, which is the resource rent per capita; Xit is a group of control variables, 
including GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared;  is the error term. The 
parameter of interest is , which shows the effect of  on .  
There is a possibility of endogeneity in equation 2-1. Particularly, there may be 
confounding variables where diversification could reversely affect resource rents. To 
tackle this issue, we instrument for resource rents by using international commodity 
prices provided by Burke and Leigh (2010), which is a weighted index of 50 
commodity prices covering the years 1950-2010. Commodity prices are directly related 
to the resource rents, but not directly to diversification measures per se, as 
diversification covariates in this analysis is a calculated figure that shows diversity 
between different sectors in the economy – exports and employment – using the 
inequality measures: Gini, Theil and HHI among others. This figure does not represent 
GDP or income or any other share in the macro economy that could be affected by the 
international index of commodity prices. Our identifying strategy is that commodity 
Divit =αi +βt +γRRit +φXit +εit
itDiv iα
tβ itRR
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prices are exogenous, as they are mainly driven by international supply and demand. 
Therefore it is a valid instrument for resource rents (Bhattacharyya & Collier, 2011). In 
addition, Burke and Leigh (2010) argue that since countries are usually price-takers for 
their commodity exports, world price index variations are exogenous in most instances 
(Deaton & Miller, 1995).  F-statistics and critical values reported in the results show the 
validity of the chosen instrument. All regressions use robust standard errors to account 
for heteroskedasticity.   
The employment data are from the International Labour Office (ILO, 2013) for nine 
main sectors (1-digit level) covering the years 1969-2009, and the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO, 2012) for 23 main sectors (3-digit level, 
INDSTAT2) covering the years 1963-2010. Note that UNIDO data are partial, covering 
only manufacturing employment and value added. It is included here because the value 
added data shine an additional light on diversification and structural change. Exports 
data are from WITS for the ten main sectors (1-digit level), covering the years 1962-
2012. Income data are from Penn World Tables (PWT) version 8.0, which goes back to 
1950. 
2.4 Results 	  
2.4.1 Natural resources and diversification 
 
We begin by revisiting the nonmonotone relationship between diversification and 
development uncovered by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and Cadot et al. (2011). Figure 2-
2 shows the existence of the nonmonotonic U-shape path in our data in employment, 
value added and exports. Column 1 in results Tables 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3 shows the highly 
significant coefficients, where the U-shape persists in diversification through all 
specifications even after counting for the non-resource sectors only. 
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Figure 2-2: Revisiting the U-shape development path noted by Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003) and Cadot et al. (2011) in :  
 
Notes: the U-shaped pattern based on our data. Countries diversify first and then specialise again through all data groups. Data 
sources: (ILO, 2012), (WITS, 2013) and (UNIDO, 2012) 
 
Secondly, we examine the effect of the natural resource rents on sectoral employment to 
test the structural change movements in resource countries. Table 2-1 shows the results 
of estimating equation 2-1 with diversification in the ILO data as the dependent variable. 
Each column separates the effects between the whole sample and only non-resource 
sectors. Across different specifications, the coefficients are mostly positive and 
significant (+ coefficient is concentration, - coefficient is diversification). Column 5 
shows the IV estimation results; there is a large and significant negative effect of the 
resource rents on ILO sectoral employment diversification. Coefficients are larger 
within the non-resource sectors, showing that employment concentration happens out of 
the resource sector, which is usually capital intensive and does not create many jobs. 
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Dutch disease theory predicts that a resource boom increases wages in the booming 
sector, and thus increases employment in that sector affected by the spending effect. 
However, due to the fact that the resource sector is capital intensive, employment 
concentration occurs in other non-tradable sectors affected by the resource movement 
effect. 
Within the UNIDO manufacturing data, we test the effect on manufacturing 
employment and value added. Table 2-2 shows that there is a significant negative effect 
of the resource rents on manufacturing employment, and on the manufacturing value 
added. This could reflect increased local demand on manufactured goods as an 
implication of the Dutch disease spending effect. This result might be also affected by 
low employment in the resource sector as explained previously.      
We next turn from employment to exports, to test the effect of resource rents on the 
tradable sectors. The Dutch disease model predicts a decline in producing tradable 
goods, and higher exports of the natural resources. Table 2-3	   shows that there is a 
significant negative effect of the resource rents on export diversification, in both full 
sample exports and in non-resource sectors. Concentration in resource exports examined 
by the total exports (All) is larger in most specifications. Less manufacturing output and 
other tradable goods could cause the noted higher diversification in non-resource sectors, 
as the Dutch disease model predicts. 
	  
Table 2-1: Dependent variable: Diversification in sectoral employment (Gini)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS - Imbs & Wacziarg OLS-linear OLS-linear OLS-nonlinear FE IV 
 All NR All NR All NR All NR All NR All NR 
Resource Rent per capita   -0.002 0.000 0.007*** 0.010*** -0.008*** -0.006** 0.001 0.002 0.035*** 0.041*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.010) 
GDPpc -6.4e+03*** -7.7e+03***   -2.9e+03*** -3.5e+03*** -7.2e+03*** -8.3e+03*** 2557.321*** 2005.802** 8284.188*** 8499.629*** 
 (678.072) (747.716)   (142.870) (159.629) (649.670) (721.390) (809.990) (961.507) (1840.290) (2067.742) 
GDPpc2 8.7e+07*** 1.1e+08***     1.1e+08*** 1.3e+08*** 3.6e+06 1.2e+07 -1.2e+08*** -1.3e+08*** 
 (1.8e+07) (2.0e+07)     (1.7e+07) (1.9e+07) (1.3e+07) (1.6e+07) (3.7e+07) (4.1e+07) 
Country & year dummies No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-stat           147.849 146.86 
Stock-Yogo critical value           16.38/ 5.53 16.38/ 5.53 
Observations 2169 2169 2169 2169 2169 2169 2169 2169 2169 2169 2167 2167 
R2 0.253 0.289 0.001 0.000 0.162 0.192 0.266 0.294 0.843 0.845 0.730 0.730 
Table 2-2: Dependent variable: Diversification in UNIDO Industrial Employment (Gini) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS - Imbs & Wacziarg OLS-linear OLS-linear OLS-nonlinear FE IV 
 EMP VA EMP VA EMP VA EMP VA EMP VA EMP VA 
Resource Rent per capita   0.003*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.001* 0.002*** 0.011*** 0.009** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
GDPpc -2.9e+03*** -2.4e+03***   -770.631** -603.213 -4.0e+03*** -3.8e+03*** 1032.003*** -267.128 291.756 -794.572** 
 (255.278) (297.548)   (365.371) (379.116) (270.244) (303.873) (201.739) (188.237) (341.811) (368.740) 
GDPpc2 5.3e+06*** 4.8e+06***     7.0e+06*** 7.2e+06*** -1.3e+06*** 6.2e+05** 8.8e+04 1.6e+06** 
 (5.1e+05) (5.4e+05)     (5.4e+05) (5.6e+05) (3.1e+05) (3.1e+05) (6.1e+05) (6.6e+05) 
Country & year dummies No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-stat           21.716 20.48 
Stock-Yogo critical value           16.38/5.53 16.38/5.53 
Observations 3304 3269 3304 3269 3304 3269 3304 3269 3304 3269 3304 3269 
R2 0.094 0.063 0.002 0.021 0.026 0.035 0.141 0.145 0.859 0.839 0.844 0.832 
Table 2-3: Dependent variable: Diversification in WITS exports (Gini) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS - Imbs & Wacziarg OLS-linear OLS-linear OLS-nonlinear FE IV 
 All NR All NR All NR All NR All NR All NR 
Resource Rent per capita   0.016*** 0.004*** 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.020*** 0.010*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.033*** 0.053*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.014) 
GDPpc -4547.8*** -5260.8***   -59.510 -463.631*** -1.4e+03*** -1.9e+03*** 1141.262*** 206.356 326.509 -1.2e+03 
 (-7.32) (-9.95)   (138.453) (152.077) (253.877) (257.326) (173.109) (409.862) (374.642) (798.129) 
GDPpc2 7.5e+07*** 7.5e+07***     3.4e+06*** 3.5e+06*** -1.9e+06*** -7.7e+05 2.9e+05 3.0e+06** 
 (5.38) (6.55)     (5.6e+05) (5.5e+05) (3.2e+05) (6.8e+05) (7.5e+05) (1.5e+06) 
Country & year dummies No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-stat           24.147 24.072 
Stock-Yogo critical value           16.38/5.53 16.38/5.53 
Observations 4216 4036 4228 4047 4227 4046 4227 4046 4227 4046 4221 4040 
R2 0.055 0.073 0.074 0.005 0.074 0.012 0.095 0.035 0.765 0.655 0.665 0.313 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, All:All sectors, NR:Non-resource sectors. +Coefficient shows concentration, -coefficient shows diversification. (6) uses instrumental variable “commodity prices”. All variables are 
divided by one billion to get shorter and easier to read results. Data sources: Employment data from ILO (2013); Commodity price index is from Burke and Leigh (2014) a weighted index for 50 commodities; Resource 
rent per capita is calculated using resource rents data from the World Bank and population data from Penn World Tables PWT 8.0; GDPpc data is obtained from PWT 8.0,*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01. 
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In all three tables (2-1), (2-2) and (2-3), the magnitude of the IV estimates in column 6 
is larger than those of the fixed effects in column 5, and than those of the OLS in 
column 4 (only in tables 2-1 and 2-3). This could be explained that the IV is estimating 
the local average treatment effect (LATE), where the OLS is estimating the average 
treatment effect (ATE) over the entire population. Therefore, the IV estimates could get 
larger than OLS estimates because of heterogeneity in resource rents among the 
resource countries studied in the sample.   
Table 2-4 reports the first stage regression, where commodity price is noticed to be 
highly significantly correlated with resource rents. As we discussed earlier, we believe 
it is not a weak instrument as it satisfies the Stock-Yogo criteria (see tables 2-1, 2-2 and 
2-3). 
Table 2-4: Resource rents and diversification: First stage regressions  
 (1) (2) 
 Resource rents per capita Resource rents per capita 
Commodity Price 1.85e-06*** 1.26e-06*** 
 (4.62) (3.58) 
Controls  No Country & year dummies 
Observations 8057 8057 
R2 0.006 0.559 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, Data sources: Commodity 
price index is from Burke and Leigh (2014) a weighted index for 50 commodities; Resource rent per capita is 
calculated using resource rents data from the World Bank and population data from Penn World Tables PWT 8.0 
 
So far, the results show high concentration in employment, value added and exports as a 
result of natural resource rents. Figure 2-3 plots predicted Gini indices against GDP per 
capita for various levels of resource rents to GDP shares; it shows that the U-shaped 
relationship is maintained in most levels, and the steepest curve is the non-resource 
countries. However, this U-shaped relationship disappears in the higher levels of 
resource rents’ share in GDP (over 40%) where the concentration continues to increase 
along the development path. Accordingly, the higher the resource rents’ share in GDP, 
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the less likely diversification could happen along the development path. Instead, 
concentration increases rapidly. 
2.4.2 Heterogeneity across natural resources 
 
Diversification in different sectors is likely to vary across different kinds of natural 
resources, since commodity prices are heterogeneous. We test the diversification 
affected by two groups of resources: oil and gas, and forestry. 
Figure 2-3: Gini indices against GDP per capita and the share of resource rents 
	  
2.4.2.1 Oil and gas rents 	  
Table 2-4 shows the combined results for oil and gas rents, showing an insignificant 
effect in employment: either ILO overall employment or UNIDO manufacturing 
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employment. However, there is a highly significant concentration in exports (Column 4) 
mainly affected by oil and gas exports. There is also a significant concentration in 
manufacturing value added (Column 3); this concentration is found to be mostly within 
sectors that are highly related to oil and gas but classified individually in the UNIDO 
dataset4, or sectors that produce locally consumed goods and fall within the non-
tradables, as they do not show up in exports5, which agrees with the Dutch disease 
model. 
 
Table 2-5: Oil and Gas rents effects on diversification  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sectoral Employment 
Manufacturing 
Employment 
Manufacturing 
Value Added Exports 
Oil & gas rents per capita -0.003 0.001 0.002* 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDPpc 3754.527*** 1152.295*** -466.322** 85.024 
 (963.925) (266.537) (202.048) (97.356) 
GDPpc2 1.4e+06 -1.5e+06*** 9.2e+05*** -4.9e+04 
 (1.8e+07) (4.1e+05) (3.3e+05) (1.4e+05) 
Observations 1517 1957 1869 2283 
R2 0.835 0.861 0.843 0.810 
Notes: Gini index is reported. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Oil and gas rents per capita is 
calculated from resource rents (World Bank) and population (PWT 8.0). Data sources: (1) Sectoral employment is 
from ILO, (2) and (3) manufacturing employment and value added are from UNIDO, (4) exports data is from WITS. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
2.4.2.2 Forestry 	  
The effect of forest rents on diversification is different than oil and gas. As explained 
earlier, the sustainability and commodity prices heterogeneity might have the biggest 
role in this variance. Table 2-5 shows a significant positive effect of forest rents on 
overall sectoral employment diversification and exports (Columns 1 and 4). These 
results are also noted by Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014). Manufacturing employment 
and value added are significantly concentrated (Columns 2 and 3): this concentration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Such as 9: Coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuels.; or 10: Chemicals and chemical products; or 12: Non-
metallic mineral products; or 13: Basic Metals. 
5 Such as 1: Food and beverages; and 6: Wood products (UNIDO, 2012). 
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mostly falls within sectors that are highly related to forestry and agriculture but 
classified individually in the UNIDO dataset6.  
Table 2-6: Forest rents effects on diversification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sectoral Employment 
Manufacturing 
Employment 
Manufacturing 
Value Added Exports 
Forest Rents per capita -6.8e+04*** 8.9e+04*** 5.1e+04** -6.7e+04** 
 (2.2e+04) (2.6e+04) (2.1e+04) (3.0e+04) 
GDPpc -710.772 584.449*** -622.573*** 922.469*** 
 (706.946) (166.672) (203.257) (199.512) 
GDPpc2 6.6e+07*** -6.1e+05** 1.1e+06*** -1.5e+06*** 
 (1.2e+07) (2.6e+05) (3.3e+05) (3.2e+05) 
Instrument  Agriculture Commodity Prices 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald  
F-Stat 22.774 142.242 154.797 237.779 
Stock-Yogo Critical 
Value 16.38/5.53 16.38/5.53 16.38/5.53 16.38/5.53 
Observations 2175 2792 2716 3348 
R2 0.713 0.787 0.811 0.748 
Notes: Gini index is reported. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Forest rents per capita is 
calculated from resource rents (World Bank) and population (PWT 8.0). Data sources: (1) Sectoral employment is 
from ILO, (2) and (3) manufacturing employment and value added are from UNIDO, (4) exports data is from WITS. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
2.4.3 Heterogeneity across countries 
 
Resource-rich countries differ in their dependence on natural resource rents, and other 
features are likely to influence the effect of resources, such as level of development and 
region. In this section, we test how this heterogeneity affects diversification.  
2.4.3.1 Level of development  	  
We start by testing the diversification across developed and developing countries. Table 
2-6 combines the tested diversification in two columns for each. As shown in the table, 
diversification coefficients in developed countries are barely affected by resource rents. 
There is a slightly significant negative effect on diversification in exports and value 
added, but no significance in employment, either in full sample (ILO) or manufacturing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Such as 1: Food and beverages; or 4: Wearing Apparel; or 5: Leather and footwear; or 6: Wood products (UNIDO, 
2012). 
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(UNIDO). This could be explained that developed countries have a well-established 
manufacturing sector that would be affected in terms of exports share, but not in terms 
of manufacturing employment share, as the resource sector is capital intensive and 
would not attract employment. Meanwhile, in developing countries, resource rents have 
a higher significant negative effect on exports’ diversification, where exports get highly 
concentrated. Moreover, the results show a significant negative effect on employment 
diversification in both sectoral and manufacturing employment. These findings show 
that manufactures are also exposed to being crowded out by resources, with a higher 
possibility in developing countries where manufacturing sectors are not highly 
developed, with less income and lower institutional quality than developed countries.   
 
Table 2-7: Diversification across developed and developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sectoral Employment Manufacturing Employment 
Manufacturing  
Value Added Exports 
 developed developing developed developing developed developing developed developing 
Resource 
Rents per 
capita 
0.001 0.003** 0.002 0.001* 0.002* 0.001 0.005*** 0.002*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
GDPpc -2.0e+03*** 3.980 -5.1e+03*** 526.093** -555.099 -67.767 8669.273*** 291.913** 
 (666.375) (651.843) (1013.597) (221.414) (1289.122) (228.596) (1370.295) (137.113) 
GDPpc2 4.6e+07*** -3.7e+06 6.5e+07*** -5.2e+05 2.6e+07* 2.7e+05 -4.3e+07** -4.5e+05** 
 (9.3e+06) (8.5e+06) (1.4e+07) (3.5e+05) (1.5e+07) (3.7e+05) (2.2e+07) (2.1e+05) 
Observations 997 997 1228 1859 1252 1913 1351 2665 
R2 0.695 0.863 0.865 0.787 0.773 0.781 0.774 0.688 
Notes: Gini index is reported. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Resource rent per capita is 
calculated from resource rents (World Bank) and population (PWT 8.0). Data sources: (1) Sectoral employment is 
from ILO, (2) and (3) manufacturing employment and value added are from UNIDO, (4) exports data is from WITS. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
2.4.3.2 Regions 	  
We finally test the heterogeneity across regions, mainly by continents, in addition to the 
Middle East and North Africa (Mena) region. Table 2-7 shows the results in four panels. 
Panel A examines the effect of resource rents on ILO sectoral employment across 
regions, where significant diversification only happens in the Mena region, while 
employment in Asia, Europe and the Americas gets concentrated. However, results for 
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manufacturing employment in Panel B are different. Manufacturing employment gets 
more diversified in Africa with a high significant positive effect, and more concentrated 
in the Americas. Asia, Mena and Europe manufacturing sectors have insignificant 
coefficients affected by resource rents. This might be explained by the fact that there are 
many resource countries located in the Mena region, and the resource effect is very high 
despite the small number of observations. Many of these countries have had resource 
rents (mainly oil and gas) for a long time before 1950, but most of them did not develop 
resilient manufacturing sectors, and, therefore, we can see that manufacturing 
employment is insignificant. We find that sectoral employment in the Mena region is 
diversified between government jobs, a number of services sectors and other non-
tradable sectors 7 . The added value figures in Panel C are mostly matching the 
employment ones. Panel D shows the effect of resource rents on exports, where results 
indicate a high significant negative effect on export diversification. Across all regions 
tested, exports tend to get concentrated within the resource sector affected by resource 
rents, except for Asia, where exports get diversified slightly significantly.    
Table 2-8: Diversification across regions 
Panel A: Diversification across regions: ILO sectoral employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Asia Europe Americas Mena 
Resource Rents per capita 0.029*** 0.001* 0.011*** -0.008** 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
GDPpc -9.6e+03*** -1.4e+03 -3.4e+03*** 4431.671 
 (1716.357) (933.953) (1180.068) (3672.648) 
GDPpc2 2.3e+08*** 4.0e+07*** 1.7e+08*** -1.1e+07 
 (4.0e+07) (1.2e+07) (2.0e+07) (2.1e+07) 
Observations 469 942 619 147 
R2 0.878 0.802 0.783 0.603 
Notes: Gini index is reported. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Resource rent per capita is 
calculated from resource rents (World Bank) and population (PWT 8.0). All variables are divided by one billion to 
get shorter and easier to read results. Africa is not reported due to data limitations. Data sources: (1) Sectoral 
employment is from ILO. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Such as 5: Construction; or 6: Wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels; or 7: Transport, storage and 
communication, or 8: Financing, insurance, real estate and business services, or 9: Community, social services and 
personal services (ILO, 2013). 
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Panel B: Diversification across regions: UNIDO manufacturing employment results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Asia Africa Europe Americas Mena 
Resource Rents per 
capita 
-0.003 -0.062*** 0.001 0.011** 0.001 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
GDPpc -482.336 -1.6e+04*** -5.4e+03*** 1932.600 563.968** 
 (1591.576) (2781.384) (986.506) (1217.061) (239.402) 
GDPpc2 5.6e+07 0.000 7.4e+07*** -1.0e+07 -6.7e+05* 
 (3.8e+07) (0.000) (1.4e+07) (2.0e+07) (3.7e+05) 
Observations 636 305 1185 742 387 
R2 0.757 0.921 0.863 0.916 0.721 
Notes: Gini index is reported. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Resource rent per capita is 
calculated from resource rents (World Bank) and population (PWT 8.0). All variables are divided by one billion to 
get shorter and easier to read results. Data sources: manufacturing employment and value added are from UNIDO. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 	  
Panel C: Diversification across regions: UNIDO manufacturing value added results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Asia Africa Europe Americas Mena 
Resource Rents per 
capita 
-0.003 -0.028*** 0.001 0.011** -0.000 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
GDPpc -5.1e+03*** -6.8e+03*** 1000.776 3979.535* 647.138** 
 (1449.360) (1971.726) (1355.019) (2265.766) (303.533) 
GDPpc2 2.1e+08*** 0.000 2.7e+07 -1.5e+08*** -8.2e+05* 
 (3.1e+07) (0.000) (1.7e+07) (3.9e+07) (4.9e+05) 
Observations 581 385 1161 723 384 
R2 0.790 0.882 0.813 0.871 0.824 
Notes: Gini index is reported. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Resource rent per capita is 
calculated from resource rents (World Bank) and population (PWT 8.0). All variables are divided by one billion to 
get shorter and easier to read results. Data sources: manufacturing employment and value added are from UNIDO. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 	  
Panel D: Diversification across regions: WITS exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Asia Africa Europe Americas Mena 
Resource Rents per 
capita 
-0.003* 0.042*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.002** 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
GDPpc 5485.706*** -3.3e+03 5238.229*** -7.7e+03*** 187.529 
 (689.791) (2477.674) (1532.717) (1726.568) (177.937) 
GDPpc2 -2.2e+07*** 0.000 -2.2e+07 2.4e+08*** -2.2e+05 
 (2.8e+06) (0.000) (2.3e+07) (3.6e+07) (2.6e+05) 
Observations 803 550 1297 993 531 
R2 0.657 0.728 0.781 0.758 0.821 
Notes: Gini index is reported. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Resource rent per capita is 
calculated from resource rents (World Bank) and population (PWT 8.0). All variables are divided by one billion to 
get shorter and easier to read results. Data sources: Exports data from WITS. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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2.5 Conclusion 	  
 
 
 
This paper examines the effect of resource rents on diversification in exports, sectoral 
employment, manufacturing employment and value added. The resource rents in 
general have a significant negative effect on diversification, and various levels of 
diversification occur in different economic sectors. The higher the resource rent share in 
a country’s GDP, the less likely this country would go through the U-shaped path noted 
by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003). Alternatively, concentration increases rapidly through 
the development path.  
However, there were some heterogeneous features among different country and natural 
resource groups. We find that there is a different effect between renewable and non-
renewable natural resources on diversification. Non-renewable resources – examined by 
oil and gas – do not have significant effects on employment diversification, but they 
reduce export diversification, while renewable resources tend to increase exports’ 
diversification and sectoral employment. We also look into different country groups: the 
effect of natural resources varies between developed and developing countries where 
manufacturing sectors are also diverse. Resource rents are likely to have higher impact 
on diversification within developing countries, especially in employment, where 
diversification gets decreased but in not affected in developed countries. However, in 
both country groups, resource rents reduce export diversification, indicating that 
manufacturing share in exports is affected in both groups, even when the manufacturing 
employment was not affected in the developed countries. Moreover, export 
diversification in all regions decreased significantly. Manufacturing diversification 
significantly declined in the Americas and to a lesser extent in Asia, not affected in 
Europe and Mena, but increased in Africa.   
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These results imply the presence of the Dutch disease mechanism, and are useful to 
policy makers in resource-rich countries who should be aware of how their labour 
market and exports are likely to be affected by the resource rents. Therefore, it would be 
very useful to test the impact of institutional quality on diversification, especially after 
having heterogeneous results between country groups.   
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Chapter 3 
 
 
3 Diversification in Oil Countries: New Evidence 
on the Role of Institutional Quality 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis, we examined the effect of natural resource rents on 
diversification. We have found that along the development path, resource rents are 
negatively correlated with diversification, and resource countries tend to experience 
higher levels of concentration in exports, employment and value added. We also saw 
that there are heterogeneous effects of different kinds of natural resources on economic 
diversification. Oil and gas rents had a significant negative impact on diversification, in 
contrast to forestry, where the impact was significantly positive. Between different 
country groups, we found a significant positive impact of natural resources on 
diversification among developed countries, while developing countries tended to be 
more concentrated in exports, employment and value added.  In this chapter, we extend 
this analysis and focus on oil and gas as the main commodity. We are mainly interested 
in testing the role of institutional quality on diversification when a country becomes 
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resource abundant, driven by the heterogeneous outcomes we found between developed 
and developing countries in the first chapter.   
The literature on the relationship between natural resources and non-resource economic 
activity focuses on the concept of the “Dutch Disease,” which is a widely-used term in 
the development literature. The Economist magazine coined the term in 1977 to explain 
the gas boom implications on the Dutch economy. The “resource curse” was first noted 
by Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001), who show a significant negative relation between 
natural resource dependence and growth in GDP per capita. They also argue that 
resource abundance squeezes the manufacturing sector, as in the Dutch disease model. 
Other studies considered oil rents specifically: Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) 
find a negative relation between oil rents and economic performance. Other papers 
show that the impact of resource abundance is mainly driven by political factors: 
Tornell and Lane (1999) argue that higher than usual redistribution of natural resource 
endowments (voracity effect) leads to a negative impact on growth affected by the 
ability of powerful groups. 
The related literature has three main limitations. The first is the limited number of 
empirical studies on economic diversification. There are a few exceptions, which 
include Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), Koren and Tenreyro (2007), Moore and Walkes 
(2010), Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), Easterly et al. (2009) and Cadot et al. (2011). 
However, there is a noted gap in studying the effects of natural resources on economic 
diversification. Secondly, most of the empirical literature on the resource curse suffers 
from two main identification limitations (Smith, 2015). First, a significant number of 
papers used resource dependency as measures of resource wealth. Lederman and 
Maloney (2003) point out that Sachs and Warners and other papers use resource exports’ 
share of GDP as a measure of resource wealth, which leads to endogeneity and omitted 
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variable problems. Lower GDP could be caused by poor growth resulting from non-
resource sectors, leading to a rise in the share of resources in GDP. The second 
limitation is that most of these papers use cross-sectional data. Panel data studies could 
provide more robust results considering both time and country variations. The third 
limitation we find in the literature is that only a small number of papers link between 
institutional quality and economic diversification directly. Most of the papers study the 
relationship between political institutions and economic growth solely as we show 
below. 
In this paper, we use panel data analysis to get the advantages of country and time fixed 
effects. However, even using this strategy is not enough, as countries could choose the 
quantity of oil they discover. To overcome this limitation, we only use giant oil 
discoveries as a source of variation. A giant oilfield discovery is deemed to contain 
ultimate recoverable reserves (URR) of 500 million barrels equivalent or more before 
exploitation8. We choose only oil discoveries, rather than other commodities, for a 
number of reasons. First, oil discoveries are widely varied in location (Wick & Bulte, 
2009). Second, most recent resource discoveries have been in oil (Smith, 2015). Third, 
oil has been the commodity mostly associated with the resource curse in the literature.  
Giant oil discoveries have three unique features (Arezki et al., 2015b). First, the 
relatively significant size of giant oil discoveries provides a unique source of 
macroeconomic news shock and is hardly predictable. Second, the production lag that 
exists between discovery and production (typically lasts for 4-6 years on average) 
makes the news shocks of discoveries a good proxy of natural resources. Third, the 
timing of discoveries is plausibly exogenous. We show in this paper that related 
macroeconomic and political features fail to predict giant oilfield discoveries. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In appendix B, we show that smaller sizes of discoveries do not have any significant impacts on diversification. 
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This paper estimates the causal effect of giant oil discoveries as a news shock on 
economic diversification, and the contribution of institutional quality in this impact. 
Using panel analysis, we compare between countries that have discovered giant oilfields 
to countries that have not during the period 1962-2012. See the data section for the list 
of control group countries in our sample. A major concern in our design is whether oil 
discoveries are exogenous or not. We test if related economic and political factors could 
predict discoveries and we do not find any significant impacts, proving the exogeneity 
of giant oil discoveries.  
In addition to the economic and political variables tested in this paper, one might also 
argue that governments or other entities could manipulate the exact timing of the 
announcement of a giant oil discovery. Arezki et al., (2015b) argue that this is not 
plausible in Mike Horn’s dataset that we use in this paper, as Horn shows that these 
concerns about a possible manipulation have little ground. In addition, they also argue 
that Mike Horn’s dataset is immune from such concerns, “as each discovery date 
included in his dataset has been independently verified and documented using multiple 
sources which are reported systematically for each discovery date” (p. 17). We also 
address the issue of the possibility that past discoveries could predict future discoveries. 
Arezki et al., (2015b) show that previous oil discoveries could have two opposite 
impacts on the possibility of current and future discoveries. First, more discoveries 
could increase discovery costs, reducing the likelihood of future discoveries. Second, on 
the other hand, previous discoveries enhance learning about the geology and therefore 
increase the chances of future discoveries. Accordingly, previous discoveries could 
have any of the noted two impacts. To control for this uncertainty and for the serial 
correlation that could arise between discoveries, we include the number of giant 
discoveries in each country from t-10 to t-1 for each discovery in year t, in addition to 
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the country and year fixed effects in our empirical design. However, in case 
endogeneity is likely to be a concern, we run an instrumental variable estimation as a 
robustness check which controls for the remaining variations between countries. We 
find that large oil discoveries lead to export concentration after a time lag of 8-10 years 
after discovery.  
Next, we add the institutional quality covariate to the model. This inclusion did not have 
a significant impact on export diversification: results are mostly unaffected. The notable 
difference comes in manufacturing employment, where adding the institutional quality 
covariate increases the concentration. In fact, we find that the institutional quality 
covariate has a high significant negative impact on diversification in manufacturing 
employment, meaning that countries with worse institutions have higher concentration 
in manufacturing employment after giant oil discoveries. This result runs counter to 
much of the literature, which argues that countries with better institutional quality 
receive less negative effects from natural resources, and thus are able to resist the Dutch 
disease. However, we find that no country is fully immune; we add in this paper that oil 
discoveries have a negative impact on diversification in all countries, with different 
impact levels on heterogeneous economic sectors as we argue in the results section.  
To get into the difference between countries with higher or lower institutional quality, 
we follow Jones and Olken (2004) methodology in observing the Polity2 score in the 
year prior to the discovery year. This mechanism allows assessing the institutional 
quality of each government one year before discovery, to avoid any institutional 
changes that could occur in the same year of discovery as an endogenous effect. We 
find that autocratic governments are generally more negatively affected than 
democracies. Employment becomes more concentrated in autocracies.   
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This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to our knowledge, it 
is the first paper to test the causal impact of an exogenous measure of natural resources 
and institutional quality on economic diversification. Second, it is among the first 
papers9 to empirically evaluate the short and long-run effects of resource discoveries on 
macroeconomic outcomes. Third, including the institutional quality measure in the 
model contributes to the literature on the correlation between institutional quality and 
the resource curse. Fourth, our data includes Middle Eastern countries, as Ross (2001) 
notes that most of the oil curse literature avoids studying the MENA countries for data 
limitation reasons, where the region includes a good number of main oil exporters with 
heterogeneous institutional quality scores.   
There are five other papers which could be close to this paper by using the same source 
of variation: Lei and Michaels (2014), Arezki et al., (2015 a-b), Smith (2015), and Cotet 
and Tsui (2013). There are three main differences between our paper and these papers. 
First, our paper is the first to test the impact of giant oil discoveries on economic 
diversification, while Lei and Michaels (2014), Cotet and Tsui (2013) and Arezki et al., 
(2015a) study the discoveries’ impact on conflict, and Arezki et al., (2015b) study the 
impact on macroeconomic outcomes, and Smith (2015) studies the impact on GDP 
growth. Second, our paper follows both Lei and Michaels (2014) and Arezki et al., 
(2015b) in using all giant oil discoveries a country experiences, whereas Smith (2015) 
uses only the first discovery that makes a country resource-rich. Third, we add a 
covariate of institutional quality in the model following Mehlum et al. (2006), whereas 
the previous papers do not.   
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: the following section views a theoretical 
introduction to the resource curse, Dutch disease and the role of institutional quality. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Lei and Michaels (2014), Arezki et al. (2015b), Smith (2015)   
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Section 3 views related papers on oil discoveries and the impact of institutional quality 
on the resource curse. Section 4 provides a brief background of the oil industry. Section 
5 describes our data. Section 6 outlines our empirical strategy. Section 7 presents the 
main results and discussions. Section 8 concludes.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Introduction 
 
Many papers in the resource curse literature argue that the experiences of resource rich 
countries have been heterogeneous. Some countries used their resource revenues to 
improve the local economy, while others ended up with worse situations10. In this 
section, we illustrate the model suggested by Van der Ploeg (2011) to describe the 
impact of a resource windfall on an open economy. The theory suggests that Dutch 
disease occurs when the extra wealth coming from natural resource sales leads to real 
exchange rate appreciation and contraction of the non-resource tradable sector (Corden 
& Neary, 1982).  
The model depends on a two-sector economy with a resource windfall, abstracting from 
capital accumulation, international investment and financial assets. There are two kinds 
of goods: tradable (T) and non-tradable (N). The equilibrium in the tradable sector 
happens when exports of resources equals net imports of tradable goods: HtQE=Ct-
HtF(Lt) where Ht is productivity in the tradable sector, Q is the natural resources 
international price, E is the volume of exports of natural resources, Ct is the 
consumption of tradable goods, Lt is the employment share in the tradable sector, 
making HtF(Lt) the output of the tradable sector. Non-tradable goods market 
equilibrium requires Cn=HnG(Ln), where Cn denotes consumption of non-tradable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This section heavily depends on Van der Ploeg (2011) and Mehlum et al. (2006). 
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goods, Hn productivity in the non-tradable sector, Ln employment in the non-tradable 
sector and HnG(Ln) output of the non-tradable sector. Labour market equilibrium 
requires Lt+Ln=1 conditioning labour mobility between the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors, where total labour supply is normalised to 1. Households maximise utility U(Cn, 
Ct) subject to the budget constraint PCn+Ct=Y, where P is the relative price of non-
tradable goods in terms of tradable goods, and Y is the national income 
Y≡PHnG(Ln)+HtF(Lt)+HtQE. Optimality requires Un/Ut=P. With CES utility, we have 
Cn=Y/(1+Pε-1)P, where ε is the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-
tradable goods. The equilibrium condition in the market for non-tradable goods is,  
HnG(Ln)=Cn= Y/(1+Pε-1)=[PHNG(LN)+HTF(LT)+HTQE Y](P+Pε), 
That yields Pε=H[F((1-LN))+QE]/G(LN), where H≡HT/HN is the productivity of the 
tradable and resource sectors relative to that of the non-tradable sector. This equation is 
illustrated in Figure 3-1 where NTGME (non-tradable goods market equilibrium) shows 
the combination between real exchange rate (P) and the share of labour in the non-
tradable sector Ln (x-axis). The NTGME slopes downwards, showing that a higher P is 
associated with relatively lower demand for non-tradable goods and thus lower 
employment in the non-tradable sector. Labour mobility between the tradable and non-
tradable sectors requires equal pay, so the value of the marginal product of labour is the 
same between the sectors. The LM (labour market) curve slopes upward, showing that a 
higher relative price of non-tradable goods (higher P) increases the marginal product of 
employment in the non-tradable sector, so employment in the tradable sector must 
decline in order to push up the marginal product of labour in the tradable sector.  
We now consider a resource windfall. Higher natural resource revenue QE boosts 
national income and demand, shifting the NTGME upwards, while LM is unaffected. 
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The equilibrium shifts from A to A`. Two spans of consequences are considered: short 
run consequences and long run consequences. Consequences in the short run are: 
1. Higher resource revenues push for higher relative price of non-tradable goods, 
and thus an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and for a decline in the 
tradable sector and expansion of the non-tradable sector.  
2. Labour shifts from the exposed to the sheltered sectors (non-tradable). This 
boosts consumption and output of the non-tradable goods.  
3. Higher resource revenues could also possibly increase imports, which adds to 
the rise in consumption of tradable goods.  
4. National income rises by more than the natural resource revenues, affected by 
the increase in consumption, and thus, welfare rises boosted by resource 
revenues. 
5. Consequently, the labour market will have higher concentration in the non-
tradable sector, and a higher concentration in resource exports considering the 
production gap.  
Figure 3-1: Natural resource dependence and labour movements 
 
Notes: a resource boom shifts A to A`, so is a shift from the tradable to non-tradable sector and real exchange 
appreciation.  
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In the long run, we must allow capital and labour to be mobile across sectors, we 
assume the economy to be an open economy with Heckscher-Ohlin framework which 
should have competitive labour, capital and product markets, and production does not 
use any resources, and there are constant returns to scale in the production of tradable 
and non-tradable goods. A rise in resource windfall increases wage-rental ratio if the 
non-tradable sector is more labour-intensive than the tradable sector. There is a rise in 
the relative price of non-tradable goods leading to an expansion of the non-tradable 
sector and a contraction of the tradable sector. Labour and capital shift from the tradable 
to non-tradable sectors, leading to higher concentration in the non-tradable sector.  
We now consider the case when the resource sector uses labour and capital as factor 
inputs. The short-term consequences as per the Dutch disease model would be as 
described spending effects of a resource boom, where the direct impact would be an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate as defined earlier. Another outcome is the 
resource movement effects, which occur as a result of the spending effect and also of 
labour movement from tradable and non-tradable sectors into the resource sector. In the 
long run, we assume both labour and capital are mobile between the tradable and non-
tradable sectors, and the resource sector only uses labour.  
Related to the resource movement effect, the Rybczinski theorem states that the 
movement of labour out of the non-resource towards the resource sectors causes output 
of the capital-intensive non-resource sector to expand. This could lead to two different 
scenarios:  
1. Pro-industrialisation: if the non-resource sector was mainly tradable and capital-
intensive manufacturing, when labour moved out to the resource sector, the 
capital-intensive output increases.  
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2. De-industrialisation: if the non-resource sector was mainly non-tradable and 
capital-intensive, when labour moved from the tradable to the resource sectors 
and output declines, the real exchange rate depreciates. The non-tradable sector 
will expand (as per Rybczinski’s theorem), which also pushes real exchange 
rates to depreciate. Expansion of the non-tradable sector increases its output, 
which also fuels the depreciation of the real exchange rate. And finally, real 
exchange rate depreciation may also result from a boost to natural resource 
exports if the tradable sector is relatively capital intensive and capital is needed 
for the exploitation of natural resources. Since less capital is available for the 
tradable sector, less labour is needed and more labour will be available for the 
non-tradable sector (more output), which also leads to a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. A final channel that could lead to real exchange rate depreciation 
is through income distribution, with a shift towards consumers with a low 
propensity to consume non-tradable goods.  
The final impact would be the shift from A to A`, where higher natural resource exports 
lead to real exchange rate appreciation and expansion of the non-tradable sector. All of 
this leads to higher export concentration in the resource sector, and a higher 
employment concentration in the non-tradable sectors. If the country did not have any 
significant resource booms earlier, we assume that the labour is diversified between a 
number of tradable and non-tradable sectors. Preceding a resource boom, labour and 
trade in the long run move towards certain sectors: resource sector in exports, and non-
tradable sectors in the labour market.  We now consider the role of institutional quality 
in dealing with these movements, using a model by Mehlum et al. (2006).    
 
 
	   53 
	  
The resource curse and the institutional quality  
We follow the model illustrated by Mehlum et al. (2006) to describe the role of 
institutional quality in influencing the resource curse. The model differentiates between 
two types of institutions in resource-rich countries: grabber friendly and producer 
friendly. Grabber-friendly institutions are where rent seeking and production are 
competing activities, and producer-friendly institutions are where rent seeking and 
production are complementary activities. Grabber-friendly institutions have gains from 
specialising in unproductive influence activities, for instance due to a weak rule of law, 
malfunctioning bureaucracy, and corruption. Grabber-friendly institutions can be 
particularly bad for growth when resource abundance attracts scarce entrepreneurial 
resources out of production and into unproductive activities. With producer-friendly 
institutions, rich resources attract entrepreneurs into production, implying higher growth. 
Mehlum et al. (2006) are in contrast to the rent-seeking story by Sachs and Warner 
(1995) where resource abundance leads to a deterioration of institutional quality in turn 
lowering economic growth. Mehlum et al. (2006) argue that institutions may be decisive 
around how natural resources affect economic growth even if resource abundance has 
no effect on institutions, and that natural resources put institutions to the test, so that the 
resource curse only appears in countries with inferior institutions.   
The analysis of Mehlum et al. (2006) argues that the differences in growth between 
resource-rich countries with good institutions and the ones with bad institutions are 
primarily due to how resource rents are distributed via the institutional arrangement. 
This is also what Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argues in assessing the decisive role 
of institutions for economic development. Using this analysis, we argue that resource-
rich countries with good institutions are more able to allocate rents into productive 
entrepreneurs in a producer friendly institutional setting.  
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The parameter λ in the model denotes the institutional quality, which reflects the degree 
to which the institutions favour grabbers versus producers. Formally, λ measures the 
resource rents accruing to each producer relative to that accruing to each grabber; λ = 
P/G where P is the rent allocated to producers, and G is the rent allocated to grabbers. N 
is the total number of entrepreneurs: N = nP + nG. 
When λ=0, that means the system is completely grabber friendly (P=0), such that 
grabbers extract the entire rent, each of them obtaining R/nG. A higher λ implies a more 
producer friendly institutional arrangement (higher P).  
When λ=1, there are no gains from specialising in grabbing as both grabbers and 
producers each obtain the share R/N of resources (as P=G).  
Accordingly, 1/λ indicates the relative resource gain from specialising in grabbing 
activities. When λ is low in some countries, the relative gain from specialising in 
resource grabbing (1/λ) is large. In countries where λ is higher, the resource gain from 
specialising in grabbing becomes lower, and the entrepreneurs are less willing to give 
up the profit from production to become grabbers.    
The payoff to each grabber is: πG = sR/N, where s is a factor decreasing in λ since each 
grabber gets less the more producer friendly the institutions are, as each producer’s 
share of the resource rent is λsR/N. There is also a positive effect on s from less 
competition between grabbers. 
The producers’ profits πP are the sum of profits from production π and the share of the 
resource rents λsR/N. Hence,  
πP = π + λs(α, λ)R/N. 
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We now turn to the productive side of the economy, since we are interested to know 
how natural resources affect incentives to industrialise. There are L workers and M 
different goods; each one can be produced in a modern firm or a competitive fringe.  
There will be an institutional quality threshold λ = λ* that determines in which 
equilibrium an economy ends up:  
λ ∗≡ 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑁𝜋(𝑁) 
and we have the following propositions: 
1. When institutional quality is high, λ ≥ λ*, the equilibrium is production friendly. And 
when institutional quality is low, λ < λ*, the equilibrium is grabber friendly.  
This proposition shows how natural resources put the institutional arrangement to a test. 
The higher the resource rents R relative to the potential production profits 𝑁𝜋 𝑁 ,  the 
higher the institutional quality threshold λ*. Accordingly, more resources require better 
institutions to avoid the grabber equilibrium.  
2. More natural resources is a pure blessing in a production equilibrium – a higher R 
raises national income. More natural resources is a curse in a grabber equilibrium – a 
higher R lowers national income.  
3. In the grabber equilibrium (λ < λ*), more producer-friendly institutions (higher 
values of λ) increase profits both in grabbing and production, and thus lead to higher 
total income. In the production equilibrium (λ ≥ λ*), a further increase in λ has no 
implications for total income.  
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4. In the grabber equilibrium, a higher number of entrepreneurs N raises the number of 
producers np, lowers the number of rent-seekers nG, and leads to higher profits in both 
activities.  
This proposition states that a higher number of entrepreneurs is a double blessing. New 
entrepreneurs get into production, and they also squeeze the grabbers’ share to shift 
over to production. The reason is the positive externality in modern production.  
To see how the dynamics work, consider Figure 3-2, where it measures the number of 
productive entrepreneurs np on the horizontal axis and the value of resources R on the 
vertical axis. The long-run relationship between R and np is:  
R =     !!!! π(np) – npπ(np) 
In the producer equilibrium, np is by definition equal to 𝑁 . Thus, the long-run 
relationship in Figure 3-2 has a kink for np = 𝑁. The kink defines the separation 
between the grabber and the producer equilibrium and is thus given by R*. The long-run 
relationship between R and np is given by the bold curve in the figure. 
The figure also has iso-income curves. Each curve is downward sloping, as more natural 
resources are needed to keep the total income constant when the number of producers 
declines.  
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Figure 3-2: Resources and rent seeking 
 
The model assumes that we have two countries, A and B, where they have the same 
quality of institutions (the same λ), and the same initial income level. Country A has 
few resources, but a high number of producers, while country B has more resources and 
fewer producers. Country A, which starts out at point a, ends up in point a`. While 
country B, which starts at point b, ends up in point b`. The figure shows that the 
resource-rich country B ends up at a lower income level than the resource poor country 
A. The reason is that country A, because of its lack of resources, ends up in the 
production equilibrium, while country B, because of its resource abundance, ends up in 
the grabber equilibrium. Accordingly, over the transition period, growth is lowest in the 
resource rich country. This is a specific example of a more general result. As provided 
in proposition 2, country B would increase its growth potential if it had fewer resources.  
Next, we assume that country B instead had more producer-friendly institutions and 
thus a higher λ than country A. As country B now is more immune to grabbing, it can 
tolerate its resource abundance and still end up in the production equilibrium. As a 
result, the long-run curve for country B shifts up, as illustrated by the dotted curve in 
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the figure. With grabber-friendly institutions (low λ), country B converges to point b`, 
while with producer-friendly institutions (high λ), country B converges to b``. Income is 
higher in b`` than in b`. Over the transition period, growth is therefore highest with 
producer-friendly institutions. Moreover, with more producer-friendly institutions, the 
resource-rich country B outperforms the resource-poor country A, eliminating the 
resource curse. If country B was successful in being immune to grabbing, it would 
allocate more resources towards producer-friendly institutions, and therefore having less 
concentration in the non-tradable sector. As described earlier, producer-friendly 
institutions encourage growth in the productive tradable sector and therefore lead to less 
concentration in the non-tradable sector affected by the resource movement effect.  
To explain these diverging experiences in the long run, Figure 3-3 plots the relative 
employment share in non-tradable to tradable sectors versus resource abundance in our 
dataset using the ILO sectoral data. We try to illustrate labour movements between 
tradable and non-tradable sectors11. Panel (a) shows that the more the country is 
dependent on oil, the higher the share of labour is in the non-tradable sector. Panel (b) 
shows that oil countries with better institutions do not experience a big shift between 
tradable and non-tradable sectors, as the slope remains almost flat. Panel (c) shows that 
oil countries with bad institutions experience the resource movement effect in the long 
run, as labour moves from tradable to non-tradable sectors, shown by the higher relative 
employment share of non-tradable to tradable sectors.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 From the ILO dataset (ISIC-revision 3), we identify five sectors to be tradable sectors: (1) Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing; (2) Mining and quarrying; (3) Manufacturing; (4) Electricity, gas and water supply; and (6) 
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, repair of motor vehicles. The remaining four sectors are non-
tradable: (5) Construction; (7) Transport, storage and communication; (8) Financing, insurance real estate and 
business services; (9) Community, social and personal services. This classification between tradable and non-tradable 
sectors is based on the European Commission Annual Macro-Economic Database (AMECO). The full regression 
results are shown in the results section. 
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Figure 3-4 plots the relative concentration in resource to non-resource exports12. We can 
see from the three panels that there are no major differences between countries with bad 
institutions or countries with better ones. The figures indicate that all resource-rich 
countries experience a shift towards a higher share of resource exports compared to 
other types of exports, while the experience varies in terms of employment and 
structural change.  
On this basis, we emphasise that the variance of structural change performance among 
resource-rich countries is mainly due to how resource rents are distributed via the 
institutional arrangement. This variance leads to different concentration outcomes in 
tradable and non-tradable sectors, affecting growth in the long term.  
The hypothesis of the role of institutional quality on growth is consistent from 
observations of several countries. Many papers in the literature take the example of 
Norway and Botswana as two resource-rich countries that have been successfully 
growing and reversing the resource curse theory. Norway has turned from the poorest in 
Europe in the beginning of the 20th century to one of the richest around the world lately. 
Botswana has one of the highest growth rates since 1965 (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001). 
The literature relates this extraordinary performance to the high level of institutional 
quality. In the data section, we show the impact of resource abundance (oil discovery in 
this paper) on export and employment diversification.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 From WITS dataset (SITC 1-digit), we identify two sectors to be resource sectors: sector 3. Mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related materials; and sector 9. Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC.   
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Figure 3-3: Oil, the Dutch disease and institutions–(a) all oil countries, (b) with 
good institutions (c) with bad institutions 	  
(a) 
 
                                (b)                                                            (c) 
  
Notes: Resource movement effect is experienced as labour moves from tradable to non-tradable sectors with higher 
oil abundance. X-axis is oil dependency measured by oil rent share in GDP, data from the World Bank. Y-axis is the 
relative employment share in non-tradable to tradable sectors within the ILO data. Panel (a) includes all countries in 
our dataset. Countries in panel (b) are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Serbia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Venezuela. Countries 
in panel (c) are: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Cameroon, China, Cuba, Egypt, Gabon, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam. 
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Figure 3-4: Export concentration between resource and non-resource sectors with 
increasing oil dependency 
 
(a) 
 
                                (b)                                                            (c) 
  
Notes: concentration in resource exports, in all regime types. X-axis is oil dependency measures by oil rent share in 
GDP, data from the World Bank. Y-axis is the relative non-resource to resource exports from the WITS dataset. 
Panel (a) includes all countries in our dataset. Countries in panel (b) are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Venezuela. Countries in panel (c) are: Algeria, Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Cameroon, China, Congo Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Egypt, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab 
Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam. 
 
 
3.3 Related literature 
 
A few recent papers have included oil discoveries into their specifications aiming to 
study the resource curse. Lei and Michaels (2014) find that giant oilfield discoveries 
lead to armed conflict. They use giant oil discoveries as a measure for natural resources, 
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as they argue it is exogenous and could give more reliable results. A related paper with 
a different outcome is Cotet and Tsui (2013), where they use discoveries at all sizes and 
find no relationship between oil wealth and civil war. They agree with Lei and Michaels 
(2014) by arguing that the fixed effects model does not estimate the causal effect of oil 
on civil war, because oil exploration might be endogenous in that case. To handle this 
problem, they extend the analysis to instrument oil wealth by natural disasters. Arezki et 
al., (2015b) follow Lei and Michaels (2014) by restricting the oilfield discoveries to the 
giant ones. They claim that giant oil discoveries provide “a unique source of macro-
relevant news shocks,” as they test the impact of oil discoveries on a number of 
macroeconomic outcomes using the ARDL model.  
Several recent papers in the resource curse literature have challenged the idea that 
resources harm development (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009); (Smith, 2015). One 
concern in recent literature is that using resource share of GDP or exports as measures 
for resource dependency creates an endogeneity problem. Alternatively, Smith (2015) 
uses oil discoveries as an indicator of oil wealth, and restricts the sample to cover only 
the first discovery that raises the country’s revenues significantly. The paper uses a 
difference-in-difference analysis to find that following an oil discovery, there is a 
positive effect on GDP per capita in the long term. Michaels (2011) investigates the 
impact of resource abundance on growth in the U.S. southern counties over the long 
term. He finds that oil wealth caused the U.S. south to catch up with the north’s 
development. He uses large oil discoveries as a measure of oil abundance, aiming to get 
an exogenous source of variation. Further results show that oil abundance in these 
counties increased the employment share of mining, shifting employment from 
agriculture to manufacturing – which includes mining jobs – especially after the year 
1940. Moreover, the paper gives some explanation to that rise by showing an increase in 
	   63 
	  
population density in oil counties, caused by migration from other counties. An 
argument that could be raised in these papers is whether these discoveries were proven 
resources or only estimates. This depends on how thoroughly a given country has been 
prospected, and this could also be affected by the country’s wealth and institutions. This 
concern could also arise in this paper, and we argue that our empirical design controls 
for time-invariant factors present before and after discovery. We also control for 
previous discoveries in the last ten years to emphasise the country’s position in terms of 
oil wealth and institutions prior to large oil discoveries.  
A number of papers have studied the correlation between natural resources and political 
outcomes. Mehlum et al. (2006) use an institutional quality index to assess the impact of 
natural resources on growth, relying on the quality of institutions in a cross-country 
setting. Empirically, the paper shows that natural resources reduce income in countries 
with lower institutional quality, while income rises in resource countries with better 
institutions, such as in Norway, Canada and Australia. The institutional quality index 
they used is an average of five indices: rule of law index, a bureaucratic quality index, a 
corruption in government index, a risk of expropriation index and a government 
repudiation of contracts index. We show below that we use “Polity 2” from the “Polity 
IV” dataset to measure institutional quality instead of the weighted index proposed by 
Mehlum et al. (2006). Polity 2 gives a score from -10 to 10 to measure democracy in 
countries up to 2012. Jones and Olken (2004) test if development is affected by 
individual leaders, through using the leader’s death as an exogenous variation. They 
find that leaders have a significant impact on growth in autocratic governments but not 
in democratic ones. We follow this paper in classifying governments and by using 
Polity data as a measure for institutional quality. Apergis and Payne (2014) focus on the 
MENA region to study the correlation between growth in oil-abundant countries and 
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institutional quality. By using time-series analysis, they find that growth is more 
negatively affected in labour-importing countries than labour-abundant countries within 
the region. The paper emphasises the role of transparency and labour market 
liberalisation in enhancing the overall economic welfare. Williams (2011) tests if 
growth is affected by transparency, as a measure for institutional quality. He argues that 
lack of transparency can harm growth through less foreign direct investments and more 
corruption.  
Other recent papers study the political resource curse through tracking inflows and 
outflows in regional budgets. Caselli and Michaels (2013) track oil revenues in 
Brazilian municipalities to see how they would affect living standards and public goods 
such as education, housing and infrastructure. By using cross-region analysis, they find 
that a fraction of the oil revenue disappears before reaching public goods and services, 
as inflows and outflows do not match in municipalities’ budgets. The paper provides a 
full analysis of oil windfalls and uses multiple specifications, but its main limitation is 
the use of cross-region analysis instead of a panel, which could provide more robust 
results in terms of variation and exogeneity. Contrary to these findings, Cavalcanti et al. 
(2014) provide evidence of an increase in GDP per capita in Brazilian municipalities 
that produce oil. They follow Caselli and Michaels (2013) in studying the impact of oil 
production and discovery on public goods and services. The paper finds no evidence for 
a Dutch disease style crowding out of the manufacturing sector. Their results indicate an 
increase in average wages and worker density, and in local services. They also argue 
that the impact of oil wealth depends strongly on the institutional setting. 
The nature of incumbents also matter in influencing the relationship between resources 
and economic outcomes. Economic analyses of government are divided into two groups 
(Besley, 2007). One emphasises government in the public interest. It focuses on what 
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governments can do to improve the living standards of their citizens. Government 
supports the market system by establishing the basic judicial regulations and property 
rights. Government can support the private sector through regulating interests out of the 
private sector’s scope. Government can offer public goods that cannot be fully provided 
by the local market. In the second group, government is taken as private interest and a 
rent seeking target. Government might fail to keep the officials away from corruption, 
which leads to consequences against the citizens’ interests. Good government is partly 
initiated by good institutions, but it is highly affected by good leaders. To proceed with 
these questions, the main requisite is to study a model of how government allocates 
resources. A major difference between democracies and autocracies lies in the way the 
information is collected. For any kind of government, powerful, organised groups seem 
to be a big source of influence on government decisions. In addition, size of government 
is not hugely different between democracies and autocracies. Besley (2007) also 
concludes that democracy comes in many forms, and looking for an effect of democracy 
is probably misguided. He emphasises the concept of government failure, which “refers 
to problems that arise when one actor in the economy (the state) monopolizes the 
legitimate use of force” (p. 46). In addition, he stresses that while markets have their 
limits in allocating resources, so do governments. Acemoglu et al. (2003) address these 
issues and study macroeconomic performance in different governments. They show that 
countries with bad institutional quality “state failure” go through more volatile business 
cycles. They also highlight the importance of other factors listed in the literature, such 
as technology, in curbing volatility but still stress on the institutional quality as the main 
factor. 
Ross (2012) shows that it is true that institutional quality in oil countries is lower, but it 
is not because of oil revenues per se. Ross (2012) argues that oil countries not only need 
	   66 
	  
better institutions to manage oil revenues, they need exceptionally strong ones that 
should be developed in a short time. There are also several papers that discuss political 
elite behaviour to explain political outcomes. Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001) show that higher resource rents lead to higher political stakes, making 
the political elite unwilling to improve current political and economic policies. The elite 
do that in order to sustain their shares in rent seeking in the future.   
A number of other papers emphasise the role of institutional features in economic 
growth. Knack and Keefer (1995) show that property rights have a big impact on 
investment and growth. Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2014) find that resource rents are 
negatively correlated with financial development in countries with lower scores of 
Polity2, showing that resource-rich countries could be financially underdeveloped. 
Mauro (1995) finds a negative relationship between corruption and growth through 
cross-country data. Hall and Jones (1999) find a close relationship between output per 
worker and government policies. Klomp and de Haan (2009) find a negative 
relationship between democracy and economic volatility.  
Although recent papers on natural resources have provided more convincing empirical 
designs and models, the issue of endogeneity is still very plausible. We argue that the 
approach we follow in this paper is most likely to be exogenous for several reasons. 
First, the fixed effects model controls for any differences in the main characteristics 
before and after the giant oil discoveries. Second, as we show in the next section, none 
of the main country characteristics could predict giant oil discoveries. Third, we did not 
find any significant differences between treatment and control groups before and after 
giant oil discoveries, and the empirical design controls for time-invariant factors present 
before and after discovery. 
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3.4 A brief on oil discoveries 
 
In this section, we go through the background of the oil industry, and how explorations 
expanded geographically. We argue that the new giant oil discoveries are exogenous: 
not driven by a single country and mainly caused by global factors13.   
In 1859, Edwin Drake found oil in the first drilling attempt to solely look for oil in 
Pennsylvania. Before that, oil was usually collected from water surfaces and used 
mainly for medicine. The main origins of oil go back to 3000 B.C. in various parts of 
the Middle East, precisely in Babylon, and the site of modern Baghdad. Following 
Edwin Drake’s historical oil discovery in 1859, the oil industry was mainly developed 
within the United States, and later in Russia and some parts of East Asia. With the rise 
of World War 1, the demand for oil increased and thus the exploration attempts, which 
led to new discoveries all over the world. The higher demand helped improve new 
technologies facilitating the expansion of new discoveries. By the 1920s, the sub-
surface structure became easier as the seismograph was invented. The number of oil 
discoveries in the United States surged due to this invention and other technologies such 
as aerial surface plotting and micropaleontology. However, these technologies were not 
used to good effect in other locations as they did in the United States at that time, as 
Saudi Arabia was reported in 1926 to be “devoid of all prospects for oil” by a British 
geological survey.  Despite the expansion of oil discoveries around the world, only 
eight countries accounted for 94 percent of world oil production by 1938, with the 
United States dominating two thirds of this share.   
Following World War 2, discoveries expanded for a number of reasons. First, it has 
been argued that the access to oil was the main driver for the allied victory, as 
governments needed oil for their armies more than for commercial purposes. This led 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This section borrows heavily from the book The Prize by Daniel Yergin, and the book The Oil Curse by Michael 
Ross, and Smith (2015). 
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countries to expand into Africa during the 1950s; for example, France began to expand 
the oil industry within its African colonies. Despite the perception that Africa would not 
be a sufficient provider of oil, discoveries began to strike in the 1950s. France 
discovered oil in its colonies Gabon and Algeria, followed by Nigeria in 1956. These 
findings changed Africa’s status, to be seen as the “new frontier” of oil, leading to more 
major discoveries in Libya and the Republic of Congo, and more in other areas.  
Second, after the World War 2, countries focused on rebuilding their economies, 
increasing the demand for oil. Main drivers were the rising income and the expanded 
use of automobiles and other industries. Demand for oil increased by more than 550 
percent between 1949 and 1972. By 1970, the oil industry was more distributed, driven 
by the order of the “seven sisters,” the seven giant companies that controlled nearly the 
entire oil industry14, but at least that increased the competition around the world. 
Moreover, barriers to entry and risk declined, affected by advancements in technology. 
Some of these developments during the twentieth century were geochemistry, 
sedimentology, satellite imaging, and computing. Another major development that 
happened in the 1960s and 1970s is the creation of a coalition by the developing oil 
producing countries in the form of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). Moreover, most of the oil-exporting countries in the developing world 
nationalised their oil industries, and established state-owned companies to run them. 
These developments transformed the oil industry and the status of oil producing 
countries, introducing more power within oil producers around the world. Ross (2012) 
notes that historically, high-income countries have been about 70 percent more likely to 
produce oil than low-income countries. Nationalisation drove international oil 
companies to look for new discoveries in low-income countries to be able to meet the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The seven companies were Standard Oil of New Jersey (later Exxon), Standard Oil of California (later Chevron), 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later BP), Mobil, Texaco, Gulf, and Royal Dutch Shell. These companies merged later 
into a smaller number of companies.   
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rising global demand. That has shifted the oil distribution in the recent decades towards 
countries with lower income. Ross (2012) also notes that the number of oil producing 
countries has been steady during the period between 1976 to 1998, ranging between 37 
and 44 countries. That number jumped from 38 in 1998 to a record of 57 in 2006. Most 
new producers were low- and middle-income countries. The entrance of more poor 
countries had shifted the average of income in all oil producing countries from $5200 
per capita in 1998 to $3000 in 2004, Ross (2012) concludes.  
Another major step in the oil industry was the deep-water drilling that developed after 
the war. Offshore drilling attempts started by trying to find wells in shallow water near 
the coast during the second half of the 19th century. Major attempts occurred in 1947 
off the coast of Louisiana. Giant gas fields discovered onshore in the Netherlands led to 
offshore discoveries in the North Sea, of which the first discovery was in 1970. The 
North Sea discoveries were supported when geologists realised that the North Sea floor 
had similar geology to the land.  By that time, offshore drilling technologies improved 
notably and the major discoveries were made around the world, even in countries that 
did not have oil before such as Malaysia, the United Kingdom, Equatorial Guinea, 
Denmark and Norway.  
In brief, we argue that giant oil discoveries are exogenous to a single country and driven 
by global factors, such as advancement in technology and increased demand. Moreover, 
Smith (2015) finds that oil prices have no impact on major discoveries, as most of the 
discoveries occurred before the price hike in the 1970s; before that time, oil prices were 
fairly low.  
However, we agree with Smith (2015) that the distribution of discoveries can be 
predicted on some occasions. Some African countries suffered from shortage in 
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infrastructure after the war era, making it difficult for any attempt at exploration. But 
that depended on whether the country was a French or British colony or not. As 
discussed earlier, colonies had discoveries back in the 1950s, earlier than the remaining 
African countries, due to the availability of required infrastructure. To address this issue, 
we use country fixed effects to control for the country-wide differences, and time fixed 
effects to control for the timing of some discoveries.   
 
3.5 Data 
 
We use a dataset on oil discovery from Lei and Michaels (2014), which is based on a 
dataset by Horn (2003, 2004). Horn reports the date of discovery, the name of the 
discovering country, and a number of other variables, for 910 giant oilfields discovered 
both onshore and offshore from 1868 to 2003. To qualify as a giant, an oilfield must 
have contained ultimate recoverable reserves of equivalent to at least 500 million 
barrels of oil. To avoid measurement error, Lei and Michaels (2014) constructed an 
indicator for whether a country is mentioned in the dataset as having discovered at least 
one giant oilfield in each given year.  
Table 3-1 and Figure 3-5 show that discoveries peaked in the 1960s and 1970s, and a 
double-digit number of oilfield discoveries boomed in the late 1990s. Of the 910 giant 
oilfields covered in Horn (2004), and 782 covered in Lei and Michaels (2014), 364 are 
used in this paper to cover the period 1962-2003. This limitation is due to the data 
availability offered by UNIDO, ILO and WITS, where the earliest data available is 1962. 
However, our data on diversification continues up to 2012, to assess the impacts of 
discoveries that occurred during the 2000s in the long run, which is 8 to 10 years after 
discovery, as we show in the results.  
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Table 3-1: Number of one or more giant oilfield discoveries (from 1962 to 2003), by 
year 
 
 
The data contains 364 country-year observations, with giant discoveries accounting for 
5.2% of total observations. Table 3-2 shows that giant oilfield discoveries are rare 
events in most countries, and country-year pairs with discoveries were most common in 
Asia (40%), followed by Africa (17%), Europe (19%), South America (10%), North 
America (9%) and Oceania (5%). The treatment group is countries that have had at least 
one giant oil discovery during the study, which consists of 64 countries, whereas the 
control group is the countries that have never had any giant oil discoveries during that 
time which consists of 72 countries, providing a balanced comparison.  
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Figure 3-5: Number of one or more giant oilfield discoveries (from 1962 to 2003), 
by year 
 
 
Table 3-2: Number of years (from 1962 to 2003) with one or more giant oilfield 
discoveries, by country (treatment countries) 
Country Years Country Years Country Years 
Former USSR 29 India 5 Albania 1 
Iran 24 Algeria 4 Azerbaijan 1 
Saudi Arabia 24 Argentina 4 Bangladesh 1 
Australia 18 Colombia 4 Cote d'Ivoire 1 
Nigeria 17 Congo, Rep. 4 Denmark 1 
China 16 Kuwait 4 Ecuador 1 
United States 16 Qatar 4 Equatorial Guinea 1 
Norway 15 Peru 3 France 1 
Indonesia 14 Thailand 3 Gabon 1 
Brazil 13 Tunisia 3 Germany 1 
United Arab Emirates 12 Bolivia 2 Hungary 1 
United Kingdom 12 Brunei Darussalam 2 Morocco 1 
Iraq 11 Italy 2 Namibia 1 
Libya 11 Kazakhstan 2 New Zealand 1 
Mexico 10 Myanmar 2 Papua New Guinea 1 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 8 Netherlands 2 Philippines 1 
Oman 8 Pakistan 2 Romania 1 
Angola 7 Sudan 2 Russia 1 
Canada 7 Trinidad & Tobago 2 Spain 1 
Malaysia 6 Vietnam 2 Turkmenistan 1 
Venezuela 6 Yemen 2 
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3.5.1 Main variables 	  
 
1. Diversification measures: The dataset in this study includes sectoral data on structural 
change measured by employment, value added and exports. The number of countries in 
the dataset is 136, ranging between all levels of development. The observations are 
annual, covering the period from 1962 to 2012. There are many measures for sectoral 
diversification; most of them are borrowed from the income equality literature. Here we 
report the Gini index–other indices are available upon request (Theil and Herfindahl-
Hirschman). Table B-1 in the appendices presents descriptive statistics of these 
measures, and table B-2 in the appendices presents the correlation between all the 
measures, which is rather high. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) use Gini, HHI and the 
Coefficient of Variation. Cadot et al. (2011) use Gini and HHI and Moore and Walkes 
(2010) use only HHI. Lederman and Maloney (2003) use HHI. McMillan and Rodrik 
(2011) use the Coefficient of Variation. All three measures are calculated in this study, 
but we report the Gini index only due to the high correlation between the three measures. 
From Table B-1 in the appendices, we can observe that the highest diversification in 
employment (using ILO dataset) happened in Algeria in 1984. The highest export 
diversification (using WITS dataset) happened in Greece in 2006, while the highest 
concentration in exports happened in Libya between 1976 and 1981, dominated by the 
mineral exports sector. Full details on diversification data construction is in Appendix B. 
2. Institutional quality measure: The advantages of using the Polity dataset to measure 
institutional quality is that it covers a broad cross-section of countries throughout our 
sample in terms of both country and time. Acemoglu et al. (2003) describe Polity 
measure as “conceptually attractive since it measures institutional and other constraints 
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that are placed on presidents and dictators” (p. 52). The Polity dataset goes back to 
independence, and our diversification measures start only from 1962. However, 1962 is 
a good starting point, as more countries are independent (not colonies), which gives a 
better reading for their macroeconomic management and also for their Polity scores.     
 
Figure 3-6: Oil discoveries and diversification in exports 
   
  
Notes: y-axis shows the Gini coefficient in each country, the x-axis shows the years where data is available. Gini 
ranges between 0 and 1, where lower Gini indicates higher diversification. The vertical line shows the year of giant 
oil discovery in each country; the red circle shows the export concentration surge occurring after a giant oil discovery. 
Data sources: Exports data is from WITS. Oil discovery data is from Lei and Michaels (2014). 
 
Figure 3-6 shows that export diversification is affected by giant oilfield discoveries in 
both democracies (Denmark and Spain) and autocracies (Egypt and the Republic of 
Congo). The discoveries displayed in these figures are not necessarily exclusive; there 
might be more giant discoveries in other years.  
Figure 3-7 show a surge in employment concentration in democratic governments 
(Norway and Australia) and autocratic ones (Egypt and Indonesia). Of course, the 
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association between the giant oilfield discoveries and diversification might be 
coincidental, and among our data there are many discoveries that did not lead to change 
in diversification. The red circles in both sub-figures show that the surge in 
concentration following a giant oil discovery is inevitable in both governments: 
democracies and autocracies. However, in the next sections, we pursue the question of 
whether giant oil discoveries matter for economic diversification empirically and if it 
was affected by institutional quality. 
 
Figure 3-7: Oil discoveries and diversification in manufacturing employment 
  
  
Notes: y-axis shows the Gini coefficient in each country, the x-axis shows the years where data is available. Gini 
ranges between 0 and 1, where lower Gini indicates higher diversification. The vertical line shows the year of giant 
oil discovery in each country; the red circle shows the employment concentration surge occurring after a giant oil 
discovery. Data sources: manufacturing employment is from UNIDO. Oil discovery data is from Lei and Michaels 
(2014). 
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3.6 Empirical strategy 
 
In order to examine the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on diversification, we begin 
with a model following Lei and Michaels (2014):  
Div!"!! = β!"Disc!" + δX!" + α! +ω! +   ε!" ,                         (3-1) 
where Div!"!! is the diversification in country i in year t+j, Disc!" is an indicator for the 
discovery of a giant oilfield in country i in year t, X!" is the number of years with 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1. α! and ω! are country and year fixed effects, and ε!" is the 
error term. To start with, we estimate this specification for different lags j, where j ∈ 2, 
4, 6, 8, 10. This allows for examining the impact on the same year of discovery and the 
following years as well.  
For each specification, we present five different timings of the Disc!" dummy. To ensure 
that the effects in diversification are not simply caused by temporary changes, we 
include the timings (t+2, t+4, t+6, t+8, t+10).  Moreover, including the future timings is 
critical for tracking the structural change and export diversification movements over the 
long run.  
Next, we extend the main regression by allowing for the diversification outcomes to 
depend on the quality of institutions. In order to assess the impact of institutional 
quality on diversification following a giant oilfield discovery, we rerun equation 3-1 
after including the institutional quality covariate, which is an interaction between 
discoveries and Polity2 score for the year of discovery: 
Div!"!! = β!"Disc!" + δX!" + γDisc!" ∗ IQ!" + θIQ!" + α! +ω! +   ε!",                        (3-2)   
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where Div!"!! is the diversification in country i in years t+j, Disc!" is an indicator for the 
discovery of a giant oilfield in country i in year t, X!" is the number of years with 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1, Disc!" ∗ IQ!" is the interaction term between the giant oil 
discovery variable and the institutional quality measures, IQ!"  is the institutional quality 
measure. α! and ω! are country and year fixed effects, and ε!" is the error term.   
Interaction term = oil discoveries x institutional quality   
We compare between these discoveries which happened in a government that received a 
Polity score less than or equal to zero in the year of discovery, which we will refer to as 
“autocracies,” with those discoveries which happened in a government receiving a 
Polity score higher than zero, which we will refer to as “democracies.” Our main 
finding is that resource curse applies in countries with grabber-friendly institutions, as 
well as in countries with producer-friendly institutions, albeit to a lesser extent. These 
findings add to the resource curse literature in studying the impact of institutional 
quality on growth, measured by structural change and export diversification, as 
economic diversification fosters growth in the long run by attracting new economic 
activity and encouraging transfer of labour from low-paying jobs in low skill-intensive 
sectors to more productive jobs in high skill-intensive sectors. 
 
3.7 Empirical results 
3.7.1 Specification checks 
 
Before testing the impact of giant oilfield discovery on diversification, we test the 
underlying identification assumption – that giant oilfield discoveries are exogenously 
timed with respect to underlying economic conditions – by attempting to predict the 
discoveries using economic variables. To do that, we estimate a fixed-effects logit 
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model, where the independent variables are lags of diversification in different sectors 
and other economic variables, and the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 
one in the year of a giant oilfield discovery. As shown in Table 3-3, we find that the key 
variable of interest – diversification – as well as changes in other economic and political 
variables do not predict giant oil discoveries. We assign changes to differences in two 
years before discovery to be able to tackle any moves in investments and income that 
could occur at the beginning or end of the year prior to discovery.  
Table 3-3: Do political and economic variables predict giant oil discoveries? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Previous 
year’s polity2 
score 
0.005 
(0.020) 
    -.0331 
(.0403) 
    
Previous 
year’s sectoral 
employment 
diversification 
(Gini) 
 -0.593 
(4.017) 
        
Previous 
year’s 
manufacturing 
employment 
diversification 
(Gini) 
  -0.267 
(2.278) 
       
Previous 
year’s growth 
   -3.58e-14 
(9.60e-14) 
      
4-year lagged 
oil prices 
    -.0105 
(.0079) 
.00402 
(.0156) 
    
Change in 
income pc 
      -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
   
Change in 
government 
expenditure 
       -0.0174 
(0.228) 
-0.0118 
(0.0098) 
 
Change in 
investments 
     .0309 
(.0216) 
 0.0359 
(0.022) 
 0.0277 
(0.0205) 
Observations 2672 772 1437 2092 2130 384 2256 481 1057 481 
R2 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.24 
Notes: reported coefficients are from a fixed-effects logit model of the probability of a giant oil discovery occurring 
in a given year. Standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 5 and 6 show the impact of lagged oil prices on giant oil 
discoveries–we chose 4-year lag to allow for the time usually taken between exploration and announcement; however, 
we did not find any shorter lags significant (3, 2, 1 years). The only significant oil price lag is 5-year lag but only at 
the 10% level; this estimate becomes insignificant if we control for variables in column 6. Any lag more than 5 years 
becomes insignificant as well. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
	   79 
	  
3.7.2 Baseline specification and results 
 
To show how giant oilfield discoveries affect diversification, Table 3-4 shows the 
results of equation 3-1 before including any institutional quality covariates. The results 
show that discoveries in a country’s recent past have a significant negative impact on 
export diversification 8-10 years after discovery. This shows that resource countries 
tend to have more export concentration (mostly in resource exports) with more 
discoveries. These results suggest that giant oilfield discoveries in a country’s recent 
past have some predictive power for whether a subsequent discovery is likely to be 
made, as also suggested by Lei and Michaels (2014).   
 
Table 3-4: Effect of giant oilfield discovery on diversification 
Outcome in 
year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Panel A. Diversification in Exports 
Discovery -6.36 -7.41 3.35 12.81** 10.81* 
 (5.79) (6.19) (5.47) (5.61) (5.57) 
Past discoveries -6.14*** -5.87*** -7.16*** -8.35*** -8.07*** 
 (1.52) (1.50) (1.45) (1.56) (1.51) 
Observations 3677 3889 3971 3936 3900 
R2 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
      
Panel B. Diversification in ILO sectoral employment 
Discovery -0.07 -0.34 3.57 1.43 -2.79 
 (4.17) (4.37) (3.99) (4.46) (4.23) 
Past discoveries -4.14*** -3.97*** -4.26*** -4.05*** -3.62*** 
 (0.94) (0.99) (0.93) (1.04) (0.95) 
Observations 2049 2191 2232 2205 2178 
R2 0.84 0.826 0.817 0.814 0.813 
Panel C. Diversification in UNIDO manufacturing employment 
Discovery -0.55 4.11 2.07 -4.15 -3.67 
 (3.48) (3.53) (3.74) (3.46) (3.34) 
Past discoveries 0.27 -0.22 0.09 0.85 0.74 
 (0.93) (0.93) (0.97) (0.94) (0.90) 
Observations 3120 3244 3289 3263 3235 
R2 0.871 0.868 0.867 0.866 0.866 
Notes: Gini index is reported. All regressions control for the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1, and 
country and year fixed effects. Data sources: (A) export data is from WITS; (B) Sectoral employment is from ILO; 
and (C) manufacturing employment is from UNIDO. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All coefficients are 
multiplied by 1000. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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As a robustness check for these results, Figure 3-8 shows estimates of equation 3-1 for 
all measures of diversification before and after discovery ranging from t-4 to t+10. All 
sub-figures suggest that diversification did not change much prior to giant oilfield 
discoveries. However, responses to discovery vary between sub figures. Sub-figure A 
shows concentration in exports 8-10 years after discovery, Sub-figure B shows a slight 
surge in concentration in sectoral employment around 6 years after discovery and fades 
after that, and Sub-figure C shows a slight surge in concentration in manufacturing 
employment around 4 years after discovery. By comparing these figures to the results, 
we can identify the insignificant impacts on diversification that occurred in both 
sectoral employment and manufacturing employment (Sub-figures B and C). In addition, 
one might argue that smaller oil discoveries could also have an impact on diversification. 
To tackle this concern, we examine the relationship between the size of oilfields and 
diversification. Specifically, we test if non-giant oilfield discoveries could have any 
impact on diversification. Table B-3 in Appendix B shows that results were mainly 
insignificant, indicating that major and smaller oil discoveries have no significant 
impacts on diversification in exports, employment or added value.  
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Figure 3-8: Impact of giant oilfield discovery on diversification in exports, in 
sectoral employment, in manufacturing employment and value added 
 
Notes: The x-axes report the number of years before or after t, ranging from t-4 to t+10. The black lines show the 
estimated coefficients, and the grey lines show the 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, which 
are clustered by country. All regressions control for previous discoveries (t-1 to t-10) and include country and year 
fixed effects. Details on variable construction can be found in the data section of the paper.  
 
Another concern is that even giant oilfield discoveries vary in their sizes, so what would 
happen if the smaller ones among the giant group are also effective? That could raise a 
question on the usefulness of limiting the data to the giant discoveries only. To 
investigate this concern, we test the relationship between the different sizes of giant 
discoveries and diversification. We divide the giant oilfield discoveries by the size of 
the estimated ultimate recoverable reserves, into four quartiles. In table B-4 in the 
appendices, we can see that the effect of the smaller three quartiles are mostly 
insignificant; some are significant only at the 10% level of confidence. However, we 
find the highest significant negative impact of discoveries in the 4th quartile, which 
contains the biggest amount of recoverable reserves (quartile 4 ∈ [2733, 160,673]). We 
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find a highly significant negative impact on export diversification around 8 years after 
discovery.  
 
3.7.3 Diversification and institutional quality 	  
Table 3-5 shows the results of equation 3-2 where we add the institutional quality 
measures. Based on the resource curse theory, our prediction is that the resource 
abundance increases concentration in non-tradable sectors, and therefore there is less 
diversification only when the institutions are grabber friendly. Therefore, we should 
expect that the interaction term has a negative coefficient. This is what we find in Table 
3-5: the interaction term has a positive impact on diversification in all panels. However, 
the magnitude varies.   
 The results suggest that the institutional quality measure has significant impacts in 
most panels, although not all timings, with a persistent positive correlation with 
diversification. Intuitively, higher Polity2 scores lead to higher diversification after 
discovery. We will investigate this argument further in the next section. The results 
suggest a number of main ideas. First, the impact of discoveries on exports’ 
diversification does not change significantly before and after controlling for the 
institutional quality measure, indicating that all countries tend to get higher 
concentration in their exports in the long run following a discovery, regardless of their 
institutional quality. Second, the impact on employment in Panels B and C (sectoral 
employment and manufacturing employment) was not significant in the baseline 
specification, but after including the institutional quality covariates we find more 
significant impact on diversification in the short and long run. The interaction term in 
Panels B and C is negative, indicating that stronger political institutions would lead to 
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less concentration (higher diversification) in the labour market, following a giant oil 
discovery. We assume that following a giant oil discovery any concentration in the 
labour market could be happening in the non-tradable sector, as suggested by the Dutch 
disease model. Accordingly, better institutions are more concerned about protecting the 
tradable sector from shrinking; therefore, diversification remains high after a giant oil 
discovery. However, we will investigate this assumption below. 
Table 3-5: Oil discovery, diversification and institutional quality (Polity2) 
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Panel A. Diversification in Exports 
Discovery -5.10 -6.94 4.82 13.54** 11.03* 
 (6.23) (6.61) (5.81) (5.97) (5.94) 
Discovery* Polity2t-1 -0.09 0.22 -0.70 -1.21* -0.83 
 (0.68) (0.72) (0.66) (0.62) (0.66) 
Polity2t-1 0.02 -0.16 -0.20 -0.15 -0.17 
 (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
Past discoveries -5.66*** 
-
5.08*** 
-
6.16*** 
-
7.29*** 
-
6.98*** 
 (1.54) (1.54) (1.48) (1.60) (1.54) 
Observations 3500 3703 3781 3746 3710 
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Panel B. Diversification in ILO sectoral employment 
Discovery 1.02 1.01 7.05 3.24 3.77 
 (6.14) (6.10) (5.38) (6.24) (6.04) 
Discovery* Polity2t-1 -0.29 -0.36 -0.82 -0.49 -1.26** 
 (0.69) (0.66) (0.61) (0.65) (0.64) 
Polity2t-1 
-
3.11*** 
-
3.21*** 
-
3.32*** 
-
3.37*** 
-
3.34*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) 
Past discoveries -1.79* -1.59* -1.77** -1.53 -1.13 
 (0.92) (0.96) (0.90) (0.98) (0.92) 
Observations 1981 2119 2158 2131 2104 
R2 0.858 0.843 0.835 0.833 0.832 
Panel C. Diversification in UNIDO manufacturing employment 
Discovery 1.34 6.05 3.28 -4.57 -3.43 
 (3.87) (3.79) (4.15) (3.87) (3.69) 
Discovery* Polity2t-1 -1.04** 
-
1.15*** -0.95** -0.12 -0.27 
 (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.41) (0.41) 
Polity2t-1 
-
1.52*** 
-
1.49*** 
-
1.55*** 
-
1.61*** 
-
1.61*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Past discoveries 1.14 0.63 1.05 1.84* 1.70* 
 (0.93) (0.93) (0.98) (0.95) (0.92) 
Observations 2955 3077 3121 3095 3067 
R2 0.878 0.875 0.873 0.873 0.873 
Notes: Gini index is reported. All regressions control for polity2, the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-
1, and country and year fixed effects. Data sources: (A) exports data is from WITS; (B) Sectoral employment is from 
ILO; and (C) manufacturing employment is from UNIDO. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All coefficients 
are multiplied by 1000 to improve readability. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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One concern is the possibility that the institutional quality measure may be endogenous 
with respect to natural resources. Ross (2001) addresses this issue and argues that oil 
countries are not politically weak because of oil per se. He adds that oil rent seeking 
might have slowed the improvement, but it is not the main reason behind worse 
institutions. In addition, Sachs and Warner (1995) address this issue and show a weak 
correlation between institutional quality and resource abundance. This potential 
endogeneity is not a major concern for the empirical results, as we only address the 
association between the concerned variables. However, we still take this concern into 
consideration and we follow Jones and Olken (2004) methodology in observing the 
Polity2 score in the year prior to the discovery year. This mechanism allows assessing 
the institutional quality of each government one year before discovery, to avoid any 
institutional changes that could occur in the same year of discovery as an endogenous 
effect. Next, we test the impact of another institutional quality measure – constraints on 
the chief executives. We follow the same approach in tackling the endogeneity concern 
applied to Polity2 as discussed above. According to Polity IV project, this measure 
reflects the institutionalised constraints on the power of the decision makers in the 
government. The measure spans from one to seven, with greater values indicating 
tighter constraints. Panel A in Table 3-6 shows that the interaction term is negative and 
becomes significant at the 5% level after eight years of discovery, indicating that 
stronger political institutions, through limiting executive power, increase the export 
diversification. Panel B examines the impact on sectoral employment diversification 
(ILO dataset) and shows stronger impacts. The interaction term is more frequently 
negative in the long run and becomes significant at the 1% level after 10 years of 
discovery, indicating that stronger political institutions, through limiting executive 
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power, have a higher impact on employment and structural change than on exports. 
Panel C did not give consistent results in the case of executive constraints.  
 
 
 
Table 3-6: Oil discovery, diversification and institutional quality (executive 
constraints) 
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Panel A. Diversification in Exports 
Discovery -4.19 -5.29 1.39 15.09*** 11.85** 
 (6.15) (6.73) (5.84) (5.82) (5.91) 
Discovery*xconst -0.42 -0.43 0.55 -0.79** -0.51 
 (0.49) (0.40) (0.49) (0.33) (0.37) 
Executive 
constraints 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Past discoveries -5.99*** -5.68*** -6.96*** -7.97*** -7.72*** 
 (1.54) (1.52) (1.47) (1.57) (1.53) 
Observations 3516 3723 3803 3768 3732 
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Panel B. Diversification in ILO sectoral employment 
Discovery -2.77 -0.22 25.70** 18.57 23.44** 
 (4.25) (4.47) (10.95) (12.13) (11.37) 
Discovery*xconst 0.51** -0.13 -4.28** -3.18* -4.81*** 
 (0.20) (0.21) (1.78) (1.91) (1.80) 
Executive 
constraints -0.38*** -0.40*** -0.42*** -0.44*** -0.44*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Past discoveries -3.92*** -3.66*** -3.70*** -3.64*** -3.22*** 
 (0.95) (1.00) (0.94) (1.03) (0.96) 
Observations 1981 2119 2158 2131 2104 
R2 0.85 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Panel C. Diversification in UNIDO manufacturing employment 
Discovery -1.27 4.78 0.22 -4.33 -3.42 
 (3.69) (3.72) (3.89) (3.71) (3.74) 
Discovery*xconst 0.24 -0.01 0.42* -0.07 -0.17 
 (0.25) (0.29) (0.22) (0.25) (0.36) 
Executive 
constraints 0.11* 0.11* 0.08 0.12* 0.12* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Past discoveries 0.48 -0.05 0.41 1.14 1.02 
 (0.94) (0.94) (0.98) (0.95) (0.92) 
Observations 2959 3081 3125 3099 3071 
R2 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Notes: Gini index is reported. All regressions control for polity2, the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-
1, and country and year fixed effects. Data sources: (A) export data is from WITS; (B) Sectoral employment is from 
ILO; and (C) manufacturing employment is from UNIDO. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All coefficients 
are multiplied by 1000 to improve readability. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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These results suggest that weaker political institutions worsen the impact of oil 
discoveries on diversification. Producer-friendly institutions may effectively curb rent 
seeking behaviour, making more resource rents available to improve the non-oil sector, 
especially the tradables. These findings suggest that oil-rich economies need stronger 
than usual institutions that are highly monitored with effective checks and balances to 
contain the potential damage from rent seeking following giant oil discoveries and their 
anticipated rents. Our empirical findings on the interaction between natural resource 
dependence and institutions accord with those of Arezki and Gylfason (2013) and 
Mehlum et al. (2006). 
 
3.7.4 Tradables vs. non-tradables 	  
To foster our understanding of the effect of the interaction between giant oil discoveries 
and institutions on diversification, it is useful to investigate if the noted high 
concentration that happens following giant discoveries falls in the tradable or the non-
tradable sectors. We explore this question in Table 3-7, by examining how giant oil 
discoveries and their interaction with the Polity2 score affect the likelihood of 
employment in tradable versus non-tradable sectors as an outcome variable, instead of 
the diversification measures reported earlier.   
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Table 3-7: Giant oil discoveries and the share of non-tradable to tradable sector 
employment 
Dependent variable: relative share of employment in non-tradable to tradable sectors  
 t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Discovery 0.029** 0.015 0.001 -0.003 -0.018 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Discovery*polity2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004** -0.004** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Polity2 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Past discoveries -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 1993 2136 2181 2158 2136 
R2 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 
 
Notes: From the ILO dataset (ISIC-revision 3), we identify five sectors to be tradable sectors: 1. Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing; 2. Mining and quarrying; 3. Manufacturing; 4. Electricity, gas and water supply; and 6. 
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, repair of motor vehicles. The remaining four sectors are non-
tradable: 5. Construction; 7. Transport, storage and communication; 8. Financing, insurance real estate and business 
services; 9. Community, social and personal services. This classification between tradable and non-tradable sectors is 
based on the European Commission Annual Macro-Economic Database (AMECO). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. All regressions control for polity2, the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1, and country 
and year fixed effects.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
In Table 3-7, we provide evidence supporting our argument by documenting that giant 
oil discoveries lead to higher (lower) employment share in the non-tradable sectors 
compared to tradable sectors in countries with lower (higher) Polity2 scores. Intuitively, 
countries with more grabber-friendly institutions tend to suffer more from the Dutch 
disease as more new jobs are created in the non-tradable sector compared to the tradable 
sector. That might have been caused by higher demand in the services and other non-
tradable sectors, which emphasises the resource movement effect following a resource 
boom. These results accord with the Dutch disease dynamics suggested by Van der 
Ploeg and Venables (2013), who argue that structural change happens in the economy 
following a resource discovery. 
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3.8 Conclusion  
 
This paper estimates the causal impact of natural resources in different sets of 
institutional quality on the existence of a resource curse, measured by diversification 
indicators in exports and employment. We find that countries respond differently to 
giant oil discoveries, as we aim to show if the quality of institutions determines whether 
countries avoid resource curse or not. The combination of grabber-friendly institutions 
and giant oil discoveries leads to a less diversified economy in non-tradable sectors, 
whereas producer-friendly institutions help countries to take full advantage of these 
discoveries and the following revenues, and maintain the employment share in the 
manufacturing sector and tradables. However, we find little evidence that producer-
friendly institutions help countries to avoid export concentration, as all countries tend to 
have concentrated exports with large shares in the resource sector.  
Results indicate that the manufacturing sector is the most negatively affected sector. 
More labour movements out of the tradable sector could have a negative impact on 
growth in the long run, which might be a single step towards the spending effect of the 
Dutch disease. It is possible that the final impact would take a longer time to stabilise 
than is studied here.  
It is, however, challenging even for countries with good institutions to maintain labour 
in the manufacturing sector, being crowded out in exports’ share. Norway’s resource 
exports reached almost 50% of total exports in 2013, crowding out other tradables, as 
manufactures’ share in exports dropped from almost 70% in 1972 to only 17% in 2013. 
The shares per se should not be a concern, but the association with less non-resource 
output should be alarming, calling for further enhancements in supporting producer-
friendly institutions in these countries, as the good performance may not last for long. 
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These results add to the Dutch disease main theory when gas production negatively 
affected the manufacturing sector even in countries with good institutions, such as the 
Netherlands. 
The question remains: Why is relatively better performance in resource countries 
associated with better institutional quality? This could give room for more future 
research to investigate different institutional quality measures and the specific types of 
regulations that support producer friendly institutions.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
4 Oil Booms, Dutch Disease and 
Manufacturing Growth 
	  
	  
4.1 Introduction 	  
Oil and gas production has affected producer countries worldwide, and many countries 
have been affected both positively and negatively by the booms and busts of the past 40 
years. A major question in front of governments is the impact on the manufacturing 
sector, as many countries rely on trading manufactured products – a lot more than they 
do on services – for long-term growth and productivity. If the tradable sector is 
negatively affected, governments begin to get concerned about the potential “Dutch 
Disease,” which is a widely-used term in the development literature as a leading 
mechanism for a “Natural Resource Curse.” The Economist magazine coined the term 
in 1977 to explain the gas boom implications on the Dutch economy. The “resource 
curse” was first noted by Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001), who show a significant 
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negative relationship between natural resource dependence and growth in GDP per 
capita. They also argue that resource abundance squeezes the manufacturing sector, as 
in the Dutch disease model. Other studies considered oil rents specifically and find a 
negative relation between oil rents and economic performance (Sala-i-Martin & 
Subramanian, 2003). 
The extensive literature on the Dutch disease (Krugman, 1987; Van Wijnbergen, 1984; 
Van der Ploeg & Venables, 2013) is pioneered by Corden and Neary (1982), who show 
a decline in manufacturing employment and exports as a result of resource boom. Three 
factors can cause this boom: a technology-induced rise in productivity, a new resource 
discovery, or a rise in the commodity world price. In this paper, we are able to cover 
two of these factors in our empirical strategy: a new resource discovery, and the rise 
(and fall) of the commodity world price. Corden and Neary (1982) distinguish between 
two main effects of the resource boom on the manufacturing sector; the spending effect 
occurs when a sudden rise in the value of the natural resource exports raises real income 
leading to extra spending on services, which raises export prices and leads to 
adjustments in real exchange rate. That makes exporting non-resource commodities 
more difficult, and makes competing with imports across a wide range of commodities 
harder. Foreign exchange earned from the resource exports may be used to purchase 
internationally traded goods, at the expense of domestic manufacturers of the goods. 
Simultaneously, domestic resources such as labour and materials shift to the resource 
sector, where the resource movement effect takes place. Consequently, the prices of 
these resources rise in the domestic market, thereby increasing the costs to producers in 
other sectors. Eventually, extraction of natural resources sets in motion a dynamic that 
gives primacy to two domestic sectors – the natural resource sector and the non-tradable 
sector, at the expense of more traditional export sectors.   
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Higher resource revenues accompanied by more income tax revenues might increase 
governments’ ability to support the harmed manufacturing sector by better 
infrastructure and policies that raise productivity (Michaels, 2011). On the other hand, 
higher income might have a stronger impact through the spending effect, leading labour 
to move out from the tradable manufacturing sector that is facing high competitive 
pressure to industries that meet the high local demand, mainly services and non-tradable 
manufacturing. Thus, even accepting the core model, the question of how a resource 
boom affects the tradable sector is ultimately an empirical one. For example, Forsyth 
and Kay (1981) argue that the manufacturing output in the UK fell in the 1970s as the 
UK started to produce oil at that time. They observed that manufacturing output has 
fallen in the UK by 10%, whereas it grew in Germany by 10%, and the two are 
comparable industrial countries. They argue that the difference in the UK comes from 
the increase in real national income, depressing the share of manufacturing and 
probably increasing the share of local industries to meet the local increasing demand. 
In this paper, we estimate the causal effect of two commodity shocks suggested by the 
Dutch disease hypothesis on the tradable manufacturing sector: giant oil discoveries as a 
resource discovery shock, and oil price boom and bust as a commodity price shock. 
Using panel analysis, we compare between countries that have discovered giant oilfields 
to countries that have not during 1962-2012. The methodology is adapted from Rajan 
and Subramanian (2011), which evaluates the impact of receiving foreign aid on the 
tradable manufacturing sector. We follow Rajan and Subramanian (2011) in using the 
dataset provided by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO): 
the industrial statistics database, which is derived largely from industrial surveys. We 
also follow their exportability classification in assigning certain manufacturing 
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industries as “exportable” and focusing on them to assess the impact on the tradable 
industries within the manufacturing sector.  
Oil discoveries will probably lead to higher oil revenues and hence local currency 
appreciation. This appreciation would likely affect local manufacturing firms through 
three different channels (Ekholm et al., 2012): first, through the firm’s export sales that 
would be harmed by competitiveness. Second, through the firm’s purchases in imported 
inputs that would get cheaper. Third, through import competition facing the firm in the 
domestic market, as imports get cheaper. Rajan and Subramanian's (2011) paper is 
based exclusively on poor and developing countries that receive aid. Therefore, their 
exportability index is based on labour-intensive industries that fit best within these 
countries. Since our data has a wider coverage and includes oil discoveries in the 
developed countries as well, we construct another exportability index, based on the 
same methodology of Rajan and Subramanian (2011), but which fits more the 
manufacturing exports in developed countries, which are usually more capital-intensive. 
We find it very useful to include the capital-intensive export index, as manufacturing 
has become more technological recently, and using both indices together. Rodrik (2013) 
argues that there are technological changes in manufacturing itself that have made the 
sector much more capital- and skill- intensive than in the past, reducing both the 
advantage of poor economies in manufacturing and the scope for labour absorption in 
the sector. We look into the heterogeneity between the two indices on three 
manufacturing outcomes provided by the UNIDO dataset: value added, wages and 
employment. We chose to expand our outcomes and not only focus on value added as in 
Rajan and Subramanian (2011), in order to be able to track spillovers within the 
manufacturing sector itself. Additionally, Allcott and Keniston (2014) suggest that the 
impact of resource booms on manufacturing depends on three factors: if local 
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manufacturing wages rise, if manufacturing is traded or not, and if there are local 
productivity spillovers from resources to manufacturing. We are able to test all of these 
channels in this paper, with more focus on the tradable industries within manufacturing. 
A major concern in our design is whether oil discoveries are exogenous or not. We test 
if related economic and political factors could predict discoveries and we do not find 
any significant impacts, proving the exogeneity of giant oil discoveries. In addition to 
the economic and political variables tested in this paper, one might also argue that 
governments or other entities could manipulate the exact timing of the announcement of 
a giant oil discovery. Arezki et al. (2015b) argue that this is not plausible in Mike 
Horn’s dataset that we use in this paper, as Horn shows that these concerns about a 
possible manipulation have little ground. In addition, they also argue that Mike Horn’s 
dataset is immune from such concerns, “as each discovery date included in his dataset 
has been independently verified and documented using multiple sources which are 
reported systematically for each discovery date” (p.15). We also address the issue of the 
possibility that past discoveries could predict future discoveries. Arezki et al. (2015b) 
show that previous oil discoveries could have two opposite impacts on the possibility of 
current and future discoveries. First, more discoveries could increase discovery costs, 
reducing the likelihood of future discoveries. Second, and on the other hand, previous 
discoveries enhance learning about the geology and therefore increase the chances of 
future discoveries. Accordingly, previous discoveries could have any of the noted two 
impacts. To control for this uncertainty and for the serial correlation that could arise 
between discoveries, we include the number of giant discoveries in each country from t-
10 to t-1 for each discovery in year t, in addition to the industry, country and year fixed 
effects in our empirical design.  
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Our second commodity shock, the oil prices boom and bust, is described by Bjørnland 
and Thorsrud (2016) as a major exogenous element that could potentially affect all 
sectors of the economy. We argue that oil price is an exogenous shock because it is 
driven by international prices that cannot be controlled by a single country, having in 
mind that the oil market in both the demand side and supply side is quite big. In this 
paper, we will only consider oil price shocks rather than all commodities, as it is the 
main variable in our identification.  
The literature focuses on two possible channels affecting manufacturing growth (Buera 
& Kaboski, 2009; Foellmi & Zweimüller, 2008, Ngai & Pissarides, 2004): first, 
demand-based reasons which rely on a shift in consumption preferences away from 
goods towards services; second, technological reasons that rely more on rapid 
productivity growth in manufacturing than in the rest of the economy. However, 
Matsuyama (2009) finds that the effects of technology and demand shocks depend 
crucially on whether the economy is open to trade or not. Hence, our empirical strategy 
tests if openness to trade could influence the impact of resource booms on 
manufacturing. We test for this impact to examine if higher government revenues lead 
to better policies that support the tradable manufacturing sector, as suggested by 
Michaels (2011).  
We find a significant negative impact of oil discoveries on the manufacturing sector. 
The concern appears if employment is declining in the manufacturing sector and instead 
moving into the non-tradable sector for a number of reasons (Rodrik, 2013). The most 
important feature of manufacturing employment is that much of it is labour-intensive, 
so it can absorb large amounts of relatively unskilled workers from the rest of the 
economy, especially in the developing countries. Harming manufacturing jobs while 
increasing resource dependency should be alarming for these countries.  
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This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to our knowledge, it 
is the first paper to test the causal impact of exogenous measures of natural resource 
booms on the manufacturing sector in that large a scale in time and scope. The paper 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between resource booms and 
activity at the manufacturing industry level in resource-rich economies. Second, our 
data covers both developing and developed countries provided by the UNIDO dataset, 
where previous papers covered only one country group, or a single country. Third, most 
of the literature analysing the benefits and costs of resource booms on manufacturing 
has been theoretical, and there are relatively only few empirical studies (Bjørnland & 
Thorsrud, 2016). The standard Dutch disease model in many of these papers does not 
account for productivity spillovers between the oil sector and the rest of the economy, 
through analysing the impact on total manufacturing.  
To address these issues with empirical evidence, we also test the effects on the tradable 
manufacturing industries. Other manufacturing industries could be growing to meet 
increasing local demand, as suggested by the literature, and thus could give misleading 
results to the Dutch disease hypothesis. To answer this question, we identify two 
structural shocks: resource boom shock, and commodity price shock. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to separate and quantify these two channels on a long 
panel on an industry level basis.   
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: the following section views related papers on 
oil discoveries, structural change and manufacturing growth. Section 3 provides a brief 
background and statistics on the two resource shocks used in this paper – oil discoveries 
and oil price shocks. Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the 
main results and discussions. Section 6 concludes. 
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4.2 Related literature 	  
The theoretical literature on Dutch disease has been far more developed than the 
empirical literature. Most recent empirical studies test common movements in 
manufacturing across countries where they find that the impact of resource booms on 
manufacturing is limited, if not positive. However, none of these papers accounted for 
manufacturing at the industry level and none of them highlighted the impact on the 
tradable industries, which are most related to the Dutch disease hypothesis. The 
empirical strategy in this paper accounts for that. 
Ismail (2010) uses sectoral data for manufacturing across oil exporting countries and 
finds that oil price shocks depress value added across manufacturing in countries with 
more open capital markets. Arezki and Ismail (2013) test the Dutch disease on a sample 
of 32 oil-rich countries from 1992 to 2009 and find that during an oil boom, fiscal 
policies have helped to reduce capital expenditure. Harding and Venables (2013) find 
that exports of natural resources crowd out non-resource exports. They claim that the 
impact on non-resource exports becomes greater in countries with high income and 
good governance, as these countries tend to have a higher manufacturing share in their 
non-resource exports.   
More recently, Allcott and Keniston (2014) investigate the impact of oil and gas 
discoveries on manufacturing in the United States. They argue that resource booms 
boost growth by increasing total employment and wages. They also suggest that 
manufacturing employment, output and productivity are all pro-cyclical with resource 
booms. They argue that these results challenge the argument that natural resource 
extraction is unlikely to drive growth. 
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Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2016) study productivity spillovers between the booming 
resource sector and other domestic sectors, and find that Norway and Australia (two 
resource-rich countries) are facing a two-speed economy where services and non-
tradables are growing at a much faster pace than manufacturing and tradables. They find 
that resource booms have significant and positive productivity spillovers on non-
resource non-tradable sectors in both countries. They also find some differences 
between the two countries’ performance after discovery, depending on the resource 
dependency level and the real exchange rate fluctuation. They argue that increased 
activity in the technologically intense service sectors and the boost in government 
spending derived by changes in the commodity price had a positive impact on value 
added and employment in the Norwegian economy, while the Australian economy 
captures the full effect of the Dutch disease and manufacturing declines. Rajan and 
Subramanian (2011) test aid rather than resources as the windfall and find that aid 
inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country’s competitiveness, reflected in the 
lower relative growth rate of tradable industries, measured by the growth in 
manufacturing value added. Accordingly, even aid inflows do cause Dutch disease. 
A few recent papers have included oil discoveries into their specifications aiming to 
study the resource curse. Lei and Michaels (2014) find that giant oilfield discoveries can 
lead to armed conflict. They use giant oil discoveries as a measure for natural resources, 
as they argue it is exogenous and could give more reliable results. A related paper with 
a different outcome is Cotet and Tsui (2013), where they use discoveries of all sizes and 
find no relationship between oil wealth and civil war. They agree with Lei and Michaels 
(2014) by arguing that the fixed effects model does not estimate the causal effect of oil 
on civil war, because oil exploration might be endogenous in that case. To handle this 
problem, they extend the analysis to instrument oil wealth by natural disasters and 
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proven oil reserves. Arezki et al. (2015b) follow Lei and Michaels (2014) by restricting 
the oilfield discoveries to the giant ones. They claim that giant oil discoveries provide 
“a unique source of macro-relevant news shocks” (p.3), as they test the impact of oil 
discoveries on a number of macroeconomic outcomes using ARDL model. Arezki et al. 
(2015a) study the discoveries’ impact on conflict, Arezki et al. (2015b) study the impact 
on macroeconomic outcomes, and Smith (2015) studies the impact on GDP growth. 
In the literature investigating productivity growth and structural change, McMillan and 
Rodrik (2011) argue that there are large productivity gaps between different parts of the 
economy in developing countries and between different firms within the same part or 
industry. These gaps are smaller in developed countries. They acknowledge that 
structural change could move in different directions along with the economic 
development process. In resource-rich countries in particular, natural resources do not 
generate much employment compared to manufacturing and other tradable sectors, 
which takes structural change in a direction away from productive sectors. In Africa and 
Latin America, for example, manufacturing and some other modern sectors have lost 
employment to lower productivity services and informal activities. 
Rodrik (2012) argues that too much of an economy’s resources can get stuck in the 
‘‘wrong’’ sectors – those that are in the informal sector. Even if resource-rich countries 
are doing well in terms of growth coming from the informal or from the non-tradable 
services sectors, manufacturing tradables could still be an important phase in these 
countries’ growth path, especially if these countries still have a significant portion of 
unskilled labour that might not be working in a high-productivity high-skill service 
industry or even a tech-based manufacturing industry. He adds that natural resource 
booms can definitely fuel growth, but could also come with many problems: capital-
intensity, low labour absorption, and the politics of rents.  
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Some recent papers examine the growth in the manufacturing sector. Diao and 
McMillan (2015) study the overall African economy including both formal and 
informal sectors and find that the share of manufacturing exports in total exports is 
actually growing, and not primarily depending on natural resource exports. This 
increase was driven by a range of manufactured exports varying from labour-intensive 
activities, like textile and shoe manufacturing, to capital-intensive activities such as oil 
refining. Between 2000 and 2010, the share of manufacturing exports in goods and 
services more than doubled from 10% to 23%. They argue that it is more useful to 
classify modern economic activities in Africa based on the exportability, as 
manufacturing could be in both formal and informal sectors, while the informal sector is 
growing rapidly in Africa and employment rates are increasing there. We take this 
classification into consideration in our paper. They add that the informal sector is less 
dependent on globalisation where productivity is low, while productivity is high in the 
formal sector as it is more related to international companies operating across borders. 
On the contrary, Rodrik (2016) finds that the manufacturing share in both employment 
and real value added has been falling in developing countries since the 1980s, with 
some exceptions in Asia. Manufacturing typically follows an inverted U-shaped path 
over the course of development, but it usually falls if the country does not have a 
comparative advantage.   
On the impact of real exchange rate appreciation on local economies, Kenen and Rodrik 
(1986) argue that the experience with real exchange volatility has differed greatly across 
countries. Plus, this volatility depresses the volume of international trade. Chatterjee et 
al.	  (2013) find that if real exchange rate appreciates, firms expand their product scope so 
their sales distribution across different products becomes less skewed in response to real 
exchange rate depreciation. Ekholm et al. (2012) argue that the extent to which a real 
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exchange rate shock changes the competitive pressure on a firm is determined by its 
exposure to trade. Real exchange rate appreciation shock led to less employment in 
exportable industries in Norway but a rise in productivity (and output) due to within-
firm improvements or cheaper imported inputs. The fiercer international competition 
resulting from real exchange rate appreciation may affect manufacturing employment 
by forcing restructuring in surviving firms, or triggering the exit of less profitable firms, 
both increasing productivity (output per worker). The paper also argues that 
productivity was not affected in sectors that experienced high import competition; 
instead, it increased in more exportable industries. Fung (2008) finds that the expansion 
of scale of continuing firms induced by real exchange rate appreciation contributes 
significantly to productivity growth at the firm level through exploiting economies of 
scale. As some firms faced by real exchange rate appreciation shock exit the market, the 
continuing firms gain a larger market share and their productivity increases. 
Although recent papers on natural resources have provided more convincing empirical 
designs and models, the issue of endogeneity is still very plausible. We argue that the 
approach we follow in this paper is most likely to be exogenous, for several reasons. 
First, the fixed effects model controls for any differences in the main characteristics 
before and after the giant oil discoveries. Second, as we show in the next section, none 
of the main country characteristics could predict giant oil discoveries. Third, we argue 
that the oil price shock is completely exogenous, as the prices are international and the 
market contains a large number of countries in both the demand and supply sides. 
Finally, the empirical design controls for time-invariant factors present before and after 
discovery. 
To sum up, the related literature suggests that if the exportable manufacturing sector in 
resource-rich countries is declining, as we find in this paper, while overall growth is 
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increasing (e.g., Allcott & Keniston, 2014, Smith, 2015), this would mean that growth 
in resource-rich countries is driven by growth in the informal sector (Diao & McMillan, 
2015), which grows through increasing local demand enhanced by the spending effect, 
and does not have a significant share in exports nor gets affected by globalisation 
(Rodrik, 2016).  
4.3 Oil discoveries and oil price shocks 
 
Oil discoveries: 
We use a dataset on oil discovery from Lei and Michaels (2014), which is based on a 
dataset by Horn (2003, 2004). Horn reports the date of discovery, the name of the 
discovering country, and a number of other variables, for 910 giant oilfields discovered 
both onshore and offshore from 1868 to 2003. To qualify as a giant, an oilfield must 
have contained ultimate recoverable reserves of at least 500 million barrels of oil 
equivalent. To avoid measurement error, Lei and Michaels (2014) constructed an 
indicator for whether a country is mentioned in the dataset as having discovered at least 
one giant oilfield in each given year.  
Table 4-1 shows that discoveries peaked in the 1960s and 1970s, but double-digit 
number of oilfield discoveries returned in the late 1990s. Of the 910 giant oilfields 
covered in Horn (2004), and 782 covered in Lei and Michaels (2014), 364 are used in 
this paper to cover the period 1962-2003. This limitation is due to the data availability 
offered by UNIDO, where the earliest data available is 1962. However, our data on 
manufacturing continues up to 2012 to assess the impacts of discoveries that occurred 
during the 2000s in the long run, which is 8 to 10 years after discovery, as we show in 
some results. 
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Table 4-1: Number of one or more giant oilfield discoveries (from 1962 to 2003), by 
year 
 
 
The data contains 364 country-year observations, with giant discoveries accounting for 
5.2% of total observations. Table 4-2 shows that giant oilfield discoveries are rare 
events in most countries, and country-year pairs with discoveries were most common in 
Asia (40%), followed by Africa (17%), Europe (19%), South America (10%), North 
America (9%) and Oceania (5%). The treatment group is countries that have had at least 
one giant oil discovery during the study, which consists of 64 countries, whereas the 
control group is the countries that have never had any giant oil discoveries during that 
time, which consists of 72 countries, providing a balanced comparison. 
Oil price shocks: 
The most significant oil price shocks took place in the 1970s when the Arab oil 
exporting countries declared an oil embargo in response to the Western support for 
Israel against Syria and Egypt at that time. Oil prices quadrupled between 1973 and 
1974, and remained high for several years. Prices hiked again in 1979 in response to the 
Iranian revolution. In 1981, oil prices crashed for a number of reasons; most 
significantly was oversupply, increase in demand for alternative energy sources and 
 
Year 
Number of 
giant 
oilfield 
discoveries Year 
Number of 
giant 
oilfield 
discoveries Year 
Number of 
giant 
oilfield 
discoveries Year 
Number of 
giant 
oilfield 
discoveries Year 
Number of 
giant 
oilfield 
discoveries 
1962 9 1971 14 1980 14 1989 7 1998 11 
1963 11 1972 9 1981 6 1990 9 1999 15 
1964 13 1973 11 1982 7 1991 6 2000 12 
1965 16 1974 9 1983 5 1992 8 2001 8 
1966 9 1975 12 1984 6 1993 4 2002 7 
1967 9 1976 10 1985 7 1994 4 2003 6 
1968 9 1977 11 1986 3 1995 9   
1969 12 1978 7 1987 4 1996 7   
1970 11 1979 9 1988 4 1997 4   
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declining economic activity in developed countries. Prices remained relatively low until 
the mid-2000s. Figure 4-1 shows a graph of oil prices in real U.S. dollars from 1950 to 
2011, with vertical lines representing the boom and bust periods. 
 
Figure 4-1: Oil price boom and bust periods 1950-2012 
	  
Notes: Oil prices are constant prices of oil in 2000. Red lines represent oil price shocks, oil booms from 1974-1980 
and 2002-2012, bust from 1981-1986, and valley from 1987-2001. Data source: M. Ross, Oil and Gas Data, 1932-
2011, Harvard Dataverse Network, 2013 provided by the QOG Basic Dataset 2015 (Teorell et al., 2015).  
 
We identify the boom and bust periods following the literature15. The boom periods are 
the years between 1974-1980 (boom1) and the years between 2002-2012 (boom2)16, 
and the bust period is the years between 1981-1986; we also add the “valley” period 
between the years 1989-1995. The data we use for oil prices is taken from the QOG 
Basic Dataset (Teorell et al., 2015).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 As mentioned in the introduction, we follow several papers by Hamilton (1983, 2009, 2011) among others  (e.g., 
Kilian, 2008; Smith, 2014). 
16 We also break up the 2000s boom into two booms: boom3 between 2002-2007 and boom4 between 2009-2012. 
This is to account for the oil drop in 2008. Results show same direction and are reported in Table C-5 in appendix C. 
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4.4 Empirical strategy 	  
We use the following equation to assess the impact of giant oil discoveries on several 
outcomes, following Rajan and Subramanian (2011): 
∆ ln 𝑌!"# =𝛽! 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐!" ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝑋!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦!"#!! + 𝛾! + α!   +ω! +   ε!"#	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (4-1) 
where	  𝑌!"# is the outcome of interest for industry i in country c in year t. Disc!" is an 
indicator for the discovery of a giant oilfield in country c in year t. Exportability index 
is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for exportable ISIC industries and 0 otherwise17. X!" is the number of years with discoveries in country c from t-10 to t-1. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦!"#!! 
is the share of industry i in country c as a share of total manufacturing sector analysed 
outcome one year prior to discovery (t-1). This is included to control for the possibility 
of convergence effects.  𝛾! is industry fixed effects, α! and ω! are country and year fixed 
effects, and ε!"# is the error term. 𝛽! is our main interest.  
The data for industry value added, employment and wages comes from the Industrial 
Statistics database (2015) of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) (INDSTAT2, 2013) series covering the years 1962-2012. The data is at the 2-
digit level of the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (ISIC, Revision 3) and has been available since 1962. This dataset offers a 
number of advantages and disadvantages. The major advantage for the INDSTAT2 data 
is the good coverage of countries going back to the early 1960s for up to 23 
manufacturing industries per country, and it is the largest industrial statistics database of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Rajan and Subramanian (2011) provide a detailed description of exportability indices: exportability index 1 is 
described as a “dummy that takes a value of 1 if industry i has a ratio of exports to value that exceeds the industry 
median value. For each industry, the average ratio of exports to value added was calculated using a group of 
developing countries”. Exportability index 2 is a dummy for industries (ISIC 321-324); we follow their strategy and 
build another exportability index instead of that, but depending on industries (ISIC 29-35). For full industry 
description please see Table C-2 in appendix C.  
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its kind18. Some papers in the literature use INDSTAT4 instead, as it provides more 
disaggregated data at the four-digit level for up to 127 industries, but on the other hand, 
it covers fewer countries, fewer years and is patchy for earlier years, making it 
impractical to work with for periods that extend before 1990. In this paper, we follow 
Rodrik (2013) by using INDSTAT2, which has the advantage of allowing us to increase 
the country coverage as well as present results for periods earlier than 1990. Yet we also 
use INDSTAT4 for robustness tests. We use INDSTAT2 to build the exportability 
indices 1 and 2, through matching the industries with the ones selected by Rajan and 
Subramanian (2011) for index 1-developing countries, and by choosing ISIC industries 
15-26 for index 2-developed countries, as shown in Table C-2 in the appendices.  
We should note that our data provided by UNIDO does not cover any activities in the 
informal sector and microenterprises, which are often excluded from such industrial 
surveys. We cannot be certain that the results are applicable to all types of 
manufacturing activities, and therefore we only claim that our findings are applied to 
the organised formal parts of manufacturing.  
Our main measure of manufacturing is the annual growth in value added, following 
Rajan and Subramanian (2011). In addition, Rodrik (2016) finds value added a better 
measure of manufacturing than employment share of manufacturing. Data of value 
added is provided in current U.S. dollars. We deflate these values using the US 
Producer Price Index from the International Financial Statistics to get real values.  
In this paper, we are not addressing the impact of resource booms on local demand or 
manufacturing for local consumption. We entirely focus on the tradable manufacturing 
industries. Our assumption is that if the real exchange rate appreciates in resource 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 As described by UNIDO: https://www.unido.org/resources/statistics/statistical-databases.html 	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countries caused by resource discoveries, their export competitiveness could decline. 
Therefore, we first test the effect of giant oil discoveries on the real exchange rate. Then 
we further analyse this impact by testing if real exchange rate appreciation (or 
depreciation) caused by giant oil discoveries has an impact on the exportability, by 
using the following equation:  
∆ ln 𝑌!"# =𝛽! 𝑅𝐸𝑅!" ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽! 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐!" ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝑋!" +𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦!"#!! + 𝛾! + α!   +ω! +   ε!"#	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (4-2) 
Equation 4-2 is similar to equation 4-1 – we only add the real exchange rate 
appreciation measure 𝑅𝐸𝑅!" to assess the impact of giant oil discoveries and the real 
exchange rate appreciation on the manufacturing value added within the tradable 
industries in oil countries 𝑌!"#. We follow Rodrik (2008) in calculating the real exchange 
rate appreciation measure, which is the logged deviation of the actual price level from 
the estimated price level using data from PWT 8.0. 
Next, we test the role of the country’s openness to trade in our model. These two steps 
are taken to be able to see if globalisation and openness have any role in this structural 
change, following Rajan and Subramanian (2011) and Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2016). 
Hypothetically, we are assuming that if real exchange rate appreciates after a giant oil 
discovery – caused by real revenues from oil exports in the medium term – the tradables 
should become more expensive in the international market compared to similar products 
from other non-oil countries. The competition will lead to less demand for the oil 
country’s tradables and eventually the tradables’ production will decline. In addition, if 
the country is more open to international trade, it should be more vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks affecting its own exports. For this assessment, we replace the real 
appreciation variable in equation 4-2 by the openness variable, taken from the PWT 
dataset.  
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After that, we test the second exogenous resource shock in our strategy by using the 
boom and bust as a test of a price-driven resource shocks. We use the following 
equation to assess that impact: 
∆ ln 𝑌!"# =𝛽! 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑚! ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽! 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!" +𝛽! 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑦! ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦!"#!! + 𝛾! + α! +ω! +   ε!"#	  	  	  	    (4-3) 
where	  𝑌!"# is the outcome of interest for industry i in country c in year t. 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑚! is an 
indicator for being between the years 1974-1980 or between 2002-2012, 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑡! is an 
indicator for being between the years 1981 and 1986, and 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑦! is an indicator for 
being between the years 1987 and 1995. Therefor, 𝛽! is the average difference in 
outcome growth rates in exportable sectors (indices 1 and 2) between treatment and 
control countries during the boom period, conditional on country, year and industry 
fixed effects. 𝛽! and 𝛽! have the same interpretation for the bust and valley periods. 
Similar to equation 4-1, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦!"#!! is the share of industry i in country c as a share 
of total manufacturing sector analysed outcome two years prior to discovery (t-2). This 
is included to control for the possibility of any convergence effects.  𝛾! is industry fixed 
effects, α! and ω! are country and year fixed effects, and ε!"# is the error term. One 
might argue that the valley period is almost flat and does not contain any significant 
shocks. We actually take advantage of this period to use it as a placebo shock, meaning 
that oil countries are expected to perform similar to non-oil countries during that time, 
as there are no significant movements in international oil prices (Smith, 2014). Corden 
and Neary (1982) suggest that testing the oil price shock should be applied to oil 
exporters exclusively, not oil importers (even if these countries produce oil, where they 
can benefit from a bust). So here we take out the oil net importers (shown in red in 
Table 4-2) to be able to compare between the two shocks. Corden and Neary (1982) 
argue that the effects of oil price shock are similar to those of an oil discovery.  
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Table 4-2: Treatment group countries, oil price boom and bust 
Country UNIDO 
Data 
Country UNIDO 
Data  Albania Yes Libya Yes 
Algeria Yes Malaysia Yes 
Bahrain Yes Mexico Yes 
Bolivia Yes Nigeria Yes 
Canada Yes Oman Yes 
Colombia Yes Qatar Yes 
Ecuador Yes Saudi Arabia Yes 
Egypt Yes Syria Yes 
Gabon Yes Trinidad and Tobago Yes 
Indonesia Yes Tunisia Yes 
Iran Yes United Arab Emirates Yes 
Iraq Yes United States Yes 
Kuwait Yes Venezuela Yes 
Notes: Countries in red are net importer oil producing countries and are excluded from the main regression; we add 
them in a separate regression – results are shown in Table C-4. 
 
Before we engage in estimating the average effect, it is probably worthwhile analysing 
some country-specific trends. In Figure 4-2 we examine the effect of giant oil 
discoveries on the 5-year average value added. The countries we choose for this graph 
are varied in terms of political backgrounds and economic development. We observe 
that value added in exportable industries grows relatively more slowly than for other 
industries after giant oil discoveries. The discoveries displayed in these figures are not 
necessarily exclusive; there might be more discoveries in other years. However, we 
chose to show discoveries 5-10 years apart from each other to allow us to calculate the 
5-year average in these figures.   
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Figure 4-2: Value added growth before and after selected giant discoveries in 
different countries with various backgrounds  
	   	  
Notes: The x-axes report the 5-year average growth in real value added in percentage terms; the y-axes show selected 
exportable industries in each country. Data sources: value added data is from UNIDO (2015). Oil discovery data is 
from Lei and Michaels (2014).  
	  
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Specification checks 	  
Before testing the impact of giant oilfield discovery on manufacturing, we test the 
underlying identification assumption – that giant oilfield discoveries are exogenously 
timed with respect to underlying economic conditions – by attempting to predict the 
discoveries using economic variables. To do that, we estimate a fixed-effects logit 
model, where the independent variables are lags of manufacturing measures in different 
sectors and other economic variables and the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
equal to one in the year of a giant oilfield discovery. As shown in Table 4-3, we find 
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that the key variables of interest – manufacturing value added and employment – as 
well as changes in other economic and political variables do not predict giant oil 
discoveries. We assign changes to differences in two years before discovery to be able 
to tackle any moves in investments and income that could occur at the beginning or end 
of the year prior to discovery.  
 
Table 4-3: Do political and economic variables predict giant oil discoveries? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Previous 
year’s polity2 
score 
0.005 
(0.020) 
    -.0331 
(.0403) 
    
Previous 
year’s real 
value added in 
manufacturing 
 1.57e-11 
(1.09e-10) 
        
Previous 
year’s 
employment 
in 
manufacturing 
  4.56e-08 
(4.20e-08) 
       
Previous 
year’s growth 
   -3.58e-14 
(9.60e-14) 
      
4-year lagged 
oil prices 
    -.0105 
(.0079) 
.00402 
(.0156) 
    
Change in 
income pc 
      -0.00006 
(0.0001) 
   
Change in 
government 
expenditure 
       -0.0174 
(0.228) 
-0.0118 
(0.0098) 
 
Change in 
investments 
     .0309 
(.0216) 
 0.0359 
(0.022) 
 0.0277 
(0.0205) 
Observations 2672 24448 27063 2092 2130 384 2256 481 1057 481 
Notes: reported coefficients are from a fixed-effects logit model of the probability of a giant oil discovery occurring 
in a given year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 5 and 6 show the impact of lagged oil prices on 
giant oil discoveries. We chose 4-year lag to allow for the time usually taken between exploration and announcement; 
however, we did not find any shorter lags significant (3, 2, 1 years). The only significant oil price lag is 5-year lag but 
only at the 10% level; this estimate becomes insignificant if we control for variables in Column 6. Any lag more than 
5 years becomes insignificant as well. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
4.5.2 Baseline specification and results 	  
After explaining our identification strategy, we now examine the model’s first 
assumption that giant oilfield discoveries harm tradable manufacturing. We begin by 
examining the impact of discoveries on the manufacturing value added. Table 4-4 
shows the results of estimating equation 4-1 with year-on-year difference in the log of 
total manufacturing value added in industry i in country c over the time period 
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examined in this paper, ranging from 1962-2012, depending on data availability as the 
dependent variable.   
 
Table 4-4: Giant oil discoveries and sectoral growth: manufacturing added value 
Dependent variable: annual growth rate of value added in industry i in country c (logged) 
Outcome in year: j=0 j=5 j=10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Oil discovery 0.003       
 (0.007)       
Oil discovery (t+j)   -0.007   -0.018***   
  (0.007)   (0.007)   
Oil discovery (t+j) 
*Exportability 
index (1) 
  -0.009   -0.015  
   (0.009)   (0.009)  
Oil discovery (t+j) 
*Exportability 
index (2) 
   -0.006   -0.014 
    (0.014)   (0.014) 
Past giant 
discoveries (t-10) 0.002 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry share (t-1) -0.532*** -1.057*** -1.062*** -1.061*** -1.067*** -1.072*** -1.071*** 
 (0.044) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) 
Observations 49481 56416 56416 56416 55908 55908 55908 
R2 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 
Notes: all regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Exportability index (1) is 
a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if an industry’s ratio of exports to value added is greater than the median value 
and is 0 otherwise, from Rajan and Subramanian (2011). Exportability index (2) is a dummy that takes on a value of 
1 for ISIC industries 15-21, and 0 otherwise (author calculation).   
 
 Column 1 shows the impact on the same year of discovery t, while Column 2 shows the 
impact 5 years after discovery on total manufacturing value added. We choose to start 
from (t+5) as we consider the oilfield production lag, which is the number of years 
between the giant oil discovery announcement and the physical production 
commencement, usually takes between 4 to 6 years on average (Arezki et al., 2015b). 
Then we continue to (t+10) to examine the structural change in the long run. 
 Interestingly, the number of giant oil discoveries in the past 10 years continues to have 
a significant positive impact on value added, indicating that if a country has more giant 
discoveries in the past – and therefore possibly more resource dependent – the value 
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added growth is positively correlated with more discoveries. In addition, we also control 
for the industry j’s value added share in total manufacturing a year prior to discovery in 
all columns. We find a consistent pattern that higher initial share of the tradable 
industries is correlated with less growth in value added. The results so far agree with a 
number of papers in the literature, by showing that resource abundance does not have a 
major negative effect on manufacturing. For example, Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2016) 
show that value added in manufacturing industries increases following resource booms, 
as these industries were boosted by government spending that increased through oil 
revenues.  
Our strategy continues to track the impact in the medium-long run to consider the 
production lag and structural changes within the economy. Columns 2, 3 and 4’s results 
show that the impact went in the opposite direction after 5 years, as growth of value 
added is now declining in our treatment group.  
In columns 3 and 4 we disaggregate the manufacturing industries depending on their 
exportability following Rajan and Subramanian (2011). Columns 3 and 4 show that 
value added in the tradable sector grows relatively slower than it does in countries with 
no giant oil discoveries. The impact is insignificant but still negative in both columns. 
The difference between the two columns is that the groups of industries included in the 
index exportability 1 are usually more labour-intensive and more frequent in developing 
countries, where industries in exportable 2 index are usually more capital-intensive and 
more frequent in developed countries in our sample.  
In the longer term, columns 5, 6 and 7 show the impact 10 years after discovery. We 
can see that the effect has now more statistical significance at the 1% level, indicating 
that manufacturing value added is negatively affected by resource discoveries in the 
long run. Manufacturing value added grew by an average of almost 2 percentage points 
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per year in countries with giant oilfield discoveries, slower than in countries with no 
discoveries. The negative effects on both exportability indices 1 and 2 industries are 
now higher but still insignificant.    
Next, we test if there are other manufacturing outcomes affected by the resource booms. 
Table 4-5 reports the results of equation 4-1 with a different manufacturing outcome: 
employment.  
 
Table 4-5: Giant oil discoveries and sectoral growth: manufacturing employment 
Dependent variable: annual growth rate of employment in industry i in country c (logged) 
Outcome in year: j=0 j=5 j=10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Oil discovery -0.010**       
 (0.004)       
Oil discovery (t+j)   -0.009**   -0.004   
  (0.004)   (0.004)   
Oil discovery (t+j) 
*Exportability index 
(1) 
  -0.007   -0.005  
   (0.005)   (0.006)  
Oil discovery (t+j) 
*Exportability index 
(2) 
   -0.009   -0.002 
    (0.009)   (0.010) 
Past giant  
discoveries (t-10) -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry share (t-1) -0.533*** -0.442*** -0.442*** -0.442*** -0.436*** -0.436*** -0.435*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Observations 56192 63010 63010 63010 61723 61723 61723 
R2 0.041 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
Notes: all regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Exportability index (1) is 
a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if an industry’s ratio of exports to value added is greater than the median value 
and is 0 otherwise, from Rajan and Subramanian (2011). Exportability index (2) is a dummy that takes on a value of 
1 for ISIC industries 15-21, and 0 otherwise (author calculation).   
 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4-5 show that total manufacturing employment becomes 
negatively affected by discoveries as soon as the discovery is announced and continues 
about 5 years after discovery. However, both exportable indices 1 and 2 interactions are 
also negatively affected but not statistically significant. So, if both exportable sectors 
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were not significantly affected, would this indicate that other non-tradable 
manufacturing sectors are the ones negatively affected – contradicting the core model of 
Dutch disease? We will still investigate the effect on wages to develop the full picture. 
These results could support the previous findings in the literature that the governments 
try to support the tradable sectors through more spending and investing, by trying to 
keep the employees in their jobs as much as possible. The impact is still negative 10 
years after discovery, as shown in columns 5, 6 and 7 but with no statistical significance, 
indicating that the effect on manufacturing employment occurs earlier than it does in the 
value added. Wages will give an additional insight into that effect. 
 
Table 4-6: Giant oil discoveries and sectoral growth: manufacturing wages 
Dependent variable: annual growth rate of real wages in industry i in country c (logged) 
Outcome in year: j=0 j=5 j=10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Oil discovery 0.004       
 (0.006)       
Oil discovery (t+j)   -0.003   -0.022***   
  (0.006)   (0.006)   
Oil discovery (t+j) 
*Exportability index 
(1) 
  0.001   -0.021***  
   (0.007)   (0.008)  
Oil discovery (t+j) 
*Exportability index 
(2) 
   0.002   -0.026** 
    (0.011)   (0.012) 
Past giant 
discoveries (t-10) 0.002 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry share (t-1) -0.433*** -0.508*** -0.508*** -0.508*** -0.306*** -0.309*** -0.307*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Observations 50577 57503 57503 57503 52396 52396 52396 
R2 0.062 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.056 0.056 
Notes: all regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Exportability index (1) is 
a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if an industry’s ratio of exports to value added is greater than the median value 
and is 0 otherwise, from Rajan and Subramanian (2011). Exportability index (2) is a dummy that takes on a value of 
1 for ISIC industries 15-21, and 0 otherwise (author calculation).   
 
The Dutch disease theory predicts that an oil boom should push up wages in the 
economy as a whole, which in turn reduces employment in the non-booming sector.  
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Columns 5, 6 and 7 of Table 4-6 show that the impact on wages takes more time to get 
through, as much as 10 years after discovery (we still find a negative impact 5 to 9 years 
after discovery but with insignificant coefficients). When examining the effect on wages 
10 years after discovery, we get significant negative results. We can conclude that the 
impact on tradable manufacturing sector wages is generally negative, and becomes 
more significantly negative in the medium-long run (10 years after discovery), lagging 
behind the negative impact on employment. Some papers in the literature claimed that 
wages and value added are channels to declining employment following resource 
booms. Our results bring a different perspective: 
First, we argue that declining output and wages are responding to the declining 
employment in manufacturing, by taking around five more years to reach the significant 
effect. Second, despite the insignificant negative effect on the tradable industries in 
employment and value added coefficients we find so far, the fact that the coefficients 
are negatively affected could indicate that the manufacturing sector showed fewer 
opportunities and became less attractive for workers, who might have shifted to other 
parts of the economy to meet the increasing local demand with probably higher wages. 
This argument is shown in the tradable industries wages coefficients, where both 
coefficients were negatively affected around 10 years after discovery as a result of less 
demand for these jobs. This also might indicate that governments are trying to support 
the tradable sector for some time, as suggested by the literature, but structural change 
takes place in the long run. Figure 4-3 plots these effects 4 years before (t-4) and 10 
years after (t+10) the discovery shock. 
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Figure 4-3: Impact of giant oil discoveries on manufacturing growth: in value 
added, employment and wages 
	  
Notes: The x-axes report the number of years before or after t, ranging from t-5 to t+10, depending on data 
availability. The black lines show the estimated coefficients and the grey lines show the 95% confidence intervals 
based on robust standard errors, which are clustered by country. All regressions control for previous discoveries (t-1 
to t-10) and initial manufacturing share, and include industry, country and year fixed effects. Exp1 indicates growth 
in exportable manufacturing industries in group “exportable 1” and Exp2 indicates growth in exportable 
manufacturing industries in group “exportable 2.” Details on variable construction can be found in the data section of 
the paper.  
 
4.5.3 Transmission channels  	  
Following our hypothesis above, as we are assessing the manufacturing industries, we 
can test more channels affecting these industries by measuring the real exchange rate 
appreciation after resource booms. After that, and following Rajan and Subramanian 
(2011) and Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2016), we test the role of the country’s openness in 
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the tradable sectors, to be able to see if globalisation and openness have a role in this 
structural change.	  	  
	  
Table 4-7: Real exchange rate appreciation and oil discoveries  
 
Dependent variable:  
Excess appreciation 
Dependent variable: 
Annual growth rate of manufacturing outcome in 
industry i in country c (logged) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Giant Oil Discoveries (t+5) -0.011***     
 (0.004)     
Panel A: dependent variable is annual growth rate of real value added in industry i in country c (logged) 
RER*Exportability index (1)  0.035***  0.026*  
   (0.013)  (0.014)  
RER*Exportability index (2)    0.007  -0.005 
   (0.018)  (0.020) 
Oil discovery (t+5)* 
Exportability index (1)    -0.022*  
    (0.014)  
Oil discovery (t+5)* 
Exportability index (2)     -0.009 
     (0.022) 
Observations 57684 14373 14373 13145 13145 
R2 0.68 0.049 0.049 0.052 0.051 
Panel B: dependent variable is annual growth rate of employment in industry i in country c (logged) 
RER*Exportability index (1)  0.003  0.000  
  (0.005)  (0.005)  
RER*Exportability index (2)   0.002  -0.002 
   (0.009)  (0.010) 
Oil discovery (t+5)* 
Exportability index (1) 
   -0.009*  
    (0.005)  
Oil discovery (t+5)* 
Exportability index (2) 
    -0.011 
     (0.008) 
Observations  65162 65162 58031 58031 
R2  0.037 0.037 0.034 0.034 
Panel C: dependent variable is annual growth rate of real wages in industry i in country c (logged) 
RER*Exportability index (1)  0.035***  0.050***  
  (0.010)  (0.008)  
RER*Exportability index (2)   0.036**  0.044*** 
   (0.014)  (0.012) 
Oil discovery (t+10)* 
Exportability index (1) 
   -0.028***  
    (0.008)  
Oil discovery (t+10)* 
Exportability index (2) 
    -0.031** 
     (0.012) 
Observations  56345 56345 49058 49058 
R2  0.056 0.056 0.061 0.059 
Notes: full details of regression (1) can be found in Table C-3 in the appendices. All regressions include country, year 
and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** 
and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level. All regressions control for the value added share one year prior to 
discovery (t-1). Regressions (4) and (5) control for past discoveries: the number of years with discoveries from t-10 
to t-1. Regressions for Panel A value added (t+10) give the same results as (t+5) and are available upon request.   
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We follow Rajan and Subramanian (2011) in this strategy, they find that exchange rate 
appreciation is the channel for Dutch disease where aid harmed tradable manufacturing 
when they introduced both coefficients in the same regression. They use the 
methodology in Rajan and Zingales (1998) that suggests that “one way to check 
whether a channel is at work is to see whether industries that might be most affected by 
a channel grow differentially (faster or slower depending on the nature of the effect) in 
countries where that channel is likely to be more operative. The industry characteristics 
we are interested in is the degree to which an industry’s competitive position is affected 
by exchange rate appreciation, the channel is real exchange rate appreciation” – in 
addition to trade openness – and countries that get oil discoveries are likely to be the 
ones where the channel is most operative. This approach gives an advantage to test all 
these effects simultaneously, by testing for these individual relationships in the data.  
 
In Table 4-7, we provide evidence that excess appreciation is not the channel through 
which resource discoveries affect exports, which also agrees with the core Dutch 
disease model. In Column 1, we show the simple reverse correlation between excess 
appreciation and giant oil discoveries, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that the coefficients have opposite effects on the manufacturing outcome19. If 
real appreciation was the channel, then like giant oil discoveries, it should have a 
negative impact on the tradable industries. We therefore test this result further and 
estimate equation 4-2, starting with Panel A in Table 4-7, where the outcome is annual 
growth in value added; columns 2 and 3 show that the interaction term between excess 
appreciation and both of our exportability measures is positive, although insignificant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 We got mixed results for the effect of giant oil discoveries on real exchange rate appreciation for each year after 
discovery up to 10 years. Although most of these results are significant at the 1 and 5% level, the mixed signals prove 
that the impact is temporary, as indicated by Corden and Neary (1982), or different from one country to another 
depending on its oil dependency and other factors, as suggested by Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2016).   
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for exportability measure 2. These results suggest that excess appreciation has a reverse 
effect of resource discoveries on growth in value added of tradable industries. And this 
is the same suggestion we get from the remaining panels B and C for employment and 
wages in tradable industries. This shows that excess exchange rate appreciation does not 
provide the same effect of resource discoveries on the growth in tradable manufacturing 
industries. 
To check these results, we introduce both the discoveries and excess appreciation 
interactions in the same regression as shown in columns 4 and 5. If the excess 
appreciation was the main channel for the causal impact of resource discoveries on 
tradable manufacturing, the effect of the discovery interaction should be weakened in 
the presence of the excess appreciation interaction compared to the baseline results20. 
We do not find these assumptions in all results. In Panel A, the coefficient estimate of 
the excess appreciation interaction for exportability measure 1 is now significant, 
compared to Table 4-4. In Panel B, the coefficient estimate of the excess appreciation 
interactions remained insignificant with less magnitude. The discovery interactions are 
similar to the results of growth in manufacturing employment in Table 4-5. In Panel C, 
the coefficient estimates of the excess appreciation interactions remain significant, 
while those for the discovery interactions increase in magnitude.  
These mixed results we get after introducing the excess appreciation measures provide 
evidence that excess appreciation cannot represent the channel through which resource 
discoveries influence the tradable industries. This suggestion agrees with the core model 
of the Dutch disease, when Corden and Neary (1982) emphasised that even if the 
resource boom leads to real exchange rate appreciation, real exchange rate appreciation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 We follow Rajan and Subramanian (2011) in this strategy, where they find that exchange rate appreciation is the 
channel for Dutch disease where aid harmed tradable manufacturing when they introduced both coefficients in the 
same regression. 
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should not be taken as a cause of de-industrialisation. The paper continues “it – real 
appreciation – should more properly be seen as a symptom of the economy’s adjustment 
towards the new post-boom equilibrium” (p. 841). These results also agree with Cashin 
et al. (2004) in an IMF study presenting evidence that for the majority of commodity 
exporting countries, it is the real exchange rate which adjusts to restore the long-run 
equilibrium with commodity booms, and it only takes half-life of adjustment of real 
exchange rates to equilibrium of about 10 months21. The study also suggests that the 
long-run real exchange rate of “commodity currencies” is not constant but is time 
varying, depending on the commodity booms. Speculatively, the impact of real 
appreciation on the tradable industries growth we find could possibly be temporary, 
while it is part of the new equilibrium and is not directly caused by the resource booms. 
The resource discoveries interactions continued to have the significant negative impact 
even after including the real appreciation interaction, giving more validity to our 
baseline results.     
Even if the real exchange rate appreciates in resource countries following resource 
discoveries, their export competitiveness could decline. At the same time, imports from 
other non-resource countries become cheaper. Therefore, government policies can play 
a major role in determining and supporting the tradable sector when the real exchange 
rate fluctuates. One reasonable way to test these policies is through the oil countries’ 
openness measures. We follow the same strategy used for testing the role of exchange 
rate appreciation to test if openness could possibly be the channel of treatment. To 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The half-life is the length of time it takes for a unit impulse to dissipate by half (Cashin et al., 2004). 	  
	   122 
	  
examine the openness and trade liberty we use openness from Penn World Table22, 
which offers a wide range of data in our panel.  
In Table 4-8 we include the openness measure interacting with our exportability indices 
in equation 4-2 by replacing the real appreciation interaction variables by the openness 
interaction variables. We find that the oil discovery interactions are still keeping the 
negative signs even after including the openness interactions, giving more validity to 
our baseline results. Yet these negative signs became more prominent in statistical 
significance, which might suggest that openness is a better explaining channel than real 
appreciation. Columns 1 and 2 for all panels test the correlation between openness and 
manufacturing outcomes without including the discoveries; the results show a negative 
impact in all panels, which is the same sign we got from discoveries, unlike the positive 
impact we got from real appreciation interactions in Table 4-7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 We use PWT 6.3 because new versions of PWT do not include openness anymore.    
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Table 4-8: Openness and the tradable sector  
Dependent variable: 
Annual growth rate of manufacturing outcome in industry i in country c (logged) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: dependent variable is annual growth rate of real value added in industry i in country c (logged) 
Open*Exportability index (1) -0.006  -0.004  
 (0.018)  (0.029)  
Open *Exportability index (2)  0.036   0.004 
  (0.025)  (0.038) 
Oil discovery (t+5)* Exportability index (1)   -0.003  
   (0.016)  
Oil discovery (t+5)* Exportability index (2)    -0.015 
    (0.022) 
Observations 46002 49045 46002 46002 
R-squared 0.046 0.051 0.046 0.047 
Panel B: dependent variable is annual growth rate of employment in industry i in country c (logged) 
Open *Exportability index (1) -0.006  -0.028*  
 (0.010)  (0.015)  
Open *Exportability index (2)  -0.007  0.032 
  (0.01)  (0.018) 
Oil discovery (t+5)* Exportability index (1)   -0.024***  
   (0.009)  
Oil discovery (t+5)* Exportability index (2)    -0.028** 
    (0.012) 
Observations 54690 54690 54690 54690 
R-squared 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 
Panel C: dependent variable is annual growth rate of real wages in industry i in country c (logged) 
Open *Exportability index (1) -0.002  0.074***  
 (0.011)  (0.015)  
Open *Exportability index (2)  -0.016  0.062** 
  (0.019)  (0.026) 
Oil discovery (t+10)* Exportability index (1)   -0.064***  
   (0.012)  
Oil discovery (t+10)* Exportability index (2)    -0.061*** 
    (0.019) 
Observations 45045 45045 48343 48343 
R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 
Notes: all regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Regressions (3) and (4) 
control for past discoveries: the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. Observations which interacted 
with openness are multiplied by 100 in all panels for better reading.  	  
 
In more detail, columns 3 and 4 of Panel A show that the value added outcomes affected 
by resource discoveries are still both insignificant, compared to Table 4-4. We now turn 
to employment in Panel B that was negatively insignificant in Table 4-6, but columns 3 
and 4 in Table 4-8 show that including the openness interaction has turned oil discovery 
interactions for both exportability indices 1 and 2 to be statistically significant with 
higher magnitude, indicating that employment is highly affected by the resource 
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country’s openness and trade policies, whether it exports labour-intensive or capital-
intensive products. The insignificant coefficients of value added interactions we still 
find in Table 4-8 might indicate that governments try to support the tradable sectors 
through investments and spending, but the workers (as the labour market is elastic and 
flexible within one country) might be moving towards more demanding opportunities in 
the non-tradable sectors such as non-traded manufacturing or services; this suggestion 
agrees with Michaels (2011) and Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2016). 
To test this hypothesis, we examine the impact on wages in Panel C, as wages in the 
tradable sectors have been negatively affected by oil discoveries in Table 4-6. Columns 
3 and 4 of Table 4-8 report the results for wages. The results show that the coefficients 
of oil discovery interactions are still negative and significant but also with higher 
magnitude after including the openness interactions.  
Rajan and Subramanian (2011) use this strategy to test if real appreciation is the channel 
where aid affects manufacturing growth, and they find it does. We do agree with 
Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2016) that the more open the economy, the more it gets 
affected by resource booms. They also argue that real exchange rate appreciation does 
not necessarily happen in all oil countries; it did not happen in Norway, for example, as 
a result of resource booms where it showed evidence of real depreciation instead. In 
Australia, the appreciation was temporary and later it was rather real depreciation.  
These results have a number of explanations. First, value added and wages take more 
time to experience the full effect of resource discoveries, even after adding the openness 
interaction measures. Wages might need more time to adjust to the new booming sector 
fitting into the economy, as production starts after an average of 4-6 years of discovery 
announcement, and exporting oil in meaningful amounts might need more than 2-3 
years. Second, the demand on labour in the tradable industries is affected by both 
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international and local demand on the tradable products – the more the country is open 
to international trade the more the tradable industries are affected. These results support 
the classic model of Dutch disease. Introducing the interaction with openness actually 
increased the magnitude of the negative impact on tradable manufacturing employment 
and wages. Intuitively, we agree with the core model of Dutch disease showing that the 
tradable sector is the mostly hurt by resource discoveries.  
 
4.5.4 Commodity price shocks: oil booms and busts 	  
In this section, we move to our second measure of resource booms: oil price booms and 
busts. The results are shown in Table 4-9, based on equation 4-3. Columns 1, 4 and 7 
show the impact on total manufacturing measures: total value added, total employment 
and total wages during the years of the two booms, bust and valley. In accordance with 
the core model of the Dutch disease, the boom had a significant negative impact on the 
three total manufacturing outcomes. Columns 1, 2 and 3 show that the bust seems to 
have more significant negative impact on the value added than the boom. In addition, 
the exportable industries of indices 1 and 2 were mixed with insignificant coefficients. 
These results support our baseline findings that manufacturing is negatively affected by 
oil booms, whether it was an oil discovery or an oil price shock. 
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Table 4-9: Impact of oil price boom, bust and valley on manufacturing 
 Value added Employment Wages 
 All 
Interacted* 
Exp 
Index 1 
Interacted* 
Exp 
Index 2 
All  
Interacted* 
Exp 
Index 1 
Interacted* 
Exp 
Index 2 
All  
Interacted* 
Exp 
Index 1 
Interacted* 
Exp 
Index 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Boom -0.088 0.012 0.016 -0.170*** -0.006 0.014 -0.143** 0.012 0.026 
 (0.070) (0.024) (0.036) (0.060) (0.018) (0.024) (0.061) (0.020) (0.028) 
Bust -0.128*** -0.025 -0.065 -0.111*** -0.008 -0.012 -0.141*** -0.004 -0.046 
 (0.048) (0.032) (0.046) (0.031) (0.019) (0.026) (0.037) (0.029) (0.040) 
Valley -0.088 0.026 0.020 -0.102*** -0.006 0.001 -0.059 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.058) (0.034) (0.053) (0.037) (0.020) (0.030) (0.046) (0.024) (0.036) 
Industry 
share 
-0.388*** -0.394*** -0.387*** -0.411*** -0.411*** -0.410*** -0.326*** -0.323*** -0.325*** 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) 
Obs 7680 7680 7680 8046 8046 8046 7709 7709 7709 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Notes: all regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level. “All” is all manufacturing 
industries. Exportability index (1) is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if an industry’s ratio of exports to value 
added is greater than the median value and is 0 otherwise, from Rajan and Subramanian (2011). Exportability index 
(2) is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for ISIC industries 15-21, and is 0 otherwise (author calculation).   
 
Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results of manufacturing employment. Column 4 shows 
that total employment is affected negatively by all three shocks. However, both 
exportable indices 1 and 2 are not affected significantly by the shocks.   
Columns 7, 8 and 9 report the results of manufacturing wages. Total manufacturing 
wages declined significantly during the boom and bust. However, both tradable 
industries’ wages grew positively during the boom, and negatively during the bust and 
valley with insignificant coefficients. 
In general, the bust has a stronger and more negative impact on manufacturing than the 
boom. This could indicate that oil countries tend to support the manufacturing sector 
during the boom, as they are receiving more oil revenues and able to spend more on 
these industries. As explained earlier, we only include net exporters in the main 
regression in Table 4-9. To examine the oil price shock impact on all oil countries 
including net importers please refer to Table C-4 in the appendices. The results are 
mainly the same, as the total manufacturing coefficients in value added, employment 
and wages are all negatively affected. One interesting difference is the significant 
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negative effect on tradable industries value added of index 1 during the bust, which 
could be explained by the fact that it is more labour-intensive than index 2, as the 
declining employment in manufacturing will harm these types of industries more 
significantly. 
One confounding factor with “all manufacturing” coefficients in columns 1, 4 and 7 is 
that it includes industries linked to the oil industry and they may be more prominent. 
But even with that in consideration, we still find negative coefficients in all three 
outcomes despite the fact that the oil boom would clearly support oil-related 
manufacturing industries. 
 Our results so far agree with Ismail (2010) in finding that manufacturers in oil-
exporting countries with more open capital markets are more negatively affected by oil 
price shocks. The results also agree with Rodrik (2016) who finds that the labour-
intensive sector is the one most harmed by globalisation. We add that the labour-
intensive sector is also the one most hurt by resource booms, especially if the resource 
country is more open to trade. The reason is that the share of these labour-intensive 
sectors in the international market is relatively small, provided by a small number of 
developing countries.  
Our results show that most contractions in the manufacturing sector could be explained 
by the contraction in the tradable industries. These results challenge results in recent 
papers by Smith (2014), Allcott and Keniston (2014) and Bjørnland and Thorsrud 
(2016), where they find a positive impact of resource discoveries on manufacturing. A 
major difference in our approach is that we can identify the impact on the tradable 
industries; non-tradable manufacturing industries might benefit from the resource 
booms through increased local demand and increased government spending and 
investments (Michaels, 2011), but this is not within the scope of our paper. Another 
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difference is that some papers focus on manufacturing in developed countries, such as 
Allcott and Keniston (2014) focusing on the United States and Bjørnland and Thorsrud 
(2016) focusing on Norway and Australia, while others focus on developing countries 
such as Smith (2014). We add additional scope by examining the impact in both 
developed and developing countries together while considering the differences in their 
tradable industries. Moreover, our estimates show that the decline in wages and value 
added in the manufacturing sector came as a result of the decline in employment. This 
argument contrasts with results in the literature23, where they argue that wages are 
rather a channel for the total manufacturing sector final impact. 
 
4.5.5 Manufacturing growth deceleration episodes 
 
After showing the negative impact of resource booms on manufacturing growth, we 
now turn to an additional measure and see if this noted slowdown is sustainable. In this 
section, we study 40 episodes of manufacturing slowdowns. A slowdown is defined as a 
significant and sustained decrease in manufacturing value added growth from one three-
year period to the next. Following Freund and Pierola (2012) on growth accelerations, 
we use their filter to identify episodes of manufacturing slowdowns. A slowdown must 
satisfy the following criteria: 
a) Real average manufacturing value added growth over 3 years is below -2%. 
b) Real average 3-year manufacturing value added growth decreases by one third 
from the previous 3-year average and is at least two percentage points below 
the previous three-year average. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Allcott and Keniston (2014) among others	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c) Average growth during the drop, excluding the weakest year of growth, is 
below than average growth before the drop. 
As Freund and Pierola (2012) suggest, condition (a) ensures that value added growth is 
below the world average for a slowdown. Condition (b) ensures that growth decreases 
significantly from the previous three-year period and is not just a trend, and condition 
(c) excludes slowdowns that are due to 1 year of very weak growth. To identify the 
slowdowns, we continue using the same INDSTAT2 dataset from UNIDO we used in 
previous sections. After applying the criteria mentioned above, we obtain 40 episodes of 
manufacturing value added slowdowns between 1971-2011.  
Next, we examine if these slowdown episodes are associated with our main external 
variation: giant oil discoveries. We aim to see if our results in previous sections are 
sustainable and are not just a trend. We use the following equation to assess the impact 
of giant oil discoveries on manufacturing value added slowdown episodes: 
𝑌!" =𝛽!𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐!" + 𝛽!𝑋!" +   𝛾! + α!   +ω! +   ε!"#	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	  (4-4) 
where 𝑌!" is the outcome of interest, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the year falls under the slowdown criteria mentioned above in country c in year t, and 
the value of 0 otherwise. Disc!" is an indicator for the discovery of a giant oilfield in 
country c in year t. X!" is the number of years with giant oil discoveries in country c 
from t-10 to t-1. 𝛾! is industry fixed effects, α! and ω! are country and year fixed effects, 
and ε!"# is the error term. 𝛽! is our main interest.   
Column 1 in Table 4-10 shows the impact on the same year of discovery t on the 
slowdown episodes, while Column 2 shows the impact after 5 years of discovery. We 
choose t+5 following our baseline strategy, as we consider the oilfield production lag, 
which is the number of years between the giant oil discovery announcement and the 
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physical production commencement that usually takes between 4 to 6 years on average 
(Arezki et al., 2015b).  
 
Table 4-10: Manufacturing slowdowns and oil discoveries 
Dependent variable: manufacturing value added slowdown episodes 
 (1) (2) 
Oil discovery 0.000  
 (0.002)  
Oil discovery (t+5)   0.008*** 
  (0.002) 
Past giant discoveries  0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 47587 54096 
R2 0.112 0.093 
Notes: all regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Past discoveries is the 
number of years with giant oilfield discoveries from t-10 to t-1. The dependent variable, slowdown episodes are 
calculated following Freund and Pierola (2012). We do not run the regression for oil discovery (t+10), as data gets 
much smaller with the bigger lag, and might result in misleading effects. 
 
In the same year of giant oil discoveries, Column 1 shows that there is no significant 
impact on slowdown episodes. Only 5 years after discovery, Column 2 shows that giant 
oil discoveries increase the probability of going through a slowdown episode in 
manufacturing value added with a highly significant coefficient. These results support 
our baseline results, where we suggest that giant oil discoveries lead to a decline in 
manufacturing value added growth starting from 5 years after discovery. 
 
4.5.6 Robustness checks 
 
To ascertain that our results are not driven by other factors, and to further tackle the 
issue of endogeneity, we subject the main results to several robustness checks and 
alternative specifications. First, one concern is that giant oil discoveries as a dummy 
variable would be misleading, and thus we substitute the independent variable by the 
value of giant oil discoveries instead. This strategy is applied by Cotet and Tsui (2013) 
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and more recently by Arezki et al. (2015b), where they construct a net present value 
(NPV) of the oil discovery as a percentage of GDP at the time of the discovery. For our 
robustness checks, we use data from Cotet and Tsui (2013), which was originally 
provided by ASPO dataset24. The data provided by Cotet and Tsui (2013) covers value 
of discoveries in all sizes; thus, we eliminate the values of non-giant discoveries and 
keep only the values of giant discoveries based on our dataset. The results are shown in 
Table 4-11, and we can see that the results are consistent with our baseline estimates by 
finding negative effects of discoveries on value added and wages, with small and 
insignificant effects on employment.   
 
Table 4-11: Value of giant oil discoveries and the tradable industries 
Outcome 
is:  Value added Employment Wages 
 All  
Interacted* 
Exp 
Index 1 
Interacted* 
Exp 
Index 2 
All  
Interacted
* 
Exp 
Index 1 
Interacted
* 
Exp 
Index 2 
All  
Interacted
* 
Exp 
Index 1 
Interacted
* 
Exp 
Index 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Value of 
giant oil 
Discoveries 
pc (log) 
-0.270*** -0.195* -0.238 0.030 0.011 0.055 -0.242*** -0.241*** -0.308** 
(0.093) (0.107) (0.193) (0.042) (0.059) (0.104) (0.064) (0.081) (0.131) 
Past 
discoveries  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry 
share  -0.557*** -0.559*** -0.559*** -0.514*** -0.518*** -0.518*** -0.387*** -0.389*** -0.389*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
Obs 44462 44508 44540 49684 49742 49782 45370 45428 45468 
R2 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Notes: All regressions control for the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1, per capita GDP, GDP growth, 
population and democracy, in addition to country, industry and year fixed effects. Independent variable is the log of 
value of giant oil discoveries per capita from Cotet and Tsui (2013). “All” is all manufacturing industries. Outcome 
data source is from UNIDO. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Second, we use oil reserves as an instrument for oil discoveries, following Cotet and 
Tsui (2013). The instrument is described by Cotet and Tsui (2013) as the log of oil 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 ASPO: the Association for the Study of Peak Oil. 
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reserves data, calculated for each country in any year by subtracting cumulative 
production from cumulative discovery. Table C-6 in Appendix C shows the 
instrumental variable estimation based on equation 4-1, after instrumenting the oil 
discovery interaction terms. The results are robust to this specification and to our 
previous estimates, indicating that giant oil discoveries have a negative impact on the 
tradable manufacturing industries. The interaction term is mostly negative in panels A, 
B and C, where the outcome variables are value added, employment and wages 
consecutively.  
Third, we follow Bjørnland and Thorsrud's (2016) robustness strategy by showing that 
the results are robust when using the nominal rather than the real figures for value added 
and wages. The results are unchanged, as shown in Table C-7 in the appendices.  
Fourth, we rerun the baseline regressions using INDSTAT4 data instead of INDSTAT2 
from UNIDO’s industrial statistics database at the 4-digit level of disaggregation for 
manufacturing. This data covers fewer countries, and a smaller time range, as it goes 
back only to 1985. The results remain the same for manufacturing value added, 
employment and wages as shown in Table C-8 in the appendices.  
These results suggest that our main results are not driven by omitted variables and do 
not suffer from serious endogeneity concerns. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 	  
This paper analyses the effect of two different resource shocks on manufacturing 
tradable activity in oil countries, adding to the narrow literature on the empirical 
evidence of Dutch disease theory. 
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We used giant oilfield discoveries as a resource boom shock. We were able to track 
structural change in the manufacturing sector following giant oil discoveries and found 
that manufacturing outcomes in the tradable industries declined significantly. To obtain 
more empirical evidence on the Dutch disease theory, we also test for the effect of the 
oil booms and bust as a resource price shock, and find a negative effect as well. We 
further checked these results through building a growth deceleration episodes variable 
and were able to show that this negative impact is sustainable and not caused by a trend.  
The results taken together suggest that the tradable industries in manufacturing are 
harmed by the oil shocks in two ways. First, the movement of concentration from the 
tradable industries to the non-tradable industries within manufacturing harms exports in 
the long run. Second, the more the economy is open, the more significant is the negative 
impact on the tradable industries. This suggests that the tradable manufacturing 
industries will be harmed by the resource shocks through less demand for exports in the 
international market, which would lead to further adjustments in the economy, as 
suggested by the Dutch disease theory.  
These results empirically support the core Dutch disease model. However, the core 
model suggests that the boom should increase potential welfare and wages in the entire 
economy, while we find that wages significantly decline in the manufacturing sector in 
the long run. Finally, by finding that manufacturing growth declines as an effect of the 
two resource shocks used in our paper, the results agree with Corden and Neary (1982) 
that the effects of an oil price shock are similar to those of an oil discovery shock in oil 
countries. 
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Chapter 5 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This thesis examined new empirical dimensions related to the impact of natural 
resources on the macro economy: the economic diversification in exports and in 
employment, the role of institutional quality on that impact, and the heterogeneity 
within the manufacturing sector. The focus shifted from examining the impact of all 
natural resources down to examining the impact of oil and gas as a suitable 
representative of the rest of the natural resources, or at least the mineral resources. Here 
I summarise the key findings of each chapter and suggest potential aspects for further 
research.  
Chapter 2 examined how natural resource rents could change the U-shaped 
diversification pattern noted by the literature along the development path. In particular, 
this chapter asked if resource-rich countries diversify out of resource and nontradable 
sectors during the development path before finding the perfect area of specialisation. 
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The chapter used several resource rent datasets available from the World Bank, and 
used the international commodity prices as an instrument to assure the direction of 
impact and avoid endogeneity.  
One limitation of this chapter was the limited coverage of labour data provided by the 
International Labour Office (ILO). The data is scattered between the years and 
combines different surveys into the same dataset. While cleaning the data, I tried to 
choose the best combinations in order to establish homogeneous data series for each 
country that could provide reliable and feasible figures to the long panel used in this 
thesis. To overcome this limitation, I combined another labour dataset from UNIDO, 
despite its limited coverage on the manufacturing sector alone. Future research could try 
shortening the panel (smaller number of years) and obtain data from local surveys 
instead. The findings raised a question: if we know that the resource sectors are capital 
intensive and do not employ a large number of individuals, then where do resource-rich 
economies get concentrated? Also, what could be done to avoid this concentration trap? 
Analysis of these issues could be used to extend the research presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 asked if institutional quality could have any role in determining the economic 
diversification when a country becomes oil abundant. The role of institutional quality 
on development and other aspects has been assessed in the literature thoroughly. 
However, the chapter contributes a new aspect for that role by looking at different 
economic diversification measures using an exogenous resource discovery variation. 
The primary finding was that countries respond differently to giant oil discoveries, as 
we aim to show that the quality of institutions determines whether countries avoid the 
resource curse or not. The combination of grabber-friendly institutions and giant oil 
discoveries leads to a less diversified economy in non-tradable sectors, whereas 
producer-friendly institutions help countries to take more advantage of these discoveries, 
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and their following revenues, and maintain the employment share in manufacturing 
sector and tradables. However, producer-friendly institutions help countries to avoid 
export concentration: all countries tend to have concentrated exports with large shares 
in the resource sector.  
A limitation of this chapter is the measure of institutional quality. The best available 
measure was “Polity2” from the “Polity IV” dataset, which gives a score from -10 to 10 
to measure democracy in most countries in our sample and covers all the years up to 
2012. The other available institutional quality measures do not report scores for 
sufficient number of years or even a wide range of countries as in our panel. Future 
research could address this issue, if more institutional quality measures could be 
developed. 
Chapter 4 examined the Dutch Disease phenomena following resource booms, by 
testing the impact within the manufacturing sector industries and their exportability in 
both developing and developed countries. A main contribution of this chapter is to 
empirically examine the impact of two different oil booms on manufacturing across 
countries with a long panel, as previous literature has thoroughly examined that impact 
theoretically with only few empirical studies. In contrast to recent studies, the results 
emphasise the negative impact of oil booms on the tradable industries of manufacturing. 
A major difference in that chapter from previous recent studies is the scope of countries 
included in the panel: most recent studies only included limited numbers of countries 
(or even one country) or short time periods.  
A challenging limitation of this chapter is that the UNIDO data does not cover any 
activities in the informal sector and microenterprises, which are often excluded from 
local industrial surveys. Therefore, the results are only applied on the organised formal 
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parts of manufacturing. Future research could benefit from more data and surveys 
available, especially within the developing countries where the informal sector 
represents a bigger share of the economy.  
The resource curse literature shows that some countries with high resource dependency 
have a successful experience in diversifying their exports and local economies. But 
many countries did not have this successful experience. The question that resource 
countries need to ask is how serious do they want to diversify their economies away 
from their natural resources and whether they were ready to move forward and take the 
necessary bold steps to achieve this goal. There are a number of policy implications that 
arise from the successful experiences to the remaining resource-countries (Gelb, 2011). 
First, it is critical to get the basic macroeconomic fundamentals right. For example, it is 
very important to run a successful countercyclical fiscal policy to contain the boom-bust 
cycles. Trade policy needs to be reasonably open in order to keep the local prices low 
amid increasing domestic rents. Second, it is vital to build other types of capital along 
with natural resource wealth, such as human capital and institutional capital. The 
literature shows that countries with less of these types of capital have higher exposure to 
the resource curse. Third, production costs in the newly targeted traded sectors must be 
lowered in order to support new entry and promote efficiency.  
All of the successful resource-rich countries have used such vertical policies, with many 
of them increasing the range of exports and exploring new local business opportunities. 
Nevertheless, diversification is a national long-term priority, and natural resource rents 
should provide the governments with the needed financing to apply these vertical 
policies to achieve diversification in the long run. 
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The resource curse literature has developed in the past few years to empirically show 
that resource discoveries might actually be a blessing to the economy by showing a 
positive impact on real income. This thesis challenges these suggestions. The empirical 
evidence in this thesis demonstrates the long-term impact on the economic 
diversification, and on the manufacturing tradable industries, and finds a negative causal 
impact on these aspects. The resource-rich countries might benefit from resource booms 
in terms of higher income per capita, higher government revenues and higher local 
demand. What this thesis suggests is that even if income rises – as suggested by the 
literature – the long-term impact on the tradable industries is negative. Better 
institutions might help have better outcome in the local economy (measured by labour 
market diversification) but cannot help keeping the exports as diversified as other non-
resource countries institutions do. The area of empirical studies in that field is still 
underdeveloped, and brings many avenues for future thorough research. 
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 Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 2  
 
Data description  
1. Employment data  
Sectoral employment data are from International Labour Office (ILO, 2013) and United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO, 2012). ILO data covers 127 
countries, while UNIDO covers 125 countries. The ILO data includes all economic 
activities at the 1-digit level between 1969 and 2008. Sectoral shares are in percentages. 
The unbalanced panel has 2369 observations (country-year). The ILO dataset reports 
employment in different classifications: some countries use the ISIC-revision 2, others 
moved to ISIC-revisions 3 and 4 in recent years, and some are using their own national 
classification. Employment data in the more disaggregated ISICrev3 and ISICrev4 were 
aggregated to ISICrev2, following Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), Timmer and Vries (2007) 
and McMillan and Rodrik (2011). If a country reports two revisions, the lower one is 
used. Official estimates are preferred over labour surveys. Data not following ISIC 
conventions are dropped. Table A-1 shows the concordance between ISICrev3 and 
ISICrev2. 
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Table A-1: different classifications between ISIC revisions 2 and 3* 
ISIC-Revision 2  ISIC-Revision 3 Equivalent 
1. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing A. Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 
B. Fishing 
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade and 
Restaurants and Hotels 
 
G. Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of 
Motor Vehicles, Motorcycles and Personal 
and Household Goods 
H. Hotels and Restaurants 
8. Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and 
Business Services 
J. Financial Intermediation 
K. Real Estate, Renting and Business 
Activities 
9. Community, Social and Personal Services 
 
L. Public Administration and Defence; 
Compulsory Social Security 
M. Education 
N. Health and Social Work 
O. Other Community, Social and Personal 
Service Activities 
P. Households with Employed Persons 
* McMillan and Rodrik (2011) and Timmer and Vries (2007) 
 
ILO data sometimes have sudden big changes in numbers in certain sectors, as countries 
sometimes change their calculation method, even if the same classification/revision is 
used. This is taken into consideration in this study, by dropping the observations that 
reports these sudden changes, making the panel more harmonised.  
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Our alternative data source is UNIDO, which covers manufacturing activities only at the 
3-digit level of disaggregation (the main 23 industrial sectors) between 1963 and 2010 
(INDSTAT2). (INDSTAT4 disaggregates to 4-digit level but only goes back to 1985.) 
The UNIDO dataset is consistent over the years and did not need adjustment. The 
unbalanced panel has 3564 employment observations (country-year). 
 
2. Value added and labour productivity 
The UNIDO dataset also provides information on value added per sector, offering an 
additional measure of sector size and productivity in industrial employment. The value 
added dataset covers almost the same period as the employment dataset, although some 
countries do not report the two sets equally. The unbalanced panel has 3465 added-
value observations (country-year). 
3. Exports data  
Exports data are from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), which is a 
collaboration between the World Bank and the United Nations Conference of Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). The export data covers 133 countries. Data is selected in 
SITC-1-digit aggregation containing the main 10 trade sectors. Values are reported in 
constant 1000 USD with the base year being 2000. The unbalanced panel has 4575 
observations (country-year). The WITS data values are consistent over the years and did 
not need any adjustment.  
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4. Diversification indicators  
Computing these measures is done through Stata.25 
 
Table A-2: The main differences between the chosen concentration measures26. 
Index Distance 
Concept 
Decomposable? Independence of input scale 
& population size? 
Range in 
interval [0,1]? 
Gini 
 
 
Depends on rank 
ordering 
No Yes Yes 
Theil 
 
 
Proportional  Yes Yes No 
HHI 
 
 
Absolute 
differences 
Yes No: decreases with population Yes: but min>0 
 
We calculate diversity for all sectors, and for all non-resource sectors. Specifically, in 
the ILO data, we exclude “Mining and Quarrying,” and in the WITS exports data we 
exclude “Crude material, inedible, except fuels,” “Mineral Fuels, lubricants and related 
materials” and “Commodities not classified according to kind.” The UNIDO data does 
not cover resource sectors at all.  
Table A-3 shows summary statistics for the diversification measures used in this study. 
Table A-4 reports correlation between these measures, which is high. Figures A-1 to A-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Azevedo, João Pedro, (2007), AINEQUAL: Stata module to compute measures of inequality. 
26 Cowell (2011) 
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6 in the appendices show the historical performance of the diversification using the Gini 
index in all sectors examined.  
5. Natural resources data 
Several natural resources are used in this study: oil, gas, nickel, tin, copper, gold, iron, 
forests, coal, bauxite, silver, lead and phosphate. Resource rents are from the World 
Bank Wealth of Nations Dataset and covers the period 1970 to 2008. Aggregate 
resource rent is calculated as the sum of all reported resources. The World Bank 
calculates resource rents as:  
Rents=Unit rent*production 
Unit rent=unit price-unit cost 
All rents are reported in current US dollars.  
The measure for resource rents used in this study is the log of resource rents per capita. 
Resource rents are available for a wide panel of countries for a long period of time, 
allowing testing long-term effects on diversification and minimising the risk of sample 
selection bias. Normalisation by population size, taken from the Penn World Tables, 
avoids a bias towards large countries. Several resources are aggregated, using data 
constructed using the same methodology, allowing us to examine the effect of different 
resources rents on diversification at the same time. This measure has been used by 
several recent studies (Bhattacharyya & Collier, 2011; Ross, 2006).  
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Table A-3: summary statistics for the sectoral concentration indices 
 
Notes: (ILO) data covers the years 1969-2008 (1-digit), the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS, World Bank) 
data covering the years 1962-2012 (1-digit), and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) 
data covering the years 1963-2010 (3-digit). Resource rent per capita is calculated from resource rents (World Bank) 
and population (PWT 8.0). The Data Appendix provides detailed definition and source of the key variables used. The 
main index used in this paper is Gini; however, the other indices are also used and report similar results, as the next 
table shows high correlation. 
  
Variable  Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
(Overall) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(between 
countries) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(within 
countries) Min. Max. 
 ILO Employment Variables (all sectors) 
Gini 2369 0.5028 0.0787 0.0919 0.0374 0.2540 0.8329 
Theil Index 2369 0.4971 0.2230 0.2464 0.1360 0.1044 2.5860 
HHI 2369 0.2273 0.0753 0.1004 0.0348 0.1562 0.9999 
 ILO Employment Variables (non-resource sectors) 
Gini 2369 0.4524 0.0877 0.1023 0.0413 0.2540 0.8132 
Theil Index 2369 0.4002 0.2094 0.2409 0.1175 0.1044 2.0630 
HHI 2368 0.2307 0.0751 0.1011 0.0337 0.1590 0.8136 
 WITS Export Diversification Variables (all sectors) 
Gini 4577 0.6531 0.1286 0.1168 0.0652 0.3132 0.9 
Theil Index 4576 0.9828 0.8018 0.6537 0.4968 0.1731 23.025 
HHI 4554 0.3683 0.2059 0.1904 0.0950 0.1327 1 
 WITS Export Diversification Variables (non-resource sectors) 
Gini 4575 0.6243 0.1139 0.0997 0.0658 0.3077 0.8888 
Theil Index 4574 0.8708 0.9329 0.6555 0.6931 0.1631 19.775 
HHI 4558 0.3440 0.1590 0.1388 0.0901 0.1435 1 
 UNIDO Manufacturing Employment Variables (employment) 
Gini 3564 0.5087 0.1086 0.1109 0.0435 0.2886 0.8823 
Theil Index 3564 0.5313 0.3302 0.4064 0.1397 0.1482 3.0334 
HHI 3558 0.1345 0.0850 0.1016 0.0280 0.0612 0.8742 
 UNIDO Manufacturing Employment Variables (Added Value) 
Gini 3465 0.6189 0.1151 0.1108 0.0470 0.3696 0.9321 
Theil Index 3465 1.1910 1.2741 1.164 0.7014 0.2352 18.045 
HHI 2473 0.1370 0.0788 .0791 .0348 0 0.6234 
 Independent Variables  
Resource Rents Per Capita 8202 3.04e+08 1.72e+09 1.35e+09 1.18e+09 0 3.92e+10 
GDP per Capita 8160 10138.92 50980.34 18753.4 47841.88 132.825 4095673 
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Table A-4: Correlation matrices for the sectoral concentration indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gini Theil Index HHI 
ILO Employment Variables (all 
sectors) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.897 1.000  
HHI 0.906 0.853 1.000 
ILO Employment Variables (non-resource sectors) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.932 1.000  
HHI 0.926 0.917 1.000 
WITS Export Diversification Variables (all sectors) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.741 1.000  
HHI 0.897 0.802 1.000 
WITS Export Diversification Variables (non-Resource sectors) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.677 1.000  
HHI 0.894 0.745 1.000 
UNIDO Manufacturing Employment Variables (employment figures) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.906 1.000  
HHI 0.727 0.803 1.000 
UNIDO Manufacturing Employment Variables (Added Value) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.678 1.000  
HHI 0.863 0.781 1.000 
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Table A-5: List of countries included in the sample, not all specifications cover the 
same number of countries due to data limitations:  
Country 
Oil 
producer 
Net oil 
exporter   
Oil 
Discoveries 
Resource rent 
receiver  
ILO         
1969-2008 
WITS     
1962-2012 
UNIDO 
1963-2010 
Afghanistan  x  x x    
Albania x  x x x x x 
Algeria x  x x x x x 
Angola x  x x x x x 
Argentina x  x x x x x 
Armenia 
 
x  x x x x 
Australia x  x x x x x 
Austria x   x x x x 
Azerbaijan x  x x x x x 
Bahrain x   x x x 
 Bangladesh x  x x x x x 
Barbados x   x x 
 
x 
Belarus x   x x x x 
Belgium 
 
x  x x x x 
Benin x   x x x x 
Bolivia x  x x x x x 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
x  x 
 
x x 
Botswana 
 
x  x x x x 
Brazil x  x x x x x 
Brunei Darussalam x  x x x x 
 Bulgaria x   x x x x 
Cameroon x  x x x x x 
Canada x  x x x x x 
Chile x   x x x x 
China x  x x x x x 
Colombia x  x x x x x 
Congo, Dem. Rep. x   x x x 
 Congo, Rep. x  x x x x x 
Costa Rica 
 
x  x x x x 
Cote d'Ivoire x  x x x x x 
Croatia x   x x x x 
Cuba x   x x x x 
Cyprus 
 
x  x x x x 
Czech Republic x   x x x x 
Denmark x  x x x x x 
Dominican Republic 
 
x  x x x x 
Ecuador x  x x x x x 
Egypt, Arab Rep. x  x x x x x 
El Salvador 
 
x  x x x x 
Equatorial Guinea   x x    
Eritrea 
 
x  x 
 
x 
 Estonia 
 
x  x x x 
 Ethiopia 
 
x  x x x 
 Finland 
 
x  x x x x 
France x  x x x x x 
Gabon x  x x x x x 
Georgia x   x x x x 
Germany x  x x x x x 
Ghana x   x x x x 
Greece x   x x x x 
Guatemala x   x x x x 
Haiti 
 
x  x x x x 
Honduras 
 
x  x x x x 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China  
x  x x x x 
Hungary x  x x x x x 
Iceland 
 
x  
 
x x x 
India x  x x 
 
x x 
Indonesia x  x x x x x 
Iran, Islamic Rep. x  x x x x x 
Iraq x  x x x x x 
Ireland 
 
x  x x x x 
Israel x   x x x x 
Italy x  x x x x x 
Jamaica 
 
x  x x x x 
Japan x   x x x x 
Jordan x   x x x x 
Kazakhstan x  x x x x x 
Kenya 
 
x  x 
 
x x 
Korea, Rep. 
 
x  x x x x 
Kuwait x  x x x x x 
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Kyrgyz Republic x   x x x x 
Latvia 
 
x  x x x x 
Lebanon 
 
x  
  
x x 
Libya x  x x x x x 
Lithuania x   x x x x 
Luxembourg 
 
x  
 
x x x 
Macedonia, FYR 
 
x  x x x x 
Malaysia x   x x x x 
Malta 
 
x  
 
x x x 
Malaysia x x x x x x x 
Mexico x  x x x x x 
Moldova x   x x x x 
Mongolia x   x x x x 
Montenegro 
 
x  
 
x x 
 Morocco x  x x x x x 
Mozambique 
 
x  x 
 
x x 
Myanmar x  x x x x x 
Namibia 
 
x x x x x 
 Nepal 
 
x   x x x x 
Netherlands x  x x x x x 
New Zealand x  x x x x x 
Nicaragua 
 
x  x x x x 
Nigeria x  x x x x x 
Norway x  x x x x x 
Oman x  x x x x x 
Pakistan x  x x x x x 
Panama 
 
x  
 
x x x 
Papua New Guinea x  x x x x x 
Paraguay 
 
x  
 
x x x 
Peru x  x x x x x 
Philippines x  x x x x x 
Poland x   x x x x 
Portugal 
 
x  x x x x 
Qatar x  x x x x x 
Romania x  x x x x x 
Russian Federation x  x x x x x 
Saudi Arabia x  x x x x x 
Senegal x   x x x x 
Serbia x   
 
x x x 
Singapore 
 
x  
 
x x x 
Slovak Republic x   x x x x 
Slovenia x   x x x x 
South Africa x   x x x x 
Spain x  x x x x x 
Sri Lanka 
 
x  x x x x 
Suriname x   x x 
 
x 
Sudan x  x x x x x 
Sweden x   x x x x 
Switzerland 
 
x  x x x x 
Syrian Arab Republic x  x x x x x 
Tajikistan x   x x x x 
Tanzania 
 
x  x x x x 
Thailand x  x x x x x 
Togo 
 
x  x 
 
x 
 Trinidad and Tobago x  x x x x x 
Tunisia x  x x x x x 
Turkey x   x x x x 
Turkmenistan x  x x x x 
 Ukraine x   x x x x 
United Arab Emirates x  x x x x x 
United Kingdom x  x x x x x 
United States x  x x x x x 
USSR   x     
Uruguay 
 
x  x 
 
x x 
Uzbekistan x   x x 
  Venezuela, RB x  x x x x x 
Vietnam x  x x x x x 
Yemen, Rep. x  x x x x x 
Zambia 
 
x  x x x x 
Zimbabwe 
 
x  x 
 
x x 
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Figure A-1: Aggregate structural change across countries since 1969 
 
 
Note: Aggregate structural change (or internal diversification) here is measured by Gini coefficient for the inequality 
of sector shares in employment. Higher Gini implies diversification concentration and vice versa. Aggregate implies 
that the figure includes both resource and non-resource sectors. The data is sourced from ILO. 
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Figure A-2: Structural change in manufacturing across countries measured by 
Gini since 1963 
 
 
Note: Structural change (or internal diversification) within manufacturing here is measured by Gini coefficient for 
the inequality of sector shares in employment. Higher Gini implies concentration and vice versa. The data is sourced 
from UNIDO.  
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Figure A-3: Structural change in manufacturing value added across countries 
measured by Gini since 1963 
 
 
Note: Structural change (or internal diversification) in manufacturing here is measured by Gini coefficient for the 
inequality of sector shares in value added. Higher Gini implies concentration and vice versa. The data is sourced from 
UNIDO. 
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Figure A-4: Structural change within non-resource sectors measured by Gini since 
1969 
 
Note: Structural change (or internal diversification) within non-resource sectors here is measured by Gini coefficient 
for the inequality of sector shares in employment. Higher Gini implies concentration and vice versa. The data is 
sourced from ILO. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Australia
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Argentina
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Belgium
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Bolivia
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Brazil
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Chile
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
China
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Colombia
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Germany
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Indonesia
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Egypt
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Malaysia
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Netherlands
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Norway
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Pakistan
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Peru
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Philippines
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Russia
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Turkey
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
UK
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
USA
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Venezuela
	   164 
	  
Figure A-5: Export diversification across countries measured by Gini since 1962 
  
Note: Aggregate export diversification here is measured by Gini coefficient for the inequality of sector shares in 
exports. Higher Gini implies concentration and vice versa. The data is sourced from WITS. 
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Figure A-6: Export diversification in non-resource sectors across countries 
measured by Gini since 1962 
 
Note: Export diversification in the non-resource sector here is measured by Gini coefficient for the inequality of 
sector shares in exports. Higher Gini implies concentration and vice versa. The data is sourced from WITS. 
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Figure A-7: Export Diversification and Resource Rents Per Capita across 
countries 
 
Note: Countries with higher resource rents per capita also have the highest concentration (Gini) in 
exports. 
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 Appendix B: Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
Table B-1: summary statistics for the sectoral concentration indices 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
(Overall) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(between 
countries) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(within 
countries) Min. Max. 
 ILO Employment Variables (all sectors) 
Gini 2369 0.5028 0.0787 0.0919 0.0374 0.2540 0.832
9 Theil Index 2369 0.4971 0.2230 0.2464 0.1360 0.1044 2.586
0 HHI 2369 0.2273 0.0753 0.1004 0.0348 0.1562 0.999
9  ILO Employment Variables (non-resource sectors) 
Gini 2369 0.4524 0.0877 0.1023 0.0413 0.2540 0.813
2 Theil Index 2369 0.4002 0.2094 0.2409 0.1175 0.1044 2.063
0 HHI 2368 0.2307 0.0751 0.1011 0.0337 0.1590 0.813
6  WITS Export Diversification Variables (all sectors) 
Gini 4577 0.6531 0.1286 0.1168 0.0652 0.3132 0.9 
Theil Index 4576 0.9828 0.8018 0.6537 0.4968 0.1731 23.02
5 HHI 4554 0.3683 0.2059 0.1904 0.0950 0.1327 1 
 WITS Export Diversification Variables (non-resource sectors) 
Gini 4575 0.6243 0.1139 0.0997 0.0658 0.3077 0.888
8 Theil Index 4574 0.8708 0.9329 0.6555 0.6931 0.1631 19.77
5 HHI 4558 0.3440 0.1590 0.1388 0.0901 0.1435 1 
 UNIDO Manufacturing Employment Variables (employment) 
Gini 3564 0.5087 0.1086 .1109 .0435 0.2886 0.882
3 Theil Index 3564 0.5313 0.3302 .4064 .1397 0.1482 3.033
4 HHI 3558 0.1345 0.0850 .1016 .0280 0.0612 0.874
2  UNIDO Manufacturing Employment Variables (Added Value) 
Gini 3465 0.6189 0.1151 .1108 .0470 0.3696 0.932
1 Theil Index 3465 1.1910 1.2741 1.164 .7014 .2352 18.04
5 HHI 2473 0.1370 0.0788 .0791 .0348 0 0.623
4  Other Variables  
Oil discoveries 8933 0.0499 0.2178 0.1159 0.1843 0 1 
Services GDP 5675 106e+11 5.02e+11 4.90e+11 1.57e+11 -3799643 8.64e+12 
Manufacturing GDP 5072 2.45e+1
0 
1.09e+11 1.52e+11 1.76e+10 164035.8 1.79e+12 
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Table B-2: Correlation matrices for the sectoral concentration indices 
 
 
 
 
Table B-3: Effect of other non-giant oilfield discovery on diversification 
Outcome variable  
Diversification in: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Panel A. Exports 
Discovery -0.006 -0.007 0.003 0.013** 0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Past discoveries -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 3677 3889 3971 3936 3900 
      
Panel B. Sectoral employment 
Discovery -0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Past discoveries -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 2049 2191 2232 2205 2178 
      
Panel C. Manufacturing employment 
Discovery -0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Past discoveries 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 3120 3244 3289 3263 3235 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include previous discoveries over the past ten years, 
country and year fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Gini Theil  HHI 
ILO Employment variables (all sectors) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.897 1.000  
HHI 0.906 0.853 1.000 
WITS Export Diversification Variables (all sectors) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.741 1.000  
HHI 0.897 0.802 1.000 
UNIDO Manufacturing Employment Variables (employment figures) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.906 1.000  
HHI 0.727 0.803 1.000 
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Table B-4: Effect of giant oil discovery size on diversification 
Outcome variable  
Diversification in: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Panel A. Discovery size in quartile 1 
Exports -0.008 -0.014 -0.003 0.004 0.016* 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Sectoral Employment 0.003 0.010 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Manufacturing Emp.  0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Manufacturing VA -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Panel B. Discovery size in quartile 2 
Exports -0.007 -0.004 0.002 0.009 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Sectoral Employment -0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.011* -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Manufacturing Emp.  -0.010* -0.004 -0.002 -0.009* -0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Manufacturing VA 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Panel C. Discovery size in quartile 3 
Exports 0.001 -0.000 0.004 0.006 0.000 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Sectoral Employment -0.005 -0.008 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Manufacturing Emp.  0.003 0.005 0.000 -0.006 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Manufacturing VA 0.006 0.002 0.004 -0.008 -0.011* 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Panel D. Discovery size in quartile 4 
Exports -0.003 0.005 0.012 0.023*** 0.013 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Sectoral Employment 0.004 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
Manufacturing Emp.  0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Manufacturing VA 0.015** 0.002 -0.002 0.012* 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include previous discoveries over the past ten years, 
country and year fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B-5: Countries and type of government at time of discovery 
Democratic Autocratic  
Argentina Afghanistan 
Australia Albania 
Bolivia Algeria 
Brazil Argentina 
Canada Azerbaijan 
Colombia Bangladesh 
Congo, Rep Brazil 
Denmark Cameron 
Ecuador China  
France Colombia  
India  Congo, Rep 
Indonesia Cote d’Ivoire 
Iran  Egypt 
Italy Equatorial Guinea 
Malaysia  Gabon 
Mexico  Hungary 
Netherlands  Indonesia 
New Zealand Iran 
Nigeria  Iraq 
Norway Kazakhstan  
Pakistan  Kuwait 
Papua New Guinea Libya 
Peru  Mexico 
Philippines Morocco 
Romania  Myanmar 
Russia Nigeria 
Spain Oman 
Thailand  Qatar  
Trinidad & Tobago Saudi Arabia  
United Kingdom Sudan  
United States Thailand  
Venezuela Tunisia  
 Turkmenistan  
 USSR 
 United Arab Emirates 
 Venezuela 
 Vietnam 
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Table B-6: Countries with two types of government in the year prior to a giant oil 
discovery 
Country Discovery year Type of government   
(polity2) 
Country Discovery year Type of government   
(polity2) 
Argentina 1971 Autocratic (-9) Mexico 1951 Autocratic (-6) 
 1977 Autocratic (-9)  1952 Autocratic (-6) 
 1989 Democratic (8)  1958 Autocratic (-6) 
 1996 Democratic (7)  1966 Autocratic (-6) 
Brazil 1965 Autocratic (-3)  1972 Autocratic (-6) 
 1968 Autocratic (-8)  1975 Autocratic (-6) 
 1972 Autocratic (-9)  1976 Autocratic (-6) 
 1984 Autocratic (-3)  1977 Autocratic (-6) 
 1985 Autocratic (-3)  1979 Autocratic (-3) 
 1987 Democratic (7)  1980 Autocratic (-3) 
 1989 Democratic (7)  1982 Autocratic (-3) 
 1993 Democratic (8)  1990 Autocratic (0) 
 1996 Democratic (8)  1998 Democratic (6) 
 1999 Democratic (8) Nigeria  1958 NA 
 2001 Democratic (8)  1959 NA 
 2002 Democratic (8)  1962 Democratic (8) 
 2003 Democratic (8)  1963 Democratic (8) 
Colombia 1956 Autocratic (-5)  1964 Democratic (8) 
 1973 Democratic (7)  1965 Democratic (7) 
 1992 Democratic (9)  1967 Autocratic (-7) 
 1993 Democratic (9)  1968 Autocratic (-7) 
Congo, Rep 1969 Autocratic (-7)  1970 Autocratic (-7) 
 1971 Autocratic (-7)  1973 Autocratic (-7) 
 1983 Autocratic (-8)  1981 Democratic (7) 
 1995 Democratic (5)  1989 Autocratic (-7) 
Indonesia 1969 Autocratic (-7)  1990 Autocratic (-5) 
 1970 Autocratic (-7)  1996 Autocratic (-6) 
 1971 Autocratic (-7)  1998 Autocratic (-7) 
 1972 Autocratic (-7)  1999 Autocratic (-1) 
 1973 Autocratic (-7)  2000 Democratic (4) 
 1974 Autocratic (-7)  2001 Democratic (4) 
 1982 Autocratic (-7)  2002 Democratic (4) 
 1991 Autocratic (-7) Thailand  1973 Autocratic (-7) 
 1994 Autocratic (-7)  1980 Democratic (2) 
 1995 Autocratic (-7)  1995 Democratic (9) 
 1996 Autocratic (-7) Venezuela 1954 Autocratic (-3) 
 1997 Autocratic (-7)  1955 Autocratic (-3) 
 1999 Autocratic (-5)  1957 Autocratic (-3) 
 2000 Democratic (6)  1958 Autocratic (-3) 
Iran  1958 Autocratic (-10)  1979 Democratic (9) 
 1960 Autocratic (-10)  1980 Democratic (9) 
 1961 Autocratic (-10)  1986 Democratic (9) 
 1962 Autocratic (-10)  1988 Democratic (9) 
 1963 Autocratic (-10)  1999 Democratic (8) 
 1964 Autocratic (-10)  2002 Democratic (6) 
 1965 Autocratic (-10) 
 1966 Autocratic (-10) 
 1967 Autocratic (-10) 
 1968 Autocratic (-10) 
 1969 Autocratic (-10) 
 1972 Autocratic (-10) 
 1973 Autocratic (-10) 
 1974 Autocratic (-10) 
 1975 Autocratic (-10) 
 1976 Autocratic (-10) 
 1978 Autocratic (-10) 
 1980 Autocratic (0) 
 1988 Autocratic (-6) 
 1991 Autocratic (-6) 
 1992 Autocratic (-6) 
 1993 Autocratic (-6) 
 1994 Autocratic (-6) 
 1995 Autocratic (-6) 
 1999 Democratic (3) 
 2000 Democratic (3) 
 2001 Democratic (3) 
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Figure B-1: Impact of giant oilfield discovery on diversification in exports, in 
sectoral employment, in manufacturing employment and value added; these 
regressions do not control for previous discoveries 
 
 
 
Notes: The x-axes report the number of years before or after t, ranging from t-4 to t+10. The purple lines show the 
estimated coefficients and the grey lines show the 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, which 
are clustered by country. All regressions control for real GDP and include country and year fixed effects. Details on 
variable construction can be found in the data section of the paper.  
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Employment data  
Sectoral employment data are from International Labour Office (ILO, 2013) and United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO, 2012). ILO data covers 127 
countries, while UNIDO covers 125 countries. The ILO data includes all economic 
activities at the 1-digit level between 1969 and 2008. Sectoral shares are in percentages. 
The unbalanced panel has 2369 observations (country-year). The ILO dataset reports 
employment in different classifications: some countries use the ISIC-revision 2, others 
moved to ISIC-revisions 3 and 4 in recent years, and some are using their own national 
classification. Employment data in the more disaggregated ISICrev3 and ISICrev4 were 
aggregated to ISICrev2, following Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), Timmer and de Vries 
(2008) and McMillan and Rodrik (2011). If a country reports two revisions, the lower 
one is used. Official estimates are preferred over labour surveys. Data not following 
ISIC conventions are dropped. Table B-7 shows the concordance between ISICrev3 and 
ISICrev2. 
ILO data sometimes have sudden big changes in numbers in certain sectors, as countries 
occasionally change their calculation method even if the same classification/revision is 
used. This is taken into consideration in this study, by dropping the observations that 
report these sudden changes, making the panel more harmonised.  
Our alternative data source is UNIDO, which covers manufacturing activities only at the 
3-digit level of disaggregation (the main 23 industrial sectors) between 1963 and 2010 
(INDSTAT2). (INDSTAT4 disaggregates to 4-digit level but only goes back to 1985). 
The UNIDO dataset is consistent over the years and did not need adjustment. The 
unbalanced panel has 3564 employment observations (country-year). 
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Table B-7: different classifications between ISIC revisions 2 and 3* 
ISIC-Revision 2  ISIC-Revision 3 Equivalent 
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
B. Fishing 
6. Wholesale and retail trade and restaurants 
and hotels 
 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods 
H. Hotels and restaurants 
8. Financing, insurance, real estate and 
business services 
J. Financial intermediation 
K. Real estate, renting and business activities 
9. Community, social and personal services 
 
L. Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 
M. Education 
N. Health and social work 
O. Other community, social and personal 
service activities 
P. Households with employed persons 
* McMillan and Rodrik (2011) and Timmer and de Vries (2008) 
 
Export data  
Export data are from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), which is a 
collaboration between the World Bank and the United Nations Conference of Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). The export data covers 133 countries. Data is selected in 
SITC-1-digit aggregation containing the main 10 trade sectors. Values are reported in 
constant 1000 USD, with base year 2000. The unbalanced panel has 4575 observations 
(country-year). The WITS data values are consistent over the years and did not need any 
adjustment.  
 
 
	   175 
	  
Diversification indicators  
Computing these measures is done through Stata.27 
Table B-8: The main differences between the chosen concentration measures28 	  
Index Distance 
Concept 
Decomposable? Independence of input scale 
and population size? 
Range in 
interval [0,1]? 
Gini 
 
 
Depends on rank 
ordering 
No Yes Yes 
Theil 
 
 
Proportional  Yes Yes No 
HHI 
 
 
Absolute 
differences 
Yes No: decreases with population Yes: but 
min>0 
 
We calculate diversity for all sectors and for all non-resource sectors. Specifically, in 
the ILO data, we exclude “mining and quarrying,” and in the WITS exports data we 
exclude “crude material, inedible, except fuels,” “mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials” and “commodities not classified according to kind.” The UNIDO data does 
not cover resource sectors at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Azevedo, João Pedro, (2007), AINEQUAL: Stata module to compute measures of inequality. 
28 Cowell (2011). 
	   176 
	  
 Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter 4  
 
Table C-1: Number of years (from 1962 to 2003) with one or more giant oilfield 
discoveries, by country (treatment countries) 
Country Years Country Years Country Years 
Former USSR 29 India 5 Albania 1 
Iran 24 Algeria 4 Azerbaijan 1 
Saudi Arabia 24 Argentina 4 Bangladesh 1 
Australia 18 Colombia 4 Cote d'Ivoire 1 
Nigeria 17 Congo, Rep. 4 Denmark 1 
China 16 Kuwait 4 Ecuador 1 
United States 16 Qatar 4 Equatorial Guinea 1 
Norway 15 Peru 3 France 1 
Indonesia 14 Thailand 3 Gabon 1 
Brazil 13 Tunisia 3 Germany 1 
United Arab Emirates 12 Bolivia 2 Hungary 1 
United Kingdom 12 Brunei Darussalam 2 Morocco 1 
Iraq 11 Italy 2 Namibia 1 
Libya 11 Kazakhstan 2 New Zealand 1 
Mexico 10 Myanmar 2 Papua New Guinea 1 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 8 Netherlands 2 Philippines 1 
Oman 8 Pakistan 2 Romania 1 
Angola 7 Sudan 2 Russia 1 
Canada 7 Trinidad & Tobago 2 Spain 1 
Malaysia 6 Vietnam 2 Turkmenistan 1 
Venezuela 6 Yemen 2 
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Table C-2: Manufacturing ISIC 2-digit industries from INDSTAT2-UNIDO 
ISIC 
code 
Industrial sectors Exportability 1  
index 
Exportability 2 
index 15 Food and beverages 1 0 
16 Tobacco products 0 0 
17 Textiles 1 0 
18 Wearing apparel 1 0 
19 Leather products and footwear 1 0 
20 Wood products except furniture 1 0 
21 Paper and paper products 0 0 
22 Printing and publishing 0 0 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 1 0 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 1 0 
25 Rubber and plastics products 0 0 
26 Non-metallic mineral products 0 0 
27 Basic metals 1 0 
28 Fabricated metal products 0 0 
29 Machinery and equipment 1 1 
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 1 1 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus 0 1 
32 Radio, television and communication equipment 0 1 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 1 1 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1 1 
35 Other transport equipment 1 1 
36 Furniture 0 0 
37 Recycling  0 0 
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Table C-3: Real exchange rate appreciation, oil discoveries and oil rents as a share 
of GDP 
 Dependent variable is:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RER appreciation 
RER 
appreciation 
RER 
appreciation 
RER 
appreciation Oil rent 
RER 
appreciation 
Oil discovery -0.026***      
 (0.006)      
Oil discovery 
(t+5) 
 -0.011**     
  (0.004)     
Oil discovery 
(t+8)  
  0.012***  2.6e+09***  
   (0.005)  (3.0e+08)  
Oil rent    0.000***   
    (0.000)   
Boom       1.145*** 
      (0.013) 
Bust      0.869*** 
      (0.012) 
Valley       0.985*** 
      (0.013) 
Observations 148994 157757 57684 44735 66746 187542 
R2 0.65 0.63 0.68 0.61 0.62 0.60 
Notes: all regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Regressions (3) and (5) 
control for past discoveries: the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. Oil rent data is from the World 
Bank.   
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Table C-4: The impact of oil boom and bust on manufacturing outputs, including 
all oil countries in the dataset (oil-producing net importers included) 	  
 Value added Employment Wages 
 All   
Interacted* 
Exp index 1 
Interacted* 
Exp index 2 
 All 
Interacted* 
Exp index 1 
Interacted* 
Exp index 2 
 All 
Interacted* 
Exp index 1 
Interacted* 
Exp index 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Boom -0.201*** 0.007 -0.001 -0.070*** 0.010** 0.013** -0.182*** 0.013** 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) 
Bust 0.026** -0.017* -0.016 -0.064*** 0.002 -0.011 -0.003 0.003 -0.014 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
Valley -0.060*** -0.008 -0.018 -0.075*** 0.000 -0.015* -0.070*** 0.003 -0.024** 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) 
Industry 
share   
(t-2) 
-0.532*** -0.532*** -0.530*** -0.320*** -0.318*** -0.318*** -0.331*** -0.329*** -0.328*** 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Obs 59319 59319 59319 67251 67251 67251 60861 60861 60861 
R2 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.089 0.089 0.089 
 
Notes: all regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Exportability index (1) is 
a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if an industry’s ratio of exports to value added is greater than the median value 
and is 0 otherwise, from Rajan and Subramanian (2011). Exportability index (2) is a dummy that takes on a value of 
1 for ISIC industries 15-21, and is 0 otherwise (author calculation). This table repeats Table 4-9 but we add Albania, 
Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico and the United States in the regression, in addition to the countries 
included in the main regression shown in Table 4-9. 
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Table C-5: The impact of oil boom and bust on manufacturing outputs, breaking 
up the 2000’s oil boom into two booms: boom3, 2002-2007; and boom4, 2009-2012 	  
 Value added Employment Wages 
 All   
Interacted  
* 
Exp index  
1 
Interacted  
* 
Exp index  
2 
All   
Interacted
* 
Exp index 
1 
Interacted
* 
Exp index 
2 
All   
Interacted
* 
Exp index 
1 
Interacted
* 
Exp index 
2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Boom3 -0.064 -0.001 -0.049 -0.080** -0.060*** -0.008 0.062 -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.051) (0.034) (0.049) (0.033) (0.022) (0.031) (0.052) (0.030) (0.039) 
Boom4 -0.088 0.012 0.028 -0.170*** 0.008 0.050 -0.143** 0.037 0.061 
 (0.070) (0.073) (0.109) (0.060) (0.060) (0.065) (0.061) (0.053) (0.071) 
Bust -0.128*** -0.031 -0.080* -0.111*** -0.014 -0.017 -0.141*** -0.011 -0.059 
 (0.048) (0.030) (0.042) (0.031) (0.017) (0.024) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) 
Valley -0.088 0.020 0.005 -0.102*** -0.012 -0.004 -0.059 -0.014 -0.019 
 (0.058) (0.031) (0.050) (0.037) (0.018) (0.028) (0.046) (0.023) (0.033) 
Industry 
share      
(t-2) 
-0.388*** -0.371*** -0.388*** -0.411*** -0.416*** -0.412*** -0.326*** -0.322*** -0.325*** 
(0.094) (0.091) (0.094) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) 
Obs 7680 7680 7680 8046 8046 8046 7709 7709 7709 
R2 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.089 0.089 0.090 
 
Notes: all regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Exportability index (1) is 
a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if an industry’s ratio of exports to value added is greater than the median value 
and is 0 otherwise, from Rajan and Subramanian (2011). Exportability index (2) is a dummy that takes on a value of 
1 for ISIC industries 15-21, and is 0 otherwise (author calculation).    
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 Table C-6: Oil discovery and the tradable industries, instrumenting the discovery 
variables following Cotet and Tsui (2013) 
Outcome in year: (1) (2) 
Panel A. Value added (t+5)   
Discovery*exportability 1 -0.121  
 (0.270)  
Discovery*exportability 2  -0.647 
  (0.844) 
Past discoveries 0.009 0.017 
 (0.017) (0.021) 
Manufacturing share (t-1) 0.162** 0.177** 
 (0.076) (0.079) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 25.88 17.75 
Stock-yogo critical value 16.38/5.53 16.38/5.53 
Observations 12416 12416 
R2 0.046 -0.019 
   Panel B. Employment (t+5)   
Discovery*exportability 1 -0.894  
 (2.189)  
Discovery*exportability 2  -3.140 
  (7.252) 
Past discoveries 0.051 0.075 
 (0.129) (0.178) 
Manufacturing share (t-1) -0.290** -0.116 
 (0.119) (0.293) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 0.288 0.313 
Stock-yogo critical value 16.38/5.53 16.38/5.53 
Observations 53060 53060 
R2 -0.330 -2.204 
   Panel C. Wages (t+10)   
Discovery*exportability 1 0.173  
 (0.222)  
Discovery*exportability 2  -0.489 
  (0.878) 
Past discoveries -0.008 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.019) 
Manufacturing share (t-1) -0.232*** -0.213*** 
 (0.031) (0.059) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 27.70 1.303 
Stock-yogo critical value 16.38/5.53 16.38/5.53 
Observations 44370 44370 
R2 0.045 0.022 
Notes: All regressions controls for the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1, and country, industry and 
year fixed effects. Instrumental variable is the log (oil reserves per capita) and its interaction with exportability 
indices 1 and 2 for instrumenting the interaction term (Discovery*Exportability 1&2). Data sources: manufacturing 
employment is from UNIDO, and the instrument is from Cotet and Tsui (2013). Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table C-7: Oil discovery and the tradable industries using nominal figures for 
value added and wages 
Outcome in year: j=0 j=5 j=10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Value Added        
Oil discovery (t+j)  0.003 -0.007   -0.018***   
 (0.007) (0.007)   (0.007)   
Oil discovery (t+j) 
*Exportability index (1)   -0.009   -0.015  
   (0.009)   (0.009)  
Oil discovery (t+j) 
*Exportability index (2)    -0.006   -0.014 
    (0.014)   (0.014) 
Past giant discoveries 
(t-10) 0.002 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry share (t-1) -0.532*** -1.057*** -1.062*** -1.061*** -1.067*** -1.072*** -1.071*** 
 (0.044) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) 
Observations 49481 56416 56416 56416 55908 55908 55908 
R2 0.065 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 
        
Panel B: Wages        
Oil discovery (t+j)  0.004 -0.003   -0.023***   
 (0.006) (0.006)   (0.006)   
Oil discovery (t+j) 
*Exportability index (1)   0.001   -0.023***  
   (0.007)   (0.008)  
Oil discovery (t+j) 
*Exportability index (2)    0.002   -0.023* 
    (0.011)   (0.012) 
Past giant discoveries 
(t-10) 0.002 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry share (t-1) -0.433*** -0.508*** -0.508*** -0.508*** -0.585*** -0.598*** -0.597*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Observations 50577 57503 57503 57503 56259 56259 56259 
R2 0.080 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.073 0.073 
 
Notes: All regressions control for the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1, and country, industry and 
year fixed effects. Data sources: manufacturing employment is from UNIDO, INDSTAT2 database. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table C-8: Oil discovery and the tradable industries using INDSTAT4 database 
from UNIDO at the 4-digit level of manufacturing 
Outcome in year: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Value added (t+5)     
Oil discovery 0.005    
 (0.016)    
Oil discovery (t+5)   -0.011   
  (0.015)   
Oil discovery (t+5) *Exportability index (1)   0.000  
   (0.021)  
Oil discovery (t+5) *Exportability index (2)    -0.032 
    (0.034) 
Past discoveries (t-10) 0.023** 0.016** 0.015* 0.016** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Manufacturing share (t-1) -0.185 -0.430** -0.431** -0.431** 
 (0.226) (0.209) (0.210) (0.209) 
Observations 19061 30248 30248 30248 
R2 0.046 0.042 0.042 0.042 
     
Panel B. Employment (t+5)     
Oil discovery (t+5)  0.003    
 (0.011)    
Oil discovery (t+5)   -0.018*   
  (0.010)   
Oil discovery (t+5) *Exportability index (1)   -0.006  
   (0.014)  
Oil discovery (t+5) *Exportability index (2)    -0.028 
    (0.023) 
Past discoveries (t-10) 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Manufacturing share (t-1) 0.197 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 (0.196) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) 
Observations 22512 34442 34442 34442 
R2 0.048 0.041 0.041 0.041 
     
Panel B. Wages (t+10)     
Oil discovery (t+5)  -0.011    
 (0.012)    
Oil discovery (t+10)   -0.021*   
  (0.012)   
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Oil discovery (t+10) *Exportability index (1)   -0.015  
   (0.018)  
Oil discovery (t+10) *Exportability index (2)    -0.034 
    (0.025) 
Past discoveries (t-10) 0.018*** 0.011* 0.010 0.010 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Manufacturing share (t-1) 0.099 0.065 0.065 0.065 
 (0.170) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) 
Observations 30892 29568 29568 29568 
R2 0.061 0.064 0.064 0.064 
Notes: All regressions control for the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1, and country, industry and 
year fixed effects. Data sources: manufacturing employment is from UNIDO, INDSTAT4 database. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
